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Abstract 
Supra -national and municipal courts are increasingly involved in determining the 
parameters of European states' refugee and asylum policy. Yet, little attention has been 
paid to how and why governments choose to comply with judicial decisions which 
constrain their policy goals. In the UK, judicial oversight of asylum control has 
occasionally met with outspoken political opposition, which has even challenged the 
legitimacy of judicial scrutiny. Nevertheless, `compliance' typically follows. This 
makes it all the more important to consider how and why judicial decisions on the 
lawfulness of asylum and deportation controls do nevertheless impact upon policy 
change and its justification by government. 
To identify key mechanisms which condition the impact of judicial decisions on the 
politics and policies of asylum control, this thesis presents comparative qualitative case 
study research into UK government responses to European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) and municipal court rulings which concern deportation and asylum control 
policies. Comparative consideration is given to significance attached by governments to 
the source of the ruling (UK / ECtHR) and whether compliance was politically 
contested. Politicisation and domestic rulings are each expected to allow greater 
governmental opposition to judicial impact on policy goals. To capture variation, my 
analysis differentiates judicial impact on two typological planes: governmental response 
and the level of generality of governing ideas 'at stake' therein. This mobilises the 
explanatory potential of governmental framings of `the problem' of compliance, in 
terms of how constraining it is perceived to be; whether removing a policy instrument 
which can be readily replaced, challenging the continuity of underlying programmatic 
logics, or even the guiding public philosophy informing deportation and asylum control. 
Where more general governing ideas are at stake, governmental responses can be 
expected to reflect opposition to judicial impact. 
Critical framing analysis of the government's discursive response is applied to four key 
cases, ranging from 1990 to 2012. Framing is presented as a necessarily observable 
process through which judicial impact is manifest within government, and can be 
traced. Specifically, I analyse how the 'problem' of compliance and its policy impact 
are framed in political rhetoric which responds to the courts and in documents through 
ííí 
which government interprets and inscribes the meaning and implementation of judicial 
decisions. My findings suggest that whilst governance of asylum and deportation in the 
UK may labour under a judicial shadow, this has not precluded legal risk taking and 
efforts to `contain' the impact of individual rulings on the viability of the overarching 
policy regime. By identifying the role of governing ideas `at stake' in governmental 
framings of judicial impact, I argue that it is possible to account for varying political 
responses to the courts, including politicisation of compliance. Where impact is framed 
as more general, politicisation of compliance follows. In contrast, the source of the 
ruling appears to have no independent significance to responses. The importance of a 
distinction between judicial impact on justificatory political rhetoric and the practice of 
administrative compliance is also reinforced. 
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1. Introduction: the politics, 
administration and judicial scrutiny of 
asylum control in the UK. 
Introduction 
Subject of the thesis 
Over the past twenty -five years, provision of asylum to refugees fleeing persecution has 
become an issue of great political importance. Supra -national and municipal courts are 
also increasingly involved in determining the parameters of European states' refugee 
and asylum policy. Judicial decisions have concernednot only whether particular 
individuals should be granted protection from persecution (i.e. asylum), but also the 
boundaries of political discretion over asylum control and constitutional debates on the 
role of foreign nationals' human rights. Yet, little attention has been paid to how and 
why governments choose to comply with judicial decisions which constrain their policy 
goals. In the UK, extensive judicial oversight of asylum control has occasionally met 
with outspoken political opposition, which has even challenged the legitimacy of 
judicial scrutiny. Some commentators have branded the issue "a potentially fatal fault 
line in the constitution "(Cavendish, 2006, p. 21; see also, Rozenberg, 1997). 
Nevertheless, `compliance' typically follows even unwelcomejudicial decisions. This 
makes it all the more important to consider how and why judicial decisions on the 
lawfulness of asylum controls and deportation do nevertheless impact upon policy 
change and its justification by government. 
This thesis investigates the impact of judicial decisions from the UK municipal courts 
and European Court of Human Rights on reformulation of deportation and asylum 
control policies in the UK over a period of twenty -two years, between 1990 and 2012. 
Interrogating governmental responses to the courts, I seek to identify and understand the 
significance of factors which shape governmental attitudes towards compliance, 
associated changes to asylum control policies and their political justification.Although 
their influence has hitherto been dismissed as negligible (Joppke, 1998b, 1999) or 
politically contested (Rawlings, 2005), prima facie it seems clear that the courts have 
indeed influencedchanges to asylum control policies. However, I will argue in this 
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thesis that the judiciary does not exercise a straightforward `constraint' on policies and 
their implementation. Necessary attention must be given to the significant governmental 
discretion exercised in determining the meaning, significance and impact of particular 
judicial decisions on asylum control. 
Structure of this chapter 
In this chapter, I begin by setting out the potential insights to be gained from the study 
of judicial impact on asylum control in the UK. I then introduce asylum control in the 
UK according to three integral facets: the politics of asylum control, its administrative 
culture, and the rise of judicial scrutiny. Introducing the topic in this manner allows me 
to subsequently summarise the fundamental governing ideas which have underpinned 
asylum control during the period under review. This delineation of `governing ideas' 
will inform subsequent consideration of judicial impact on governance of asylum 
throughout the thesis. I close the chapter by briefly summarising my approach to the 
study of judicial impact on asylum control andthe structure of the remainder of the 
thesis. 
Why this topic warrants investigation 
Accounting for reluctant compliance 
This thesis is motivated firstly by an empirical problem. There has been a seemingly 
paradoxical tendency of governments towards hard political rhetoric condemning 
certain judicial decisions as unwarranted or illegitimate, yet almost unfailing 
compliance with the courts in practice. In seeking to interrogate the relationship 
between such rhetoric and policy change, I build on interpretive approaches to the role 
of ideas in policy governance to address a related theoretical problem: there is a 
surprising lack of insight into how and why governments enact reluctant policy change, 
particularly in response to the courts.Migration scholars tend to accept a particularly 
significant role for the courts in constraining otherwise illiberal migration controls, 
although this function has not been regarded as particularly strong in the UK. Much has 
been said in broader political science on conditions under which governments may 
reject, accept or even welcome judicial input in policy making (Davis, 2010; Rosenberg, 
2008; Shapiro & Stone Sweet, 2002; Silverstein, 2009; Stone Sweet, 2000). There is an 
even larger, somewhat sceptical literature on judicial impact on bureaucratic behaviour 
(summarised by Canon & Johnson, 1999; Hertogh & Halliday, 2004a; Richardson, 
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2004). Yet these existing approaches are not particularly instructive in cases of 
`reluctantpolicy change.' 
In order to better understand this specific, yet seemingly common phenomenon, I 
embrace a broad synthesis of approaches to the study of judicial impact, policy change, 
and the politics of immigration and asylum, to develop a plausible theoretical model for 
interrogating variation in the impact of the courts on changes to asylum control policy 
in the UK and its political framing. By investigating judicial impact on asylum control 
from the perspective of the respondent government, important empirical insight can be 
brought to bear in addressing a gap in understanding as to how and why compliance 
appears to follow the courts in almost all cases (Hertogh & Halliday, 2004a). 
In particular, the curious disconnect between rhetoric opposing judicial constraints and 
the practice of compliance makes asylum control in the UK an unusual and potentially 
illustrative case study. Investigation of this `disconnect' between what governments say 
and what they do may provide significant insights into both the politics of asylum 
control and governmental attitudes towards the judiciary and rule of law. Attending to 
the reception and reaction to judicial decisions within government allows for 
consideration of the political forces which shape legal outcomes, whilst also considering 
the role played in political outcomes by law. As such, this thesis contributes to a number 
of existing academic debates: onthe possible distinctiveness of executive attitudes to the 
rule of law (Daintith & Page, 1999); the role of political interpretation in 
government(Baachi, 2009; D. Stone, 2002; Zittoun, 2009);and their functionas 
determinants of judicial decisions' impact on policy change. My approach also 
comprises a rare 'interpretivist'contribution to ongoing debates in migration studies 
about the role of courts in constraining illiberal restrictions on immigration and 
asylum(Bonjour, 2011; Guiraudon, 2000; Hollifield, 1992; Joppke & Marzal, 2004; 
Joppke, 1998a, 1999, 2001; Kawar, 2012; Thomas, 2003, 2013). 
Potential insights from studying asylum control in the UK 
The UK also makes for a compelling case study of judicial impact on policy change for 
a number of other theoretical and methodological reasons. I wish to briefly emphasise 
some of these distinctive characteristics of the politics of asylum control and judicial 
review in the UK. I will then return to locate my researchwithin this context in more 
detail below. 
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Over the duration of the period studied in this thesis (1990- 2012), the British 
public,media, and successive governments and opposition political parties, have been 
consistently supportive of restrictions on immigration and asylum(Harvey, 2000; 
Jennings, 2010; L. Morris, 2010).This may suggest possible governmental intransigence 
towards implementation of court rulings which impede restrictions, making asylum 
control in the UK a possible `hard case'(Eckstein, 1975)in which to find a constraining 
judicial impact on policy change. This assessment is also supported by the 
comparatively `weak' form of judicial review in the UK: the British judiciary cannot 
`strike down' unlawful policies and depends on the executive and parliament to initiate 
reforms in line with its rulings. Indeed, this constitutional fact of government in the UK 
emphasises the general importance of considering the role of political processes 
involved in determining judicial impact - for rulings of both municipal and 
supranational courts. 
Asylum control in the UK is also an important case for studying how governments 
respond to unwelcome judicial pressure for reform. Immigration and asylum contribute 
a sizeable majority of the UK senior courts' growing case load, and are regularly 
considered the ECtHR, resulting in a particularly large volume of `adverse' rulings 
against UK governments (see figures 3 -5 in appendix 1). On a practical level, this 
renders asylum conducive to empirical analysis of possible variation in judicial impact. 
However, asylum control is also a particularly interesting case. It is perhaps uniquely 
bound by a tension between discretionary political authority over individuals and the 
potential activation of extensive legal and human rights constraints on the exercise of 
such powers. Sustained judicial oversight has been transformative of asylum in the UK: 
from a subsidiary of immigration policy into a fully- fledged institution which is subject 
to strong judicial oversight, extensive procedural safeguards and human rights 
guarantees. This process of transformation can be traced from its initiation to fruition in 
the space of only twenty -five years - by analysis of a handful of landmark judicial 
rulings. 
My investigation of judicial impact on policy change focuses particularly on deportation 
and removal, as well as policy alternatives pursued where such expulsion is precluded 
by jurisprudential constraints. Judicial oversight has been particularly impactful in this 
area of immigration and asylum control. A freedom of information request by The 
Guardian newspaper revealed that between 2007 and 2012, 22,079 removal orders and 
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1,450 deportation orders were cancelled due to successful judicial challenges. In 2012, 
18% of enforced removals were ruled unlawful, and as many as 50% of all removal 
orders were cancelled (Taylor, 2013). These figures suggest that deportation and 
removal areboth a significant and normatively important case for investigation of 
judicial constraints on state power over the individual. Courts are often a last resort for 
extremely vulnerable foreign nationals seeking protection, over whose fate the state 
exercises a very high degree of discretionary power, with potential life and death 
consequences. 
Asylum control in the UK 
Having briefly introduced the topic of the thesis and its intended added value, I now 
wish to locate it within the broader context of the politics, administration and judicial 
review of asylum control in the UK, over recent decades. Besides providing a necessary 
introduction to the topic, this overview also concludes by summarising and specifying 
consistent trends and governing ideas which have underpinned asylum control in the 
UK. This overview is therefore intended tofacilitatesubsequent chapters' interrogation 
of how asylum control has been impacted upon by the courts. 
The restrictive politics and policies of asylum control 
From 1990 to 2012, the period studied in this thesis, between eighteen and eighty -five 
thousand applications were made per year for asylum in the UK. These individuals 
sought protection from "fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion" in their home 
state (UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951, Art. 1.A(2)).As can be 
seen in figure one in appendix one, a large proportion of applications are unsuccessful. 
Someof those who fail to qualify as refugees are awarded humanitarian protection or 
other forms of leave in accordance with the ECHR. Ultimately, both refugee status and 
humanitarian protection are awarded at the discretion of the state. Yet the right to seek 
asylum and international protection are reinforced not only by international refugee law 
and its implementation in British law, but also by a plethora of human rights guarantees 
which are upheld by the courts - particularly the prohibition on removal of an 
individual to a prospect of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (ECHRArt.3; 
United Nations Convention Against Torture 1984, Art.3(1); International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights1966: Art.7).Given this cocktail of state discretion and rights 
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protections which characterise asylum, it is perhaps little surprise that its award, refusal 
and withdrawal have become subject to frequent judicial review. However, UK asylum 
controls are also characterised by a growing regime of restrictive policies. 
Attitudes to asylum control in the UK 
Notwithstanding its grounding in refugee and human rights law,in the UK, asylum has 
been persistently and overwhelmingly conflated with immigration control (Joppke, 
1999, p. 128). Until 1993, there was no distinction in British law between immigration 
and asylum policy, which was handled under the Immigration Act 1971 and non - 
statutory immigration rules (Macdonald & Blake, 1991). There was no opportunity to 
appeal initial decisions by the immigration authorities from within the UK - resulting in 
possible refoulement. This historical legacy is still reflected institutionally: immigration 
and asylum share a bureaucracy, policy regime and government minister. The conflation 
has been sustained not only in public attitudes and media reporting (Baker et al., 2008; 
McLaren & Johnson, 2007, p. 728, at 7) but also in political discourse over several 
decades(Goodman & Speer, 2007; Layton -Henry, 2004). Politicians havefixated on 
"good migration" versus "mass migration" (Gower & Hawkins, 2013),including 
perceivedabuse of immigration controls by "bogus" asylum seekers (Home Office, 
2005, s.27; Menz, 2009, p. 155). 
As a consequence, the politics and administration of asylum have been dominated by a 
"rhetorical panic" over numbers, often at the expense of attention to effective 
administration, fairness or humanitarianism (Sanderson, 2011; Spencer, 2007, p. 341).A 
raft of restrictions on access to asylum has been motivated by a desire to demonstrate 
that the UK (or government of the day) is not a "soft touch ", and has the issue under 
control (Layton -Henry, 2004). That asylum has fallen within the purview of restrictive 
immigration control, clearly sets dominant public and political attitudes apart from the 
judiciary's more recent approach to asylum as a form of humanitarian protection, often 
involving complex consideration of individual human rights protections. 
Restrictive policies 
Reduction in asylum seekers and illegal entrants was a government policy as early as 
1985 (Cerna & Wietholtz, 2011, p. 212), and became an explicit political priority of 
Prime Minister Tony Blair, during a peak in applications in the early 2000s (Spencer, 
2007). Among a multitude of restrictions on access to asylum and its enjoyment within 
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the country, visa restrictions and `carrier sanctions' upon those transporting 
undocumented travellers have made legal arrival in the UK difficult (Gibney, 2004, p. 
123); implementation of the Dublin Regulation,requiringasylum to be claimed in the 
first European Union country of transit, has facilitated repulsion of asylum seekers to 
third countries (Lavenex, 1999; Noll, 2003); there has been a marked rise in expulsion 
of ̀ failed' asylum seekers (Gibney, 2008) and foreign nationals suspected of threatening 
national security or the public good(Hampshire, 2009; Paoletti, 2010); and successive 
waves of new legislation have sought to diminish rights of appeal against asylum 
determinations - although with mixed success (Rawlings, 2005). 
Particularly strong discretion to restrict migration was provided to the Home Office in 
the form of enhanced deportation powers by the Immigration Act /97 /(Joppke, 1 999), 
which was legislated in the wake of governmental pledges to end mass migration (Cerna 
& Wietholtz, 2011, p. 197). Whilst a commitment to zero -migration gave way to 
acceptance of economically beneficial "managed migration" (Home Office, 2002b) 
under the New Labour government of 1997 to 2010, this was accompanied by even 
stricter controls on unwanted migration, including asylum - driven in large part by a 
"race to the bottom" between political parties keen to capitalise on public unease ( Cerna 
& Wietholtz, 2011, p. 125; Somerville, 2007, p. 126). Governmentaldesire to be seen to 
be in control is indicated in the language of Home Office documents(1998, 2002b), 
party political manifestos (e.g. New Labour, 1997) and thesheer volume and frequency 
of legislation over the past twenty years: major immigration legislation was passed in 
1993, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2014. The role or function 
of the asylum tribunal system was also significantly restructured in 2003, 2005 and 
2010. In parallel to this legislative flurry, there has been ongoing adjustment of the 
immigration rules, which play a significant role in asylum control (Hansen, 2000), and 
have until recently been incorporated without parliamentary oversight. 
Indeed, there is technically no legal route of entry to the UK for those wishing to claim 
asylum on arrival -a consequence of strict pre -travel identity checks and visa controls 
which fail to adequately distinguish between irregular migrants and those seeking 
asylum from persecution. Even a modest annual quota allowing legal arrival of refugees 
recognised by the UNHCR as in grave need of resettlement has consistently not been 
met (Cooley & Rutter, 2007; Home Office, 2010, p. 30). Those who succeed in arriving 
in the UK to claim protection can be subject to detention in prison -like conditions; may 
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be forcibly relocated; are not allowed to work; are subject to restrictions on welfare 
support; and susceptible to destitution during often extended delays in initial decision 
making or while awaiting subsequent removal proceedings in the likely event that their 
application for asylum or humanitarian protection should be refused (Schuster, 2003). 
Put briefly, successive British governments (like many other OECD states), appear to 
have disregarded the expansive normative imperative issued by international refugee 
law, which calls for high standards of treatment for asylum seekers and refugees, the 
removal of barriers against the claim of asylum, and the enjoyment of procedural 
safeguards against expulsion to a real risk of ill- treatment (non -refoulement) (Hathaway, 
2005; Kneebone, 2009; O'Sullivan, 2009). 
Liberal paradox 
I do not wish to contest the prevalent observation that the politics and policies of asylum 
control in the UK are characterised by restrictions rather than expansive 
humanitarianism. I do, however, wish to argue that restrictions imposed upon asylum 
are not a consequence of governments acting outside of existing legal constraints.In this 
regard, I stand apart from claims made in critical security studies, that immigration and 
asylum control have lent themselves to government by exceptional measures, free from 
constraint by liberal values and institutions(Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998; 
Huysmans & Buonfino, 2008; Huysmans, 2006; c.f. Boswell, 2007a). Whilst arguably 
not consistent with the spirit of international refugee law, British asylum control 
policies are governed by the domestic incorporation of refugee law in national law 
(Kneebone, 2009). Although there is no supranational judicial body to monitor 
compliance with theRefugee Convention, the lawfulness of immigration and asylum 
controls is not only overseen by a national tribunal system, but has also dominated the 
case load of the British senior courts. 
Somewhat ironically, this frequent judicial barrier to expulsion has been considered a 
likely cause for increasingly restrictive barriers to entry. This has been termed a `liberal 
paradox': strong liberal protections on foreign nationals' rights once present on the 
territory of the state have led to illiberal restrictions to preclude access to these 
territorially bound protections (Gibney & Hansen, 2003). Such observations of illiberal 
responses to liberal values espoused by the courts at once recognise a role for judicial 
constraint and yet indicate a political willingness to circumnavigate its effects on state 
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capacity to control immigration and asylum. The observation of this paradox goes some 
way to problematizing the common tenet in academic literature on migration that courts 
have imposed a judicial constraint on illiberal immigration and asylum controls 
(notably, Hollifield, 1992; Joppke, 1998b, 1999, among many others). 
The rise of deportation 
Within the broad area of British asylum policy, this thesis pays much attention to 
removal and deportation measures as a compelling policy area for the investigation of 
judicial constraint. A common unifying factor between deportation and removals is the 
threat or use of force to expel individual non -citizens (Gibney, Anderson, & Paoletti, 
2011, p. 549). Expulsion of foreign nationals is perhaps the quintessential example of 
the state's coercive power over the individual: an "emphatic reaffirmation of state 
sovereignty itself' (De Genova & Peutz, 2010, p. 2). Deportation and removal are, 
however, distinct legal powers. If a person claiming asylum is not recognised to be a 
legitimate refugee, they may become subject to a removal order. Even recognised 
refugees, among other foreign nationals considered by the state to be a threat to the 
public good, may readily be subjected to a deportation order. Whilst removal orders are 
pursuant to the executive's prerogative over the entry of aliens, deportation is 
administratively initiated on the sole grounds of the Home Secretary's `reasonable 
suspicion' and `belief that a person's expulsion is conducive to `the public good' 
(Immigration Act 1971: s.3(5)(a)). In other words, this is policy area which is subject to 
an extremely high degree of political discretion. As removal proceedings have been 
shortened and rights of appeal "eroded almost to vanishing point ", the result has been a 
significant tendency to seek judicial review (Clayton, 2012, pp. 568, 588). 
Removals have always been an integral, if inconsistent and lacklustre tool of asylum 
control in the UK(see figure two in appendix one; Home Affairs Committee, 2003). 
Although long considered an impractical and potentially politically costly tool (Gibney 
& Hansen, 2003), there has been a doubling of those leaving the UK under a threat of 
removal or by its coercive implementation, between 1997 and 2009 (Gibney et al., 
2011, p. 550). This is consistent with a dramatic rise in many liberal states' threat and 
use of such coercive powers, which has been characterised as a remarkable "turn to 
deportation" (Gibney et al., 2011, p. 551; Gibney, 2008). In the UK, growth in 
deportation has partly been justified by concerns over what to do with foreign nationals 
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suspected of involvement in terrorism, particularly in political rhetoric (Gibney, 2008, 
p. 167; Paoletti, 2010, p. 21).Although Home Office statistics (see figure two in 
appendix one) indicate an inconsistent and partial record of implementation of removal 
orders, we may note Prime Minister Tony Blair's "tipping point target" (Blair, 2004) to 
remove more asylum seekers than apply each month. The willingness of the government 
to pursue such a coercive regime of large scale expulsion, even if only by issuing 
paperwork to foreign nationals, is highly significant in its indication of a willingness to 
coercively control inclusion and exclusion within the bounds of sovereign borders. 
Asylum control as a policy culture 
Having indicated the importance of political discretion as a defining attribute of UK 
asylum controls, it is also important to note its distinctive policy culture. The impact of 
a judicial decision will depend on how policy makers consider it alongside a complex 
matrix of other potentially conflicting pressures for attention. Many words have been 
used to describe this context, perhaps best evoked as an "administrative soup ", in which 
law competes with other influences.The discretion available to implementing actors (S. 
Halliday, 2004; Richardson, 2004, p. 127) and attitudes towards the law in general 
(Ewick & Silbey, 1998; Hertogh & Halliday, 2004b, p. 283) aretherefore vital 
considerations in understanding responses to the courts. However, we may do well to 
remember that such factors are not merely a cognitive facet of decision makers, but also 
derive from the context in which discretion is exercised. In this respect, the nature of 
asylum control in the UK as a policy domain is highly relevant to consideration of how 
policy decisions are determined, including how to respond to the courts. 
In practice, refugee law varies from state to state according to its domestic 
implementation (Kneebone, 2009). In the UK, administration of asylum control has 
been characterised as subject to "more or less unlimited discretion in its determination 
of who is a refugee and what rights they should be afforded." (Addo, 1994) This 
discretion has been enhanced by the particular strength of the executive under 
comparatively weak legislative and judicial oversight, and historic lack of an 
enforceable bill of rights (Hansen, 2000). Even after the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) 
came into effect in 2000, the significance of judicial scrutiny of how rights are 
impactedby immigration and asylum control has been contested (Cerna & Wietholtz, 
2011, p. 204; Statham & Geddes, 2006). As I will discuss further below, the boundaries 
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of executive discretion in immigration and asylum have become increasingly subject to 
judicial supervision. However, the culture of discretionary authority which has been 
observed in asylum control deserves consideration. Organisational orientations are often 
acknowledged as producing particular, "overall policy perspectives and approaches to 
problems, including how problems are defined - or denied - in the first place, thereby 
serving to shape the institutional agenda." (Dorey, 2005, p. 93) Such organisational 
perspectives and approaches to problemswill be of significance to subsequent 
interrogation of how the Home Office has responded to the courts (as the institution 
responsible for immigration and asylum policy). 
The organisational culture of the Home Office and associated agencies 
The importance of interrogating the Home Office's response to judicial decisions on a 
case by case basis is reinforced by a consensus among studies suggesting that it is an 
inherently unpredictable and reactive organisation. The Home Office, and the various 
historical incarnations of the Border Agency (UKBA), have generally been 
characterised as "muddling through "(Simon, 1957) a relentless stream of political (and 
legal) controversies, in a purely reactive fashion (Boswell, 2007a; Mulvey, 2010). 
Successive Home Secretaries have themselves characterised life in the department in 
just such as fashion: absorbing "punishments ",incurred as a result of "things coming out 
of the blue" (Blunkett, quoted in Pollard, 2005, p. 258); UKBA and its 
predecessors "often caught up in a vicious cycle of complex law and poor enforcement 
of its own policies..." (May, quoted in Travis, 2013b). UKBA's own documents openly 
characterise the law and practice of migration and asylum control as "complex" 
(UKBA, 2011, p. 11). This reflects the interdependency of asylum and other equally 
controversial political issues, such as national security, welfare, housing, education and 
the labour market, in addition to broad social and political values, such as 
humanitarianism, citizenship, and civic integration. However, the complexity of asylum 
control has often been cast by governments as a product of the large amount of case law 
flowing from the tribunal and courts. The judicial imposition of untenably "complex" 
and "increasingly ornate procedural requirements ", in the early 1990s (Clarke in HC 
Debate (02 Feb) 1992,c. 31 -32) was still being decried in 2012 as "anathema to good 
administration ", due to judicial "unpredictability and inconsistency" (May in HC 
Debate (23 Oct) 2012,c. 189). From the Home Office perspective, judicial scrutiny has 
been presented as frustrating determinacy of policy outcomes. 
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Attitudes to the rule of law 
Former Home Secretaries have described judicial decisions as requiring careful 
consideration of exactly how to comply (Clarke 2011) and legal advice as a 
"provisional" policy concern which is a "subject of debate" (Straw, 2010, pp. 25 -6). 
Studies of the Home Office's legal culture have observed a historical tendency to make 
decisions in isolation from the rest of government, and a propensity to take legal risks 
(Daintith & Page, 1999, p. 337; Kinley, 1993)- leaving the fine detail of legal questions 
to be determined only if and when a policy is "tested in the courts and we find there's a 
problem." (May, quoted in The Guardian, 2012b) This governing logic appears to have 
survived not only incorporation of the Human Rights Act as a primary consideration in 
policy making, but also attempts to centrally coordinate increased awareness of the role 
of judicial review and human rights during the tenure of New Labour in government 
(Daintith, 2001, p. 17; Treasury Solicitors, 2006). 
Discretion necessary to such risk taking in asylum control has been facilitated by 
recourse to non -legislated "rules of practice "(Cerna & Wietholtz, 2011, p. 204).Until 
recently, the Home Secretary was not bound by these rules. Further to this, the Home 
Office has a poor reputation for compliance with the asylum tribunal (Thomas, 2013) 
and has, on rare occasions, opted to expel asylum seekers in direct contravention of a 
court order (UKHL 1994; Taylor, 2012). The particularly high rate of appeals against 
initial asylum decisions is also, arguably, illustrative of a sustained function of the 
courts in curtailing distinctive executive interpretations of legality (figure three in 
appendix one indicates the growing proportion of immigration and asylum applications 
to the High Court for review). 
Observation of a strong will to executive discretion is consistent with how the Home 
Office has been characterised by comparative studies of the institutions of British 
government: subject to a departmental philosophy oriented around the balancing of 
liberty and security (Marsh, Richards et al. 2001: Ch.4). Discretion is a fundamental 
prerequisite to exercising authority over such a balance. Such a balancing act is also 
likely to be at odds with potential judicial invocation of the primacy rights and 
procedural justice, ipso facto. Where judicial decisions are interpreted by implementing 
actors as disruptive to a much laboured state of equilibrium between liberty and 
security, or discretion and constraint, compliance may be problematic, likely 
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engendering resistance to policy change. Intransigence may be particularly likely where 
the legitimacy of such an executive balancing act is brought into question. Where 
judicial decisions are interpreted as requiring a rebalancing of equilibrium between 
liberty and security, compliance may prove more likely. Such compliant changes may 
develop incrementally in response to rising pressure for policy change over the course 
of several run -ins with the courts, which serve to both elaborate and specify legal 
principles involved in a policy area, and also to heighten awareness of judicial scrutiny 
among other political actors within the policy community. Compliance with cases 
where the core goals of a policy are challenged is likely to be more controversial due to 
the implied difficulties in merely adjusting rules in response to the court. 
Disparity between discretion and control 
In general, studies of public policy consider the characteristic conditions of asylum 
control (complexity, ambiguity and potential for conflict) as tending to enhance the role 
of interpretation and discretion in implementation of policy change (Matland, 1995). 
Yet this discretion has not manifested itself in the form of demonstrable control over the 
outcomes of the administration of asylum. The UKBA and its predecessors have clearly 
not functioned as an output oriented organisation. It has consistently failed, over 
decades of administration, to meet targets for both the determination of initial asylum 
applications and removal of failed applicants. This has led to highly controversial 
backlogs of unresolved cases, at times in excess of 400,000 (Home Affairs Committee, 
2003, 2011). The litany of condemnation the organisation has faced from within 
government is quite unprecedented: unfit for purpose(Reid in BBC News Online, 
2006e); lacking shared understanding between policy makers and implementing actors 
(Independent Chief Inspector of the UKBA, 2012); a dehumanizing, "closed, secretive 
and defensive" organisation incapable of reform (Home Affairs Committee, in Taylor & 
Muir, 2010; May, in Travis, 2013b). One may readily observe that for the Border 
Agency, asylum has been beyond its effective control. Legitimation of its function at 
times of organisational crisis has typically depended upon its seemingly continuous 
reconfiguration and re- branding, most recently in 2013 with the outright abolition of 
UKBA as an independent agency. Yet, plus ca change... Even as the Home Secretary 
announced the abolition of UKBA, her Permanent Secretary reportedly reassured Home 
Office staff in an internal memo: "Most of us will still be doing the same job in the 
same place with the same colleagues for the same boss and with the same mission." 
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(Travis, 2013a)Multiple historic changes to the organisational structure of theBorder 
Agency do not appear to have resulted in changes to its organisational culture. 
The recognised difficulties which the government faces in exercising demonstrable 
authority and control over asylum may bring uncomfortable attention to its bureaucratic 
decision making. Yet the politics of asylum has focused all the more on pledging 
demonstrable capacity. Such political rhetoric, along with the continual restructuring of 
the agency, may say much as to the importance of symbolic attempts to legitimate 
command over a policy domain which is considered not only out of control, but 
arguably beyond effective control. Responding to outside pressure, particularly from the 
public and media, to justify policies and their implementation continues to be a 
fundamental aspect of this process (Boswell, Geddes, & Scholten, 2011, p. 7). In this 
regard, when it comes to the governance of asylum control in general, and responding to 
the courts in particular,how policy change is transacted matters just as much as the 
substantive end result of that change. This is due in large part to the importance of 
public justification of change. Indeed, the articulation and justification of this change is 
perhaps one of the fundamental and instructive outputs of the process. As such, it is the 
primary of this thesis. 
Judicial review in the UK 
I now turn to the third and final thread which I present by way of an overview of the 
main factors which characterise the governance of asylum control in the UK: the role 
played by judicial review. In doing so, I will briefly summarise the nature and scope of 
judicial review in the UK, before turning to the particular significance of the courts to 
asylum control. 
Judicial review and impact on policy change 
In parallel to a rise in restrictive asylum controls over the past thirty years, there has 
been a dramatic growth in the scope and extent of judicial review in administrative law. 
Judicial confidence became increasingly emboldened in this period, extending the 
traditional role of judicial review from protecting the individual against abuse of 
governmental power towards a more expansive targeting of the exercise of executive 
discretion (Rawlings & Harlow, 2009, p. 98). This emboldening of judicial power 
developed in line with an extensive elaboration of administrative law; the UK's 
accession to the European Community; growth in the importance of European human 
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rights law, and its eventual domestic incorporation by the Human Rights Act. Asylum, 
in particular, comprised an area of governmental discretion over which the judiciary had 
deferred all oversight until this surge of judicial confidence in the 1980s. 
The potential for a judicial decision to impact upon policy change is largely a product of 
the court's consideration of the legality of legislative provisions, operational guidelines 
and practices of implementing actors, and so is not tied to the particular outcome of a 
given case for the litigant. Judicial review is, however, limited to the issues raised in the 
specific case under consideration. Judicial review in the British courts has traditionally 
been limited to three grounds for challenging a decision of a government actor: 
illegality, irrationality (unreasonableness), and procedural impropriety (Stevens, 2004, 
p. 316). To these, we may add the more recent grounds provided by the Human Rights 
Act(HRA), which, since taking effect in 2000, has provided for review of the 
proportionality of decisions impacting upon specified civil and political rights (largely a 
domestic implementation of the ECHR in UK law), assessing justification for 
interference of a right in terms of the importance of the right interfered with. The HRA 
has also empowered the judiciary to consider whether statutory provisions comply with 
the UK's obligations under the ECHR, and to issue a declaration of incompatibility 
where the court cannot read the statute as compliant. 
The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty means that the courts cannot quash 
legislative provisions, whether found unlawful under common law or human rights law 
(Jones, Kavanagh, & Moran, 2007, pp. 597 -8). However both parliament and the 
executive must consider whether to change the law in such a way as to bring it into line 
with the courts' interpretation of human rights requirements (HRA 1998, ss. 4, 10). 
Rulings cannot directly impact upon the continued implementation of policy, and 
require political actors to implement their content via reforms to statute (Kavanagh, 
2009, p. 5). Similarly, rulings from the European Court of Human Rights require 
political action to implement them. Changes to policy or statute are therefore by no 
means guaranteed. A minister "may" order amendments "as he considers necessary to 
remove the incompatibility" (HRA 1998, s.10), but is not compelled to act, although 
parliament may press the issue (Davis, 2010, p. 91). 
The role of the HRA as a point of reference in policy making is consistent with 
observations elsewhere that politics is becoming generally subject to careful 
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justification of decision making in terms of legal principles (see e.g. Jasanoff, 1995; 
Shapiro & Stone Sweet, 2002; Stone Sweet, 2000).Through the HRA, courts have been 
politically empowered to become implicated in policy making, and exert a strong 
normative authority and pressure upon parliament and the executive to reform 
legislation. Yet, as rulings may be subject to legislative overrule, the UK comprises a 
case of comparatively "weak" judicial review (Tushnet, 2003). Ultimately, rulings of 
the British judiciary could be sceptically regarded as little more than strong and 
authoritative advice which is hard to ignore.Whilst the HRA (along with other legal 
regimes, notably under membership of the European Union) may have transformed the 
legal and political landscape of the UK, the traditional role of the judiciary has remained 
largely unchanged: it cannot strike down or amend legislation; parliament has 
legislative supremacy; courts interpret and enforce the will of parliament (Richardson, 
2004, p. 109). In this respect, there is some commonality between judicial rulings 
instigated on the basis of traditional grounds for judicial review, and those driven by 
consideration of principles deriving from the HRA; notably, that responsibility for 
enforcement of a judicial decision and determination of any necessary legislative 
change or political or administrative reforms to policy is left squarely in the hands of 
government and parliament, whether or not such reforms concern the protection of 
human rights. 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
Whilst it may be possible for the purposes of studying judicial impact on policy change 
to blur distinctions between case law and grounds for review which derive from the 
Human Rights Act and alternative legal principles, there is a very notable difference 
between judicial decisions emanating from municipal courts and those handed down 
from the ECtHR. Having jurisdiction only in cases where all available domestic 
remedies have been exhausted, theECtHR has been considered by some as effectively 
comprising a de -facto constitutional court of last resort, empowered to review 
governmental policies and actions in terms of their impact on individuals' human rights 
under the ECHR (e.g. Sadurski, 2009). In particular, processes and protocols initiated 
within government for reporting compliance with rulings from Strasbourg significantly 
pre -date more recent reporting on compliance with municipal courts to the Joint 
Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights, since its establishment in 2000. The 
supranational dynamic of the ECtHR invokes compulsory submission to the Council of 
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Europe of a plan of action on how the judicial decision will be implemented, thus 
implicating the Ministry of Justice and Foreign and Commonwealth Office in specifying 
a plan for compliance and in coordinating government departments involved in policy 
making (Ministry of Justice, 2010).This potential difference in coordinating actors 
involved in compliance with municipal courts and the ECtHR may also affect how 
decisions are made about associated policy change. However the impact of rulings from 
both `sources' can be considered by recourse to the same governmental processes 
through which compliance is enacted:legislative change; change to operational 
guidelines;re- making of administrative decisions; and justification of changes by 
government. 
Rise of judicial review of asylum 
Having outlined the general nature and scope of judicial review, I now wish to indicate 
its particular significance to asylum control. From the late 1980s to the mid- 1990s, the 
judiciary transitioned from a marked hands -off attitude towards asylum policy into an 
extensive and prolific supervisory role. In this respect, asylum became newlysubject to 
the judicial review mechanisms which I have described above - operating to determine 
whether individual appellants were adversely affected by governmental failure to fulfil 
legal obligations, or by an overstepping of legally prescribed powers in its actions 
(judicial review of ultra vires).Until this historical juncture, asylum had been considered 
a diplomatic prerogative without need of public, political and legal oversight (Gibney, 
2001; Grahl- Madsen, 1963, pp. 195 -6; Thomas, 2003). 
Remarkably, considering that the British government of the day had been central to 
drafting of the Refugee Convention 1951(Grahl- Madsen, 1963), to which the UK is a 
party, it was only in 1987 that the British judiciary found itself competent (or indeed, 
willing) to consider the implementation and effect of the Refugee Convention in British 
municipal law as a potential constraint upon immigration and asylum measures(UKHL 
1987, 531). In his historical overview of judicial rulings on British asylum policy, 
Robert Thomas (2003) emphasises the unanticipated and rapid growth in asylum 
applications to the UK as a determinant of this sudden and belated interpolation of a 
judicial component into the governance of asylum. Between 1980 and 1990, annual 
applications rose from 2,352 to 26,205; more than a tenfold increase (MPI, 2009). This 
placed increased pressure upon existing institutional arrangements for the 
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administration of asylum, resulting in a decline in the procedural efficiency, consistency 
and perceived fairness of initial decisions on whether to grant asylum or order the 
applicant's removal. With between eighteen and eighty -one percent of applicants being 
refused both asylum and alternative statuses within the UK during this period (see 
figure one in appendix one), the result was an exponential rise in applications by asylum 
seekers to the judiciary to rectify perceived procedural injustices in the determination of 
these asylum decisions and precipitant detention and removal orders. 
In the face of such pressures, motivated by its self -understanding as guarantor of 
procedural rights in public law, the judiciary has been regarded as having had little 
choice but to shake off its prior "self- abnegation" and assert jurisdiction over asylum 
(Thomas, 2003, p. 482). This historical deference of the judiciary stands in sharp 
contrast to recent judicial decisions, which have insisted that the Home Secretary's 
exercise of the royal prerogative to control entry of aliens must be subject to statutory 
limitations (UKSC 2012a, 2012b). 
The role of the ECtHR in scrutiny of asylum control 
Although the ECtHR has emphasised that it does not govern entry and expulsion of 
aliens, as a contracting party to the ECHR, the UK has an obligation to guarantee 
foreign nationals' rights under the convention (European Court of Human Rights Press 
Unit, 2011). This has particularly involved constraints on expulsion to a real risk of 
death, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, or where there may be violation 
of the right to a family life in the host state. 
The role of the ECtHR as a barrier to deportation and removal decisions has led to much 
ire among government ministers, who have decried "unelected judges" constraint of 
sovereign discretionary power to act in the national interest (Walters & Owen, 2013). 
Governmental resentment towards perceived interference by municipal and 
supranational courts dates back at least to the early 1990s(Griffith, 1997;Le Seur, 1996; 
Rozenberg, 1997). However, the recent `turn to deportation' has led to increased 
political frustrations with judicial review. Ministers have even threatened to withdraw 
the UK from the ECtHR (Robson, 2013). The UK has a track record of occasionally 
delayed implementation and a substantial number of historic ECtHR judgements against 
it (Çali & Wyss, 2009). However, between 2011 and 2012 (in the lead -up to threats of 
withdrawal), the UK lost only nine of twenty -eight cases against it at the ECtHR, whilst 
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the court rejected over two thousand applications against the UK as inadmissible 
(Council of Europe, 2011, 2013; Ministry of Justice, 2012) Nonetheless, the political 
challenges posed by judicial barriers to removal - for example of suspected terrorist, 
Abu Qatada - have posed particular challenges to the government's ability to justify its 
effective capacity to exercise immigration controls. 
Statistics an the significance of judicial review 
Beyond the possibility that governments may be concerned over the symbolic incursion 
of the courts upon their objectives in asylum control, it is clear that judicial review 
exerts a profound and substantive pressure on the administration of asylum, which 
cannot be ignored.The majority of immigration judicial reviews were transferred to the 
Upper Tribunal of the Immigration and Asylum Chamber in November, 2013 (Ministry 
of Justice, 2013, p. 27). However, statistics compiled by Christopher Hood and Ruth 
Dixon (2012) indicate that judicial review of immigration and asylum has been the 
dominant contributor to a steady growth in applications to the High Court for judicial 
review since the municipal courts affirmed their jurisdiction in the late 1980s. These 
figures (see figure three in appendix one) indicate that a three -fold increase in 
applications for review since 1995 is largely due to immigration cases. Applications 
rose from 2,173 in 2000 to 13,210 in 2013, with 84% of all judicial reviews in 2012 
relating to immigration or asylum (Ministry of Justice, 2013, p. 3). It may ostensibly 
appear that success rates are low - 6% to 14% of applications resulted in a ruling against 
the government between 2006 and 2011 (see figure four in appendix one). However, 
Robert Thomas (2013) has indicated that in 2011, 43% of immigrations cases which 
received a substantive hearing were successful. 
Even this consideration of the pressure imposed on the executive by judicial scrutiny is 
most likely a gross under- estimate. Based on extensive interviews with public law 
practitioners, research by The Public Law Project(Sunkin & Bondy, 2009) suggests that 
a significant proportion of cases are resolved before commencement, simply by the 
solicitor threatening challenge (p.30). Of asylum cases sampled, they found a further 
64% of those going forward to the court were settled before the court's decision on 
permission (p.38). Such results indicate public authorities' concession to the claim or 
that their case lacks merits. As such, judicial review's true impact on governance of 
immigration and asylum is likely far beyond that suggested by the Ministry of Justice's 
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own figures, as presented by Dixon and Hood. This extensive role in scrutinising mostly 
administrative actions is suggestive of the `expressive' influence of judicial review as 
representative of rule of law principles.This is the oft -hypothesised `shadow' cast by 
law over administrative behaviour (Cane, 2004; Rawlings & Harlow, 2009, p. 713). 
Impact as implementation 
This contextual and statistical overview may go some way to helping us understand why 
political actors have historically come to accept and not simply disregard judicial 
oversight of asylum. As already noted, however, the comparatively weak constitutional 
power of the municipal courts has led to scepticism about their authority over the 
executive. This is a particularly pressing concern given the great degree of discretion 
and appetite for illiberal restrictions which characterise the governance of asylum. Even 
to the extent that one may claim judicial activism, rulings could easily be dismissed as 
"courteous requests" to a sovereign, rather than "pronouncements of truth from on 
high." (Gearty, 2006, p. 96) Under the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, parliament 
may not only nullify judicial decisions through legislation, it also has discretion to 
restrict the jurisdiction of the courts and conditions for accessing judicial review 
(Rawlings & Harlow, 2009, pp. 25 -6). Moreover, recent resentful rhetoric from 
government ministers about the ECtHR, and indeed attempts to overturn the constraints 
of its jurisprudence (see Chapter 5), suggest a need for investigation of the extent to 
which we may observerigorous compliance with its supranational rulings. 
To some extent, governmental rejections of unwelcome judicial decisions as judge - 
made policy (implying an overstepping of parliamentary sovereignty) reflect the 
obvious political role of the courts. Jurists have observed that public law is indeed a 
form of political discourse (Loughlin, 2003) and that judges have always been "up to 
their necks in policy" (Wade, 1989, p. 78).Administrative and public lawyers also 
notethe "mounting importance" of judicial review of high level policy decisions and 
compliance of legislation with EU law and the ECHR (De Smith, Woolf, & Jowell, 
2007, p. 5). But simply highlighting the growth in judicial review tells us nothing of 
why governments would be willing to take judicial rulings on board as meaningful or 
authoritative, or even to pay lip- service to judicial decisions. That the courts lack 
material power to enforce their decisions requires investigation of rulings' 
implementation as a necessarily political phenomenon. As a case study, the UK presents 
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an imperative to refocus attention on necessary political agency required to accept (or 
reject) and implement judicial decisions, including those which may impose constraints 
on future policy measures. The authority and meaning of judicial decisions is therefore 
best approached by reference to their interpretation and implementation by government. 
This requires investigation of the response from government to understand the 
significance and effect of judicial review on political and administrative outcomes - 
whether in terms of changes to policy or legislation, reconsideration of an 
administrative decision, or its impact on the rhetorical justification of compliance. 
John Griffith is notable as one of the few British political scientists who have 
historically sought to bridge scholarship between policy making processes and the 
judiciary(1997). His focus on the political nature of the judiciary demonstrates some of 
the ire and fire with which controversial rulings have been met in Westminster and 
Whitehall. However, it is only by understanding the political processes underpinning the 
politicisation of law - or ultimately, law in context - thatwe may begin to account for 
why judgements meet with varying rhetorical responses and forms of implementation. 
This is to engage with the imperative for enquiry which is posed by the undeniable 
normative authority of law in democratic states, such as the UK. Law and judicial 
decisions are clearly both prescriptive and authoritative. However, it is equally clear that 
they are often both resented yet accepted by governments. Perhaps ironically, it is 
administrative lawyers, not political scientists, who have best expressed this paradoxical 
political authority of law and its call to empirical investigation: 
it is difficult to resist the temptation to at least try to find out if and how law 
matters... (Hertogh & Halliday, 2004b, pp. 270 -71) 
By studying political responses to judicial review of deportation, removal and asylum 
control, this thesis seeks to avoid tendencies towards depicting politicseither as 
labouring under an all- enveloping judicial shadow, or as subject to an intransigent 
political will to power, free from liberal constraints. A focus on how political actors 
have sought to interpret and justify their response to judicial decisions can allow us to 
apprehend variation in judicial impact. This allows for a more satisfactory appreciation 
of the potential variation in courts' influence over asylum controls, and possible factors 
which may account for such variation. 
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Specifying the ideas governing asylum control in the UK 
When considering judicial impact as a function of political responses to the courts, care 
must be taken to have regard for what government actors perceive to be impacted upon 
by compliance. To facilitate this requirement, I now wish to summarise myoverview of 
asylum control in the UK in terms of the consistent trends and concerns which have 
characterised its governance. In doing so, I will make use of Vivien Schmidt's 
(2008)distinction between three general levels of policy ideas engaged by political 
science. These provide a means of differentiating the governing ideas which have given 
substance and meaning to asylum control policies and their political framing in the UK 
over the past thirty years. This distinction may prove helpful in expressing variance in 
how governments have responded to the courts to reconcile judicial impact with asylum 
control policies. I will return to discuss this conceptual tool in greater detail in chapters 
3 and 4. Briefly, however, one may distinguish governing ideas according to the 
following levels of generality: 
1. Policies: the specific solutions proposed by policy makers; 
2. The more general programmes which `underpin' these policy ideas - 
theunderlying programmatic logic which defines the problem to be solved; and 
3. The foundational `public philosophies'which ground these (J. L. Campbell, 
1998) - the rarely contested assumptions and values on the ordering of 
knowledge and society. (Schmidt, 2008, p. 306) 
In this manner, we may distinguish the underlying public philosophy of asylum control, 
its manifestation in a programmatic logic and policy tools through which governments 
have pursued policies of control.I consider political attitudes towards asylum control to 
have exemplified a relatively consistent trend towards restricting inclusion over the past 
thirty years. More recently, commentators have observed a decisive turn to more 
extensive use of deportation in the UK and other liberal states as a tool to ensure the 
effective policing of this goal (Gibney et al., 2011; Gibney, 2008). However, we may 
note the apparent willingness of a succession of governments since the late 1980s to not 
only pursue deportation as a tool for immigration and asylum control, but to enter into 
occasionally open conflict with the judiciary over the legitimate boundaries of its 
discretion to do so (Griffith, 1997; Hussain, 2001; Le Seur, 1996; Rawlings, 2005; 
Rozenberg, 1997; Thomas, 2003). The government's more recent self -imposition of 
targets for removals and deportations (Spencer, 2007) has entrenched a political and 
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organisational culture oriented around the maintenance and pursuit of administrative 
discretion over asylum control. Particularly striking, are the terms in which key policy 
papers have expressed the primacy of expedient removals and government being "seen" 
to be in "firm "control (Home Office, 1998, 2002b; New Labour, 1997). The symbolic 
performance of authority and capacity are clearly crucial factors in the politics of 
immigration and asylum control. 
On the basis of my brief, indicative overview of the politics, administration and judicial 
review of asylum control, I summarise the following trends or governing ideas as 
foundational to governance of asylum in the UK over the past thirty years: 
Public philosophy: Restrictive asylum controls. 
The state seeks to exercise coercive controls necessary to restrict inclusion (and 
therefore enforce the exclusion) of certain foreign nationals, including asylum seekers. 
This is pursued in opposition to a more expansive humanitarian philosophy of asylum 
control. 
Programmatic Logic: Executive discretion. 
Demonstration of authoritative governance of inclusion and exclusion requires 
discretion to execute asylum controls. This is reflected in a governing logic of balancing 
politicalexpediency against potential liberal constraints. The executive therefore seeks 
discretion over a balancing of inclusion /exclusion, individual /state, 
liberty/security,expediency/review. 
Policy: Deportation, removal and restrictions on rights in- country. 
The public philosophy and programme of asylum control are implemented by means of 
certain policy tools: expulsion and other forms of coercive control of unwanted foreign 
nationals, such as placing limitations on their human rights within the country.Policies 
may also seek to limit barriers to expedient and authoritative governance of asylum, 
notably by restricting access to judicial oversight. 
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My approach and structure of the thesis 
In introducing the topic of asylum control in the UK above, I have endeavoured to show 
that itspolicies, administration, and associated political rhetoric are characterised by 
sustained judicial scrutiny. However, greater insight is required into how and why 
governments choose to comply with judicial decisions which purport to constrain their 
policy goals. In particular, I have highlighted an apparent gap between rhetorical 
opposition to unwelcome judicial decisions and `compliant'policy change. Factors 
whichshape governmental attitudes towards compliance with the courts in asylum 
control must be identified and investigated.Greater insight is required as to the 
determinants of reluctant compliance; gaps between rhetoric and practice; and variations 
in responses to judicial decisions which require policy change for compliance.This 
thesis will seek to address these gaps in knowledge about the influence of judicial 
decisions on policy change and its political framing in the area of asylum control. 
Looking beyond questions of whether governments comply with `adverse' judicial 
decisions, I employ a broader conception of 'judicial impact;' a complex of dynamic 
processes through which actors and institutions interpret often inconvenient judicial 
signals, and endeavour to justify their reconciliationwith the continued, stable function 
of government. Judicial decisions must, after all, be translated into a politically 
meaningful programme for action which is intelligible to politicians and bureaucrats 
charged with implementation. As such, I seek to identify and explain judicial impact on 
policy change as exemplified in this process of sense -making and adjustment within 
government. 
This is achieved by reference to how the political and administrative systems of 
government use rhetoric and documents. These practices serve not only to 
communicate, but also to constitute and sustain the stability and legitimacy of policy 
measures and political authority in response to judicial decisions which challenge prior 
narratives of legitimate asylum control. Judicial decisions which find against the 
government set into motion a process where key actors and institutions consolidate, 
document and express policy positions. Both political rhetoric and the production of 
documents by government are just such sense -making exercises, which seek to order 
social and political relations and meanings. Governmental documents and rhetoric serve 
not simply to specify and articulate policy positions in the face of judicial pressures, but 
also serve an ongoing process of elaborating and delimiting policies, justifying and 
legitimating positions proposed following challenges from the courts. Turning to the 
24 
assumptions, problem constructions and calls for action which these discursive sources 
express allows for interrogation of political attitudes to compliance and potential 
insights into the drivers and political significance of policy change in the wake of 
judicial decisions. 
Structure of the thesis 
In chapter 2, I begin reviewing the potential merits and deficiencies of existing literature 
which may be drawn upon to understand how judicial decisions impact changes to 
asylum policy and its political framing. Emphasis is placed on highlighting plausible 
accounts of how courts may influence political change and what form this may take. 
This provides a necessary starting point for identification of possible factors which may 
condition judicial impact. 
Having highlighted the explanatory and conceptual deficiencies of existing approaches, 
Chapter 3 turns to consider more instructive insights into the process through which 
policy change happens, what such change may look like, and how it unfolds. I focus, in 
particular, on the role of political discourse in not only responding to and organising 
political pressures, but also constituting policy problems, such as compliance with the 
courts,as stable objects for political action. To capture variation, I call for differentiation 
of judicial impact on the basis of two analytic typologies: governmental response and 
the level of governing policy ideas which are articulated as impacted upon by 
compliance with the courts.l then turn to the significant role of governmental documents 
and political rhetoric in the process of policy change in response to the courts. 
Chapter 4 advances a methodology for investigation of governmental responses to the 
courts, and associated impacts on policy - in the form of material actions, such as 
legislation and procedural rules effecting policy change, but also in the way this 
response is discursively articulated and justified in its political framing. I employ a 
qualitative case study based approach to contrast responses to judicial decisions on the 
basis of whether they are handed down from the European Court of Human Rights or a 
UK superior court, and whether compliance was politicised.I also delineate critical 
framing analysis as an effective tool for investigation of how the `problem' of 
compliance and its policy impactare framed in political rhetoric and documents through 
which government interprets and inscribes the meaning and implementation of judicial 
decisions. 
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Chapters 5, 6 and 7 present my analysis and findings on judicial impact on policy 
change and its framing by government in my four chosen case studies.Particular 
consideration is given to significance attached by governments to the source of the 
ruling (UK / ECtHR) and whether compliance was politically contested. I also further 
marshal this data for consideration of the governmental response and the level of 
generality of governing ideas at stake' therein. 
Chapter 8 draws together my empirical findings from each case study to compare the 
role of politicisation of compliance, source of ruling, response, and governing ideas 
expressed as `at stake.' In doing so, I endeavour to elicit a deeper understanding of how 
and why judicial decisions impact upon changes to asylum control policy. Particular 
emphasis is placed on consideration of the role of governing ideas in governmental 
framings of judicial impactas a means of accounting for varying political responses to 
the courts.My findings suggest that whilst governance of asylum and deportation in the 
UK may labour under a judicial shadow, this has not precluded legal risk taking and 
efforts to `contain' the impact of individual rulings on the viability of the overarching 
policy regime. 
I conclude the thesis by emphasising that judicial impact is a political construct which is 
fundamentally predicated upon the intersection of judicial imperatives with pre- existing 
policy ideas. Building on my consideration of asylum control in the UK, I offer more 
general reflections on judicial impact on government and avenues for future research. 
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2.Judicial impact on policy change 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I consider the merits and deficiencies of existing literature which may 
be drawn upon to understand how judicial decisions impact upon changes to asylum 
policy and its political framing. I begin with debates in migration studies on the role 
of courts as constraints on otherwise illiberal and restrictive controls. Moving beyond 
the confines of this literature, I also explore potential for cross -fertilisation from a 
variety of disciplinary approaches to the influence of judicial power on legislators 
and government bureaucracies. I seek to highlight plausible accounts of how courts 
may influence political change and what form this may take. This provides a 
necessary starting point for identification of factors which may condition judicial 
impact. Notable deficiencies are identified in dominant approaches, which fail 
variously to account for compliance, non -compliance, and generally, for how and 
why variation exists in compliant implementation of policy changes inresponse to the 
courts. Towards the goal of better understanding the how and why of judicial impact, 
I draw on socio -legal scholarship which emphasises the importance of understanding 
law in context' - here, according to its interpretation and implementation by 
political actors in government. I close the chapter by summarising factors arising 
from existing scholarship which may plausibly help account for variation in judicial 
impact. I also establish a broad conceptual framework for the study of judicial impact 
as a product of political and bureaucratic function over time. 
Approaches to the problem 
Migration Literature 
The academic study of liberal democratic states' migration controls has been 
particularly concerned with accounting for why particular policy options are selected 
and why they either succeed or fail in their goals. This reflects a fundamental 
concern of social science, and public policy in particular - asking `why' decisions 
are made, in order to better understand stability and change (Cairney, 2012, p. 1; 
Marsh, 2010). For the study of migration control, a particularly stable tendency 
towards political promises of management and control (Boswell & Geddes, 2011, p. 
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104) has led to extensive reflection on "why liberal states accept unwanted 
migration" (Joppke, 1998a). Also known as the policy failure thesis, this concerns 
the clear gap between rhetoric which specifies policy objectives and the reality of 
continued immigration which precludes their realisation (Boswell & Geddes, 2011, 
p. 112). Despite public pressures for increasing restrictions on immigration and 
asylum (Bommes & Geddes, 2000; Hollifield, 2004), liberal democracies have 
continued to accept migrants. The empirical problem of interrogating the motives 
and behaviour underpinning migration control has been approached both in terms of 
accounting for policy failures, as well as a characteristic mismatch between 
protectionist public opinion and more inclusive controls (Boswell, 2007b). Alongside 
the influence of organised lobbies, particularly on labour migration (G. P. Freeman, 
1995), the role of courts as guarantors of aliens' rights has been a central explanation 
for states' apparent failure to coercively limit immigration and asylum. 
As an institution oriented towards the protection of liberal universal values, including 
foreign nationals' human rights, courts are typically held to impose a `liberal 
constraint' on the restrictive tendencies of otherwise purportedly liberal democracies 
(Cornelius, Martin, & Hollifield, 1994; Gibney, 2001, p. 12; Guiraudon & Lahav, 
2000; Guiraudon, 2000; Hollifield, 1992, p. 94, 2000; Joppke, 1998a, 1999, 2001; 
Soennecken, 2008). Migration scholars have therefore sought to identify sources of 
judicial power over entry and expulsion of aliens: judicial activism (Joppke, 2001, p. 
358); an associated growth in rights for migrants (Cornelius et al., 1994, p. 9; 
Jacobson, 1997; Sassen, 1996; Soysal, 1994); and effective use of courts by 
organised advocacy groups (Kawar, 2012; Soennecken, 2008). This focus is 
consistent with contemporaneous, yet sepárate developments in the application of 
prior American scholarship on the relationship between courts and governments to 
European cases (Alter & Vargans, 2000; Chalmers, 2000; Conant, 2002; Epp, 1998; 
Mattli & Slaughter, 1998; North & Weingast, 1989; Shapiro & Stone, 1994; Stone 
Sweet, 2000). Both fields of study have delineated the incursion of courts as active 
policy makers into a domain previously exclusive to the executive and 
parliament.Christian Joppke, in particular, has held the immigrant to be "the most 
dramatic test case" for debates about whether individual human rights `trump' 
majoritarian political decisions (Dworkin, 1978, p. 153; Joppke, 2001, p. 340). 
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Although variable across European states, this pseudo -constitutionalisation of 
migrants' rights has developed through repeated engagement of governments with 
the judiciary over the lawfulness of individual policies and administrative actions 
(Joppke & Marzal, 2004).Christian Joppke and Elia Marzal refer to not merely a 
`division,' but "competition of powers in the liberal state ", wherein legislators have 
come to dance around "the shadow" cast by the courts(2004, pp. 839 -40, quoting 
Soltsez). 
Migration literature on liberal constraint tends to take for granted the independence 
of the judiciary from public and political pressure (Boswell, 2007b, p. 83), as well as 
its commitment to an apolitical vision of universal legal principles (Joppke, 1999, p. 
18). Yet,its liberal judicial constraint thesis is grounded in a valid observation of 
growing conflict between courts and state administrations over not only the lawful 
exercise of state power in migration control, but also the protection of the human 
rights of unpopular minorities (Epp, 1998; Joppke, 2001, p. 340). However, beyond 
the identification of sources and forms of judicial power, little has been said as to 
how and why the courts exercise influence within political and administrative 
processes of government.Indeed, even less is offered on when judicial decisions will 
exert such an influence (Boswell, 2007b), and there is a notable silence on the form 
this may take, beyond simple `constraint.' In recognition of this descriptive and 
explanatory deficiency, I wish to contribute to a more limited, recent turn towards 
not only questioning the presumed extent of judicial constraint of immigration and 
asylum control(Bonjour, 2011; Messina, 2007), but more importantly, questioning 
how judicial power is manifest as a constitutive influence over political values and 
agendas of immigration control (Kawar, 2012). I do not mean to suggest that existing 
insightsinto the role of the courts should be dismissed. In particular, I wish to give 
brief consideration to the main features of existing studies of the courts' influence as 
a starting point for consideration of alternative approaches to the problem. 
Domestic courts vs supranational rights 
Existing literature has debated whether illiberal migration policies have been 
constrained due to a growth in European human rights law (Jacobson, 1997; Sassen, 
1996, 1999; Soysal, 1994) or as a result of judicial review by the domestic courts 
29 
(Guiraudon, 2000; Joppke, 1999, 2001, p. 339). Such accounts tend to appeal either 
to the role of liberal values "embedded" within liberal states' identities (Hollifield, 
1992, pp. 26 -8) or the opportunity for migrants to appeal to an extra -national 
extension of human rights which are independent of their status within the host state 
(Soysal, 1994). Yet, the traction of both accounts for understanding policy 
formulation and implementation depends upon the influence of such processes upon 
norms, institutions and ideas at the domestic level (Çah & Wyss, 2009; Hansen, 
1999, p. 428; Joppke, 1998a; Stone Sweet & Keller, 2008). At the domestic level, we 
may question practical adherence to liberal universalist principles and whether states 
consider them applicable to foreign nationals, especially where this may interfere 
with perceived national interests (Boswell, 2007b, p. 86). Indeed, the activation of 
supranational legal principles is contingent upondomestic legal institutions which 
either apply them or, in failing to effectively do so, produce the opportunity for 
individuals to appeal to supranational courts (Acosta Arcarazo & Geddes, 2013; 
Stone Sweet & Keller, 2008). Only according to variation in such domestic factors 
can one account for the "peculiar bifurcation" between the highly restrictive 
treatment of asylum seekers, as compared to economically desirable migrants - 
united in their recourse to universal human rights, yet subject differential 
immigration controls (Joppke, 2001, p. 342). 
This debate over the sources of legal and judicial protection of migrants indicates the 
importance of considering not just the role of domestic institutions of the state, but 
their engagement with supranational institutions and the enforcement of international 
human rights law. In particular, jurisprudence on the European Convention on 
Human Rights has, in recent years, become instrumental to both domestic and 
supranational litigation by refugees and other migrants (Mole & Meredith, 2007). 
The source of a judicial decision, whether from the ECtHR or domestic courts, may 
influence how it impacts immigration and asylum control. Yet, variation in the 
source of rulings has not been given due consideration by existing migration 
literature.This is perhaps due to its tendency to focus more on comparative variation 
in states'constitutional configurations as a predictor of `constraint', rather than 
attending to actual variation in the form which such judicial influence over political 
outcomes may take. 
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When liberal constraints aren't so constraining or so liberal 
The liberal constraint thesis depends for its explanatory force on the idea that liberal 
states comply with the law because of their inherent liberal identity (Hollifield, 1992, 
pp. 26 -8). Although effectively tautological (Steiner, 2000), this explanation also 
underpins many accounts from international organisation scholarship on the 
`embeddedness' of liberal universal principles in domestic institutions (e.g. Jacobson 
& Ruffer, 2003). As such, it deserves consideration as at least a point of departure in 
attempting to arrive at a more adequate account of why states comply with legal 
values, such as judicial decisions. 
Such accounts make recourse toperceived path dependent behaviourof liberal states. 
Yet, we may enquire what it is that makes liberal states so liberal, and whether such a 
consistent liberal behaviour is evidenced in practice. This seems particularly 
important given that the apparent proclivity of liberal states to illiberal migration 
control is the very problem with which this literature engages. Illuminating in this 
respect, Matthew Gibney has postulated that the institutionalisation of liberal norms 
within the state may lead to a "liberal paradox" of increasingly restrictive controls on 
migrants' entry to it (Gibney & Hansen, 2003; Gibney, 2001, pp. 17 -18). 
Deportation, in particular, exposes an uneasy contradiction between the state's 
principled support for universal individual rights and its sovereign will to effective 
immigration control (Paoletti, 2010, p. 7). Even where liberal constraints are taken as 
axiomatic, this does not predict their broader, often `paradoxical' political effects. 
The state's (liberal) national identity is effectively an agglomerate of historically 
located national interests, international norms, and yet more nebulous formulations 
of morality, which can readily be deployed in arguments for either more or less 
restrictive immigration and asylum policies(Steiner, 2000). Policies and political 
rhetoric are grounded in and expressive of these arguments. In this regard, 
exclusionary immigration and asylum policies can be considered as having no less to 
do with liberal states' national identity than do restrictive judicial decisions. Indeed, 
studies of citizenship and integration have recently emphasised the rise of "regressive 
liberalism ": the pursuit of disciplinary and illiberal means to achieve liberal 
goals(Joppke, 2007, p. 268). For example, a rejection of accommodation of 
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difference, in defence of "distinctively liberal ways of life "(Tebble, 2006). This is the 
often ignored "dark side" of cultural nationalism and "welfare state chauvinism ", 
according to which governments may quite reasonably justify exclusionary policies, 
not according to liberal universal values, but according to membership of the national 
community (Geddes, 2003, pp. 6, 22).These "sharp edges" of protectionist liberal 
identity (Boswell & Geddes, 2011, p. 114)determine the role played by liberal 
principles, including the rule of law and human rights, in the development and 
implementation of migration and asylum control policies. The role played by 
substantive liberal values and legal principles of human rights is therefore potentially 
variable on a case by case basis, and necessarily the subject of investigation of the 
political and administrative processes involved in policy making. 
As a consequence of the presumed liberalism of the state, judicial power over 
political outcomes has wrongly been taken to be axiomatic. Governments may not 
respond to liberal `constraints' in a straightforward or predictable way. An adequate 
theory of the judiciary's impact on immigration and asylum controls must therefore 
engage with variation of outcomes, and must be capable of accounting for political 
opposition and illiberal responses. 
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Avoiding constraints 
Critical Security Studies on migration control 
The centrality of just such illiberal tendencies in policy governance is a central tenet 
of critical security studies, which haveobserved that governmental actors may seek to 
circumnavigate or manipulate the meaning and effect of liberal constraints. Scholars 
in this field haveplaced particular emphasis on liberal states' tendency to treat 
immigration control as a potential security concern, leading to enhanced political 
discretion. It is held that where a framing of migration as a security threat is 
accepted, such "securitisation" can facilitate circumnavigation of erstwhile liberal 
constraints to enact exceptional measures (Bigo, 2002; Buzan et al., 1998; Huysmans 
& Buonfino, 2008; Huysmans, 2006). This literature also hypothesises a tendency for 
the executive to attempt to remove certain policies from normal political debate in 
order to enhance discretionary power over them. 
This suggests much to be considered about what motivates the politics of 
immigration and asylum control, and how it is justified in political framing. 
However, the securitisation hypothesis says nothing directly on what fate can be 
expected for judicial attempts at constraint of such bids for discretion or the resulting 
exceptional measures. Indeed, where governments suspend the effect of a policy 
pending the outcome of its review by the judiciary, we may presume that appeals to 
exceptionalism are susceptible to irreconcilable barriers imposed by lengthy judicial 
processes - as has been argued of processes of democratic deliberation more 
generally(Aradau, 2004). Political actors may plausibly seek to enhance their 
discretion over a policy in many contexts, of which security is but one example. Such 
bids for discretion may well become subject to unwelcome judicial delays or 
constraints in their effect. The return of a policy issue to `normal' democratic 
procedures as a result of judicial arbitration, including affirmation of the applicability 
of rule of law values, may well be regarded as a predictor of executive opposition to 
compliance with the courts. 
Admittedly, this consideration of a politics of exceptionalism says little of the scope 
for political actors to seek to legitimate circumnavigation of liberal constraints by 
means of a more general discourse of `unease' about links between migrants and 
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social ills, such as criminality (Squire, 2009). Yet, we should not presume that such 
political discretion over the terminology and justifications pursued to legitimate 
policies need have anything in particular to do with national security (Boswell, 
2007a) or criminality. Immigration control in the UK has long been characterised by 
a high degree of political discretion (Legomsky, 1987). Such discretion will 
doubtless be applied in the subjective interpretation and application of liberal 
principles of government to the formulation and implementation of policies. 
Nevertheless, critical security studies literature places valuable emphasisonthe 
importance of how policies are justified in relation to liberal principles.It is clearly 
necessary to the study of judicial influence on policy to consider the role of political 
contestation of compliance with the courts, and how governmental responses are 
justified - whether this invokes security and migrants' rightsor not. 
Getting around constraints 
It is also important to consider that governments may seek to circumnavigate the 
courts' impact on migration controls.In their evaluation of a "constitutionalization of 
immigrant rights ",Christian Joppke and Elia Marzal (2004, pp. 839 -40) outline three 
particular ways in which governments may seek to "neutralize or pre -empt" judicial 
intervention into policies which discriminate against migrants' rights: self -limitation; 
outsourcing to avoid judicial oversight; and dressing up restrictions in terms of rights 
to help them weather judicial scrutiny. Implicit to consideration of suchgovernmental 
tacticsto avoid unwanted judicial interference in policy goals, is the recognition that 
judicial oversight of immigration and asylum control may be unwelcome, resented, 
or even opposed. Yet, the tacit assumption is once again that governments seek to 
avoidunwelcome judicial decisions due to an inherent and unavoidably constraining 
effect: this is the oft supposed judicial shadow cast over governments (Joppke & 
Marzal, 2004, pp. 839 -40). 
Yet, immigration and asylum policies, as in other areas of administrative law, often 
lead to a cycle of repeated litigation, adjudication, and re- formulation of policy:an 
iterative engagement between government and judiciary on the lawfulness of 
policies(on eviction powers, see Bingham, 2010; on liberty and security, see Ewing 
& Tham, 2008; on asylum, see Thomas, 2003). This may problematise simple one 
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off' neutralisation' of judicial rulings (Hickman, 2005; Hogg, Bushell- Thornton, & 
Wright, 2007).A consistently high volume of judicial rulings on asylum, and "culture 
of pervasive challenge "to policies' legitimacy (Thomas 2003: 484), have placed 
growing and sustained pressure upon government and its administrative 
bureaucracies to take account of the judiciary's role (e.g. Treasury Solicitors, 2006). 
Yet, where repeated and sustained scrutiny of a policy areais unwelcome, this may 
lead to a partial and incremental implementation of judicial rulings on what 
comprises legitimate policy. In any case, the timeline of government hitherto 
delineated by theories of judicial constraint of immigration and asylum control has 
been cut too short, failing to consider the ongoing and iterative engagement which 
takes place between government and judiciary over the exact limits on policies' 
incursions upon individual rights. This engagement can be understood from a 
governmental perspective by recourse to how political actors articulate the meaning, 
significance and effects of judicial scrutiny when formulating and justifying policy 
change. 
Focusing on process to account for variation 
Existing theories of migration control fail to adequately account for why political 
elites would accept such constraining rulings from the judiciary as binding. As 
already indicated, a fuller account of the judiciary's influence on policy change 
requires abandonment of a number of dominant assumptions: in particular, that the 
liberal state is necessarily liberal in its proclivities, and that judicial power is 
axiomatic. Moreover, insight into potential variation in how governments respond to 
judicial pressures requires that we move beyond the deterministic depiction of 
policies floating on a spectrum between absolute discretion and constraint, as implied 
by the liberal constraint hypothesis and to a certain extent by theories of 
securitisation of migration. Such approaches are notably deficient on how, when and 
why constraints on immigration and asylum are upheld. These questions can only be 
addressed by attending to qualitative processes of interpretation of rulings and 
reaction to the courts within government. As Antje Ellerman has noted of the 
implementation of deportation policy, a tendency to focus on constraints has led to a 
lack of attention to states' capacities, and an associated lack of regard for 
bureaucratic factors and the politics of implementation ( Ellerman, 2009, p. 
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10).Understanding of judicial influence over policy change requires similar attention 
to the implementation of compliant policy change - in terms of the process involved, 
and not merely whether the outcomes demonstrate constraint. This requires a 
departure from existing literature from migration studies which rests its conclusions 
upon the content of law and judicial power as inevitable constraints upon politics, 
without considering their necessary political implementation. 
Despite a disaggregation of the state to consider the role of the courts, there has been 
little engagement with potentially nuanced or varied political responses to the courts 
across government. Necessary agency on the part of government must be brought 
back into theories of judicial constraints on liberal states (Evans, Rueschemeyer, & 
Skocpol, 1985) in order to apprehend variation in political responses to the courts. 
The liberal constraint thesis perhaps understandably suffers from these deficiencies, 
because it seeks to explain variation in judicial constraints across many countries. 
The focus on variations in judicial institution (for example, whether constitutional 
court or common law review) as a predictive variable for cross -national comparison 
presentsan impression that judicial impact is a two dimensional, definitive and a- 
temporal result, rather than something which can vary on a case -by -case basis and 
even develop overtime. 
Recent developments in broader migration studies may help here. Academic 
attention has shifted from frustration over a lack of plausible insights into the 
"motivations, interests and behaviour of the political actors who employ state power 
to intervene" (Massey et al., 1998, p. 292), to seek insights at the more promising 
level of the policy process and its political context (Bonjour, 2011; Boswell et al., 
2011; Boswell & Geddes, 2011; Boswell, 2009; Ellerman, 2009). This comprises a 
turn to investigate the qualitative detail of how political and bureaucratic processes 
involved in policy making may account for policy outcomes, such as the resilience of 
illiberal immigration controls. By turning to consider the governmental processes 
involved in shaping varied judicial influence over asylum control policies, I seek to 
contribute to this contextually situated approach to explaining policy outcomes. 
Having outlined the need for advancement of a fuller theory of how the courts impact 
upon migration and asylum control policies, I now wish to begin the task of 
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differentiating possible variation in the influence of the courts on government. I do 
this by recourse to the extensive literature in administrative and public law as well as 
socio -legal studies on courts' impact uponbureaucratic function. In so doing, I 
endeavour to extrapolate to the level of both policy bureaucracy and the broader 
politics of asylum control. 
Explaining judicial impact 
Moving from constraint to judicial impact 
In contrast to the judicial constraint literature from migration studies, the starting 
point of much administrative law and socio -legal scholarship on government is that 
judicial `constraint' is not a given, nor is the response to the courts typically a 
straightforward distinction between compliance and non -compliance. The discipline 
is dominated by scepticism about the courts' influence. In particular, it has been 
observed that government agencies often merely creatively remake unlawful 
decisions (Creyke & McMillan, 2004). Although judicial review in the UK has come 
to be regarded as exerting a "constant and central" influence on the exercise of power 
(De Smith, Woolf, & Jowell, 1995, p. vii), the executive may understand this 
influence in its own entirely unique way (Daintith & Page, 1999,p.10; Krygier, 2009, 
p. 67). Socio -legal scholars are particularly inclined towards "impact agnosticism ", 
given difficulties collecting data on judicial impact and the lack of a general 
theoretical consensus on its causes (Hertogh & Halliday, 2004b, p. 269). Such 
scepticism also reflects concerns over the `weak' form of UK -style judicial 
review(Gearty, 2006, p. 96; Tushnet, 2009), and the ECtHR's lack of enforcement 
mechanisms. Fundamentally, implementation matters, and tends to vary. 
The first task which I believe necessary to advancing understanding about the 
influence of the courts on policy change is to eschew the limited concept of 
`constraint' in favour of judicial impact. This facilitates a focus on variation of 
outcomes, which may be unexpected and not particularly constraining (Richardson, 
2004). It is necessary to move beyond determinations of whether there has been 
compliance with the courts, to consider how and why it has taken shape in a 
particular way. The concept of judicial impact is borrowed primarily from 
consideration of literature on the influence of judicial review on bureaucratic 
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function (Hertogh & Halliday, 2004c). The starting point of this approach concerns 
firstly the determination of "impact on what ?" (Richardson & Sunkin, 1996; Sunkin, 
2004, p. 44) before turning to ask what impact may be observed (conceptualising 
variation of outcomes). 
In this section, I conduct an overview of existing literature on `judicial impact', with 
a particular focus on identifying theoretically plausible accounts of how and why 
changes may occur to policies which have undergone judicial review by the courts. 
Firstly, I emphasise that explaining policy change, which is the outcome of political 
processes, requires that we look beyond the content of the ruling at the political 
context in which it is implemented. Secondly, drawing parallels to the largely 
separate academic discipline of policy studies, I argue that existing accounts of 
judicial impact can be loosely divided into three traditions, according to the 
mechanisms to which they attribute primary causal significance in shaping policy 
outcomes: rational choice drivenstrategic political behaviour; the constraining power 
of institutions; and `ideational' analyses which attend to contextual, cognitive and 
normative factors affecting the receptiveness and responsiveness of political actors to 
judicial imperatives. By relating judicial impact theories to their analogues in policy 
studies, I show that many existing approaches may benefit from a complementary 
attention to the role of ideas in shaping and constraining political behaviour. In this 
respect, cross -fertilisation from policy studies on the role of ideas has the potential to 
significantly deepen understanding of how and why judicial decisions impact upon 
policy change. 
Focus on the response, not the ruling 
Many dominant approaches to the impact of courts on politics and bureaucracy share 
certain of the features for which I criticised the judicial constraint hypothesis. A 
majority of studies focus on either mobilisation through law as a vehicle to leverage 
social change, or on the so called judicialization of politics (Epp, 1998; McCann, 
1994; Rosenberg, 2008; Schultz, 1998; Simmons, 2009; Vanhala, 2012). Legal 
mobilisation literature presumes that law has a constraining effect on policy, so turns 
to consider when litigation is successful, rather than when it results in policy change. 
Judicialization literature typically concerns either the ceding of decision making 
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power to courts, or the gradually increasing influence of legalistic norms and 
discourse on strategic political behaviour (Blichner & Molander, 2008; Hirschl, 
2006, pp. 721 -2; Stone Sweet, 1999, p. 164, 2000). Although attempting to 
determine whether "courts matter" as agents of social change or are politically 
impotent (Schultz, 1998), such "top down" approaches tend to focus more on courts 
and the extension of judicial power over arbitration than on the reception of judicial 
decisions within government (Sunkin, 2004, p. 65) - largely due to a legacy from 
their origins in an introspective literature on the uniquely strong review function of 
the US Constitutional Court (Shapiro, 2008, pp. 768 -9). Yet, even regarding the case 
of US -style constitutional review, there is no consensus on its impact on policy 
change. Influential assessments range from claiming a transformative effect of 
litigation on policies to the charge that courts offer only "a hollow hope" (compare 
McCann, 1994; Rosenberg, 2008). 
First and foremost, it must be emphasised that judicial impact on policy change is a 
matter of government, and that we must therefore engage the role of law within 
politics, and not the fixation with "law and courts" which continues to attract the 
majority of scholarship on judicial power (Shapiro, 2008). Judicial review certainly 
has its own distinctive specificities as a process, in its particular decisions, and as a 
system of legal values and norms(Sunkin 2004: 47). As such, legal scholarship on 
jurisprudence seeks to distinguish law from other normative orders and forms of 
social control.Yet, law is both the product of the political system and the means by 
which government organises itself; "law is not only the product of politics but also 
constitutive of politics. "(Whittington, Kelemen, & Caldeira, 2008, pp. 3, 8 -9) The 
overarching project of the majority of socio -legal and social- scientific studies on law 
and courts is to illustrate that law is a political construct and the judiciary make 
political decisions (Hertogh & Halliday, 2004a; Shapiro, 2008; Whittington et al., 
2008). Similarly, when we turn to consider the impact of law and judicial decisions 
on government: 
The subject of study ought not to be the formal, legal rules purporting to 
prescribe how government officials ought to act but rather the actual, real -world 
behaviour of officials and other politicians.(Shapiro, 2008, p. 768) 
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This raises an important question which must be answered. Is variation in judicial 
impact a product of the ruling itself, the context in which it is received and 
implemented, or some combination of the two? Certainly, a "rights revolution" 
seems more likely where litigants benefit from an effective "legal mobilisation 
support structure "to aid inbuilding robust arguments for the court (Epp, 1998). The 
framing of legal principles and their application, as put forth by advocacy groups in 
court, may well influence the manner in which the judiciary rule and frame necessary 
implementation measures (Kawar, 2012).Different `juridical norms' may impose 
different requirements on government (Feldman, 1988; Rawlings, 1995) - for 
example, a new approach to decision making, new procedures or a new policy 
framework (Richardson, 2004, pp. 117 -8; Sunkin, 2004, p. 52). Compliance may 
require changes to legislation, or operational guidelines, or merely that an 
administrative decision be revisited. Different implementing actors and procedures 
for justification of compliance will be engaged according to the content of the ruling 
and whether it is from the British courts, or ECtHR. The invocation of constitutional 
principles, or the arguable pseudo -constitutional stature of the ECtHR as a last court 
of appeal for migrants may also suggest different obligations on state governments, 
potentially even making the court a `veto' player (Tsebelis, 2002, pp. 222 -47). 
However, an explanation of why judicial decisions exert an effect on policy change 
requires more than an assumption that government actors apperceive a guiding, 
hierarchical, normative authority over political behaviour in accordance with the rule 
of law (Canon & Johnson, 1999, p. 178). We must avoid the "upper court myth "; 
"the epistemological trap of simply positing a hierarchy of norms or courts" 
(Harrington, 2004, p. 564). This is especially important given the domestic, statutory, 
not constitutional implementation of the European Convention on Human 
Rights(Shapiro & Stone Sweet, 2002, p. 139). 
In the UK, the academic study of policy change has conventionally held the 
influence of the courts as "peripheral ", since policy decisions are made and ratified 
elsewhere (Jones et al., 2007, p. 596). This side -lining of the significance of judicial 
decisions on policy change is understandable given the role of the judiciary under 
parliamentary sovereignty as impartial arbitrators without powers to strike down 
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legislation. The assumption that the courts merely arbitrate, and are not producers of 
judicial policy also implies that the substantive content of judicial decisions is merely 
a variable stimulus for political processes which respond to the courts. Approaches to 
judicial impact which rest upon the jurisprudential content of court rulings rather 
than their reception within the policy process fail to capture the nature of what policy 
is. Policies are not so much decisions as ongoing processes of administration, subject 
to a variety of influences. They are the product of subjective problem definitions by a 
variety of political actors, demonstrating often unexpected and potentially illogical, 
strategic and adaptive behaviours (Heclo, 1972, p. 83; Hill, 2002, p. 4; Hogwood & 
Gunn, 1984, pp. 19 -23). 
Focusing on the content of judicial decisions captures none of this political response, 
which is inescapably a fundamental determinant of variation in judicial impact. 
Regardless of the content of a court ruling, governments may be willing to take legal 
risks with implementation (Daintith & Page, 1999, p. 337). The significance of the 
ruling, its features, and the hierarchical, normative authority of the court it originated 
from are inescapably a product of how the ruling is received in the political and 
administrative branches of government which are charged with implementation. In 
terms of their consequences for change to the content and administration of policies, 
the particular nature of a given judicial decision and its implications are a product of 
the political process of interpretation of law and its authority, and not therefore 
inherent features of the ruling at all (at least from the position of political actors, as 
opposed to the judges and lawyers involved in arriving at the ruling). As such, it is 
necessarily facets of political decision making and the policy process to which we 
must turn in order to understand judicial impact, rather than a doctrinal study of 
jurisprudence. 
Differentiating theoretical accounts of impact and policy change 
In so far as explanations of judicial impact on politics and policy change concern the 
entry and influence of outside stimuli into processes of political change, these can 
readily be considered in terms of the explicit or implied social mechanisms which 
they appeal to. Theories of judicial impact and policy change can be loosely grouped 
according to three broad trends in what they consider to be the most significant 
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factors influencing implementation of judicial decisions and political attitudes to law. 
Broadly speaking, emphasis is placed either on the agency of policy makers who 
respond to the courts according to strategic cost -benefit analyses; institutional 
constraints on policy making, which court rulings either impose or activate, shaping 
policy makers' options; and lastly, theories which focus neither directly on rational 
agency, nor limitations imposed by institutional structures, but instead on how 
dominant ideas which frame understandings of a given policy area will intersect with 
policy actors' interpretations of judicial decisions and their implementation. 
Strategic responses 
Dominant approaches to the relationship between the political and judicial systems 
focus on classical material variables in political analysis: power, interests, and 
rational calculations of utility as determinants of compliance with the courts. 
Typically, this positions the judiciary as a sectional elite interest group (Poggi, 1990), 
seeking to impose its preferred policies upon government. This includes studies of 
both legislatures' response to judicial decisions (Davis, 2010; Hiebert, 2012; 
Silverstein, 2009; Stone Sweet, 2000) and bureaucratic behaviour, whereby rational 
agents solve the problem posed by compliance with `adverse' rulings in a context of 
complex coordination of competing policy goals (Sunkin, 2004, pp. 70 -71). 
Accounts of increasing judicial impact on `high' politics and governance of moral 
issues have hypothesised a political rationale akin to that of a principal -agent 
arrangement. Politicians may welcome "passing the buck" for determination of 
contentious policies to the courts (Davis, 2010; Hirschl, 2008a),even if the courts 
may thereby "constrain" future strategic choices (Silverstein, 2009, p. 33). Gordon 
Silverstein, for example,holds that in this manner courts establish readily discernible 
"boundaries and frames "(2009, p. 35) within which legislators' and bureaucrats' 
discretion is more limited. However, he is silent on why such judicial parameters 
may be accepted as constraints. Such rationalist accounts of strategic use of the 
courts by governments are also silent on the implications for compliance where a 
deferral of power to the courts risks an unwelcome overstepping of political trust, or 
jurisdictional "slippage "(Alter, 2006, pp. 312 -16). Although the courts are 
commonly held to be cautious of overstepping political boundaries for fear of 
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invoking ire or even non -compliance (Stone Sweet, 2000, p. 88), political backlash is 
an underdeveloped consideration in terms of its mediation of judicial impact on 
policy change. 
In her account of Member States' implementation of rulings from the European 
Court of Justice, Lisa Conant observes that governments will by default endeavour to 
"contain" compliance to the individual case at hand, avoiding impact on broader 
policy guidelines, unless "persistent counterpressure" is imposed for further 
application of the judicial decision (Conant, 2002, pp. 32 -4). A similar appeal to the 
role of political interests and risk -benefit analysis as drivers of judicial impact 
underpins Gerald Rosenberg's highly influential thesis of judicial impotence in the 
United States, The Hollow Hope: that the courts can only influence policy change 
where they facilitate decision makers' pre -existing desire for reform, or where 
compliance is induced by economic or political costs, or incentives from outside 
government. We are quite literally told that governments will comply if they are 
"willing" (Rosenberg, 2008, pp. 31 -5). This process of strategic adjustment may be 
conceived as either a product of individual cognition or organisational function. 
Compliance maybe motivated by a desire not to risk triggering further scrutiny from 
the courts, parliament, the media or international organisations 2012). 
However, there may be not only reputational, but also `psychic' costs to self -image 
where an agency defers to "outlaw" behaviour (Canon, 2004, pp. 82, 89). 
Unfortunately, rational- choicetheories of political behaviour offer no insight into 
how exogenous pressures, of which the judiciary is but one, will lead to compliance 
decisions. They fail to get "inside the box" of how political actors identify and 
understand relevant costs and benefits imposed by the courts and other material 
factors (Hay, 2002, p. 10). These models largely depend upon an assumed primacy of 
cost -benefit calculations as the governing logic of policy change, positing that fuller 
implementation of judicial decisions will ensue where costs are minimal or can be 
deflected. Yet, judicial decisions with a potential impact on policy questions usually 
result from a process of litigation in which governments defend their preferred 
outcome and policy position through to the highest available level of appeal. In other 
words, by its very nature, implementation of judicial decisions would be politically 
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costly; overriding previous political and policy preferences, disrupting equilibrium of 
policy domains and potentially embarrassing those actors who may be seen as 
coerced into formulating policy reforms. Theories of strategic political behaviour are 
not therefore entirely helpful in explaining why political actors do reform policies, 
even if reluctantly, creatively, or symbolically. They may be more useful in 
accounting for rare cases where judicial decisions do not result in implementation via 
policy reforms. 
Political actors may or may not aspire to or succeed in rationally deliberating policy 
alternatives in response to the courts.Yet, where such reasoning is employed, it will 
seek to make the best choices given the circumstances. These subjective 
constructions of the utility of implementation to the realisation of political interests 
will certainly be contingent on the opportunities and exigencies which structure 
evaluation of policy options (Simon, 1985). Implementation decisions may be driven 
as much by "inertia or pride" (Canon, 2004, p. 91) as by instrumental rationality. 
Whilst implementing actors' articulation of perceived interests should not be ignored, 
it is clearly necessary to consider the role of structural factors which condition the 
interpretation and implementation of judicial decisions in the context of policy 
bureaucracies and legislatures. 
Institutional processes and rules 
It has been said that the impact of new -institutionalism on the study of public law put 
the idea of law into its political context (Sheingold, 2008, p. 741). In the broader 
academic study of public policy and political economy, approaches to rules and 
institutional structure as determinants of behaviour have placed varying emphases on 
the influence of bounded rationality, normative constraints and historical -contextual 
path- dependency. These have emphasised the productive outcomes of contention 
between "frames of meaning, scripts and symbols" (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 954) - 
for instance a judicial frame versus a prior organisational one - in potentially 
overcoming entrenched organisational bias(Steinmo, 1993, p. 7), world views and 
associated "self- images and basic preferences" (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Hall & 
Taylor, 1996, p. 940; Trondal, 2001, p. 73). 
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Legal literature has paid more generalised attention to observing legal values and 
rules' increasing influence over institutional function and decision making (Blichner 
& Molander, 2008; Scott, 1998, p. 19). These studies mostly emphasise the 
embodiment of normative and material constraints in cognitive or organisational 
structures involved in policy change. Strategic policy options are thereby bracketed 
by legal constraints activated or imposed by judicial decisions.Such "juridification" 
may be wilfully accepted by political actors where legal values are a "reasonably 
good fit" with those of the system they regulate (Richardson, 2004, p. 122). Studies 
of the impact of the courts on a related "judicialization" of politics (Blichner & 
Molander, 2008; Stone Sweet, 2000) have traced the influence of judicial norms and 
discourse on political interaction (behaviour) and the normative structure of political 
communities (Stone Sweet, 2000, p. 13). Both juridification and judicializationare 
essentially questions of the development of path dependency: long -term processes 
whereby the law and judicial values become increasingly entrenched, taken for 
granted, and thus hard to deviate from. This process has its origins in the state's 
dependence upon the judiciary for arbitration of disputes - stabilising social, 
economic and political relations (Stone Sweet, 1999; Tilly, 1990; Weber, 1978, pp. 
813, 1095). 
In polities with strong constitutional review and a culture of rights -based litigation, 
Alec Stone Sweet has observed a tendency for political debate to mobilise 
constitutional and judicial language and norms to justify and contest the legitimacy 
of legislative provisions. Over time, such referents have become embedded in both 
legislation and political practice, leading to a wilful judicialization of politics, even if 
it is an outcome which most political parties would not consider desirable (A. Stone, 
1992; Stone Sweet, 2000, p. 88). In such cases, judicial power has been accepted and 
institutionalised as a constraint on government, despite political preferences, as a 
means to the pragmatic realisation of policy preferences in a context of dynamic 
tension between government, political opposition and judicial scrutiny. Yet a 
necessary precondition in Stone Sweet's cases is governmental regard for the 
saliency of constitutional law and judicial decisions as a valid and binding constraint 
upon policy making. 
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Judicializationtells us little as to how or why legal referents aremeaningful to 
political actors, and would be adopted as tools to legitimate policies - especially 
where we cannot identify a politics of opposition to government which is mobilised 
around demonstrating policy proposals' implications for constitutional rights 
principles.Theories of judicialization are not concerned so much with explaining the 
conditions affecting compliant implementation of judicial decisions, as with 
developing a broader theory of how judicial influence may manifest within 
government - a more nebulous and diffuse form of indirect judicial impact. This 
approach may help illuminate changes in the mobilisation of political interests over 
time through sustained engagement with the courts. However, it does not help in 
explaining how and why compliance may follow judicial decisions which threaten 
the viability of stated political interests and policy preferences.Similarly, sociological 
arguments about institutional behaviour - for instance, that domestic actors respect 
the ECtHR due to self -perceptions as law abiding internationalists (Çali & Wyss, 
2009) - tell us nothing of how such attitudes are formed,nor how they operate 
differentially on a case by case basis. Accounts of judicial power and the normativity 
of law through the largely synonymous phenomena of `legalisation,' `juridification' 
and judicialization,' tend to agency over decisions as to how, 
when and why to blur boundaries between following rules and exercising discretion 
(Shapiro, 2008, p. 772). 
Nevertheless, we can take from this discussion an implicit emphasis on processes of 
gradual institutional change though learning. The centrality of such processes to 
policy studies provides an important rejoinder. We may ask whether policy makers 
merely `cope' with judicial impact by means of minor changes, or embrace a 
transformation of the logic governing their political behaviour (Radaelli & Schmidt, 
2004, p. 189). Judicialization may comprise just such a transformation, but it is by no 
means inevitable, even under conditions of sustained interaction between 
government agencies and the courts.Institutional and judicialization theories do, 
however, indicate the significance of prior normative, cognitive, and organisational 
frameworks at play in a given policy domain, which may make policy makers more 
or less amenable to implementation of a given judicial decision. Implementation may 
depend uponeither the consistency of a judicial decision with these prior 
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frameworksand "institutional scripts" or its ability to otherwise unsettle these 
dominant practices and understandings (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010, p. 5). Conant's 
observation of contained compliance, noted above, may be taken as an example of 
how prior policy orientations and guiding principles may prove resilient, even in the 
face of sustained judicial scrutiny. Judicialization of political discourse may even 
represent a "de- coupling" of talk about official compliance from any active, deeper 
transformation of beliefs and practices (Brunsson, 2002; March, 1984; Trondal, 
2001, p. 19). 
Such concerns are what lead to the ubiquitous observation that institutionalist 
theories tend to be better at explaining stasis than change. However, a desire to 
account for why change happens has led to a turn to ideas and discourse as indicative 
of how rules, norms and context are understood as both constraining and enabling by 
political actors responding to pressure for reform (Bleich, 2002; Genieys & Smyrl, 
2008; Hay, 2002, 2004; Radaelli & Schmidt, 2004; Schmidt, 2008). Rules and 
institutions are taken not only as a context for political behaviour, but as contingent 
results of actors' thoughts, words and actions - internal to actors, perceived as both 
constraining structures and as constructs which they create and change (Schmidt, 
2008, p. 314 e.1).Crucially, for the purposes of political analysis, such ideas and their 
discursive articulation are expressive of change and its contextualised meaning. 
To refer this discussion back to judicial impact - its meaning and significance may 
be better understood as a product of political actors' apprehension, interpretation and 
enactment of court rulings alongside other policy constraints. These interpretive, 
"ideational factors" mediate between context and conduct (Hay, 2002, p. 167), such 
that a change in policy constitutes a necessary change in the ideas which govern it. 
Judicial impact 'in context' 
So far, the approaches to explaining courts' influence on political function and policy 
change which I have considered have tended towards a recreation of the same 
problematic dichotomy I observed for migration studies' liberal constraint thesis: a 
tension between constraint and discretion, yet with little indication as to how and 
why this tension may be resolved on a case by case basis. However, insights derived 
from the foregoing theoretical consideration may be combined with a sensitivity to 
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`law in context' which is demonstrated by a smaller number of primarily socio -legal 
approaches to judicial impact. Research in this field has emphasised not only the 
significance of historical and contextual configurations of policy culture to the 
influence of judicial decisions on bureaucratic function, but also the central role of 
implementing actors in interpreting and enacting necessary policy change (S. 
Halliday, 1998, 2001; Hertogh & Halliday, 2004b; Hertogh, 2001; Sunkin, 2004). 
This approach is close to what has historically been labelled "sociological 
jurisprudence ": explaining law not as an abstract principle, but as "the actual effects 
of juridical activity" in the context of the particular social world in which it is 
manifest (Mather, 2008, p. 681; Tomlins, 2008, p. 725). The meaning, and therefore 
the impact of judicial review, `mutates' according to administrative procedures 
which revolve around interpretation and reinterpretation of messages received from 
the courts and from other non judicial pressures upon policy making (Halliday 
1998). There may be no clear "hard edge" separating the implications of judicial 
review from innumerable other factors in an "administrative soup of decision 
making" (Sunkin, 2004, p. 71). Equally, the significance of particular court rulings 
may extend far beyond the direct administrative decision or policy measure under 
arbitration, to exert a broader, indirect impact on other areas of government 
(Richardson, 2004, p. 106). Such outcomes will depend on whether and how judicial 
decisions "resonate throughout the polity. "(Sheingold, 2008, p. 743) 
Judicial impact thereby concerns the form and means by which government officials 
secure compliance. The significance of a given judicial decision is not the product of 
an administrative balance between law and discretion (Dworkin, 1978), but 
constituted entirely by "the discretionary decisions that give it meaning." (Mather, 
2008, pp. 690 -1) Implementation may require a broad variety of responses from 
different government agencies and political actors, which may not share a common 
understanding of a judicial decision's implications for policy processes (Sunkin, 
2004, p. 72). Such responses will vary according to who is engaged by a ruling; 
whether, for instance, requiring administrative decisions to be revisited, or 
necessitating legislative amendments in order for policy provisions to conform to the 
law. 
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Even legislative change may be the "beginning of a complex new chapter ", rather 
than the end of the story of judicial impact on policies (Sossin, 2004, pp. 129 -30). 
Ongoing bureaucratic processes are typically involved in developing the scope and 
application of new policies. In this respect, judicial impact may develop and diverge 
over time (Creyke & McMillan, 2004) and across government. Indeed, it is highly 
challenging to isolate judicial impact as a discrete event, such that it may be 
considered distinct from its political and temporal context, given continuous and 
interdependent processes of litigation, policy development and administrative 
renewal (Sossin, 2004). Where it exists, such sustained bureaucratic engagement 
with the courts, or reflection on their impact on policy goals, may even breed 
contempt over time, leading to a ministerial willingness to take legal risks, rather 
than maintain strict compliance (Daintith & Page, 1999, p. 337; Le Seur, 1996, p. 
11). Similarly, sustained exposure to judicial review may simply diminish agencies' 
self -scrutiny or reflection on values relating to judicial review (S. Halliday, 2001). 
This suggests that judicial impact on the governance of a particular policy domain 
may change over time, because the policy domain, the contextually situated 
understanding of judicial decisions, and the role of judicial review are themselves 
subject to change. 
Literature on judicial impact on bureaucratic function draws important attention to 
the need to investigate variation in political responses to the courts, including the 
possibility that such impact may vary across government and over time. Little 
attention has been paid, however, to impact at the level of policy change, as opposed 
to bureaucratic behaviour. In particular, the role of potential political backlash 
against the constraints imposed by compliance with judicial decisions requires 
further consideration. Nevertheless, an important concern to be taken from the 
judicial impact literature is that policy change is neither a product of the inherent 
normative authority of judicial decisions, nor necessarily of a predictably stable 
political rationality or institutional configuration. Rather judicial impact arisesin 
interpretations which are contingent and potentially subject to change: "what the 
court proclaims is not always what the agency understands "(Canon, 2004). 
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As such, we should not ask whether litigation drives changes to policies without first 
asking what general impact and influence judicial decisions may have on various 
actors' interpretations of the relevant policy context and associated roles and 
responsibilities. In this regard, attitudes towards law in general will also shape 
judicial impact (Ewick & Silbey, 1998; Hertogh & Halliday, 2004b, p. 283; van der 
Burg & Taekema, 2004).Such factors are not merely a cognitive facet of decision 
makers, but also derive from the context in which discretion is exercised. In this 
respect, the nature of asylum control in the UK as a policy domain is highly relevant 
to consideration of how policy decisions are determined, including how to respond to 
the courts. Prior experience and knowledge of legal norms and conventions "at once 
constrain and facilitate, delimit and enable" (McCann, 1996, p. 467). Law functions 
here not as discrete rules.Through the language and practices of policy governance, 
law enters into implementing actors' self -understanding, explanations and 
negotiations of naming, blaming and claiming authority and control (McCann, 1996, 
p. 467). 
By endorsing the potential for insights to be gained into judicial impact in these 
terms, I am exhorting an interpretivist approach to the subjective understanding of 
court rulings inside government. This agenda is motivated by a belief that subjective 
constructions of meaning by political actors and policy bureaucracies are both 
fundamentally important and observable determinants of how and why judicial 
decisions are implemented(Hertogh & Halliday, 2004b, p. 275). The task of analysis 
is therefore to identify and engage with what governmental agencies interpret 
compliance to mean in practice (Canon, 2004). To investigate judicial impact in such 
terms is to pursue what Steven Lukes has called a "three dimensional" understanding 
of power: not merely decision making, persuasion or inducement, but a shaping of 
values and interests according to norms and ideologies, manifest in social 
interactions, language and actions, yet not necessarily conscious or explicit(Lukes, 
2005, p. 13). The power of the courts - or judicial impact - is something 
fundamentally internal to the politics and administration of government and its self - 
understanding, beliefs and desires. 
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I return to the specificities of how such an approach may be applied conceptually in 
my next chapter. In the remainder of this chapter, I firstly provide a brief synthesis of 
what the foregoing literatures suggest as to possible variation in the outcome of 
judicial impact on policy change. I then close the chapter by highlightingplausible 
factors arising from my review of existing approacheswhich warrant particular 
consideration of their potential role in shaping judicial impact on a case by case 
basis. 
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Typologies of change in existing literature 
Judicial decisions may hypothetically impact on a variety of social and political 
issues, inside and outside government, including public attitudes, for example. 
However, given my interest in policy change and its political framing, I will now 
endeavour to summarise key trends and themes of studies which have sought to 
capture and differentiate such direct impact on government. This overview provides 
a spring -board for further elaboration of how judicial impact on policy change can be 
apprehended and contrasted in my next chapter. Here, I draw primarily upon insights 
from qualitative studies of bureaucratic behaviour in response to judicial injunctions 
to revisit administrative decisions, alter overarching decision making processes, or 
policy regimes. Certainly, the context of legislative change is significantly different 
to such bureaucratic responses. However, a suitable typological overview may be 
applicable to both contexts, so long as care is taken in each instance to consider 
relevant factors which may affect implementing actors and agencies' interpretations 
of judicial decisions and requisite policy change. 
Firstly, it should be noted that judicial impact does not necessarily imply policy 
change, and will include responses designed to oppose, appease and overrule judicial 
decisions. As noted earlier in this chapter, expectations of reluctance and political 
opposition to implementation, or even a null -hypothesis, characterise much research 
on judicial impact (Creyke & McMillan, 2004; Hertogh & Halliday, 2004a). This 
scepticism is reflected in the sheer variety of indecisive and oppositional responses 
encapsulated in more comprehensive typologies of judicial impact on bureaucratic 
reform: 
1. Denying the existence of the judicial decision; 
2. Depreciating the decision by interpreting it to be inapplicable; 
3. Dissociating from the field covered by the decision; 
4. Becoming indecisive; 
5. Keeping the original attitude and derogating from the law; 
6. Accentuating the original attitude and derogating from the law; 
7. Converting to the legal attitude; 
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8. Diminishing the importance of or eliminating an originally equivocal 
attitude. 
(Canon & Johnson, 1999, based on Muir 1967 and Johnson 1967) 
Only numbers seven and eight of these various responses would constitute 
compliance. In her consideration of implementation of rulings of the European Court 
of Justice, Lisa Conant (2002, pp. 32 -3)has noted that non -implementation or 
legislative over -rule of judicial decisions is actually very uncommon. So too, 
however, is complete application of judicial decisions as policy. Conant has argued 
that following a typical period of debate or policy stagnation, during which political 
compromises are made, a ruling will meet with one of three common responses: 
1. Contained compliance - legal interpretations are only applied to the 
particular individual court case which activated judicial scrutiny, and not 
as broader policy guidelines; 
2. Restrictive application as policy - secondary legislation is used to place 
limits and exceptions on judicial principles' adoption as policy; 
3. Pre -emption - new law is constructed in such a way as to avoid future 
judicial interference. 
There is certainly value in Conant's emphasis on such strategic means of limiting the 
potential disruptive effects of adverse judicial decisions on the viability of policy 
goals. However, it would be advantageous to be able to articulate judicial impact on 
policy change in cases where compliance may indeed constrain policy goals. 
In their overview of several decades of the study of the courts' impact on 
bureaucratic behaviour in the United States, Bradley Canon and Charles Johnson 
distinguish three phases of judicial impact: interpretation of what a ruling means; a 
weighing of options, driven by cost -benefit analysis; and a behavioural response 
(Canon & Johnson, 1999; Canon, 2004, pp. 85 -95). This trifecta is intended to help 
explain the trajectory of judicial influence from receipt of a ruling through to a final 
material response. However, it also indicates the distinct importance of political 
actors' orientation towards a judicial decision and their subsequent rationalisation of 
how to respond. Bradley Canon (2004)describes the former as an "acceptance 
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decision" -a psychological reaction to the ruling, which depends on prior attitudes 
towards the policy under review, the court, and the perceived consequences of its 
decision. These are shaped by the decision maker's understanding of their social role 
and responsibilities - for example, a career politician courting public opinion and the 
media, or an agency director facing potential internaldissent (Canon & Johnson, 
1999, pp. 24-5). These factors are integral to the interpretation of judicial decisions, 
and will necessarily influence understanding of and attitudes towards possible 
"behavioural" responses to the court, in terms of implementing the judicial decision. 
Such prior factors will, however, only be feasible objects of investigation to the 
extent that they are manifest in the discursive articulation of compliant policy change 
and its justification. Nevertheless, we may distinguish between material responses to 
the courts such as those outlined by Lisa Conant, and more subjective interpretive 
responses which reflect what implementing actors perceive to be at stake. To the 
extent that it can be mobilised as an object of analysis, the latter offers more scope 
for understanding the perceived consequences of a judicial decision for the viability 
of the policy regime which is subject to compliant changes, rather than simply 
whether or not to `contain' compliance. 
Such an approach must take account of the possibility that what governments 
perceive to be significant about judicial impact may not be limited to (or even 
evidenced by) reform to formal procedures, guidelines or legislation. In so far as 
implementing actors' interpretations matter, impact may be significant "more in the 
way of impassioned argument than real change" (Canon, 2004, p. 78). In this respect, 
BradleyCanon notes judicial policies in the US that have met significant "resistance 
or evasion "by bureaucracies have nevertheless "changed the behaviour of millions of 
people ": desegregation, removal of prayers from schools, and legalisation of 
abortion, for example(2004, p. 78). Such impact may be apparent in the way 
implementing actors respond to the courts and justify their actions and beliefs.This is 
to say that change to ideas potentially matters as much as material changes to 
operational guidelines or legislation. 
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Key Factors for further consideration (insights and gaps) 
Thus far, I have sought to delineate possible ways in which judicial decisions may 
impact on policy. I now wish to summarise central observations to be taken from this 
overview, which will inform my further theoretical and empirical engagement with 
judicial impact in subsequent chapters. 
Existing migration studies on the courts' influence on controls tend towards a 
reductive dualism of absolute constraint or exceptional discretion (where 
securitisation occurs). A similarly two dimensional impression of judicial impact 
characterises much other political science on the relationship between government 
and judiciary; judicialization of politics and related conceptualisations tacitly 
position legal and political logics of government as discrete and potentially zero-. 
sum. However, legal values and judicial review are inherent and constitutive of 
government, and this should not be ignored. Rather we should interrogate their 
manifestation in the practice of compliance with the courts. 
Theories oriented around strategic political responses to court rulings cannot explain 
why political actors would accept increased constraints form the judiciary. Constraint 
oriented theories, in turn, face challenges in explaining how such constraints are 
internalised, overcome or altered by political actors to comply with judicial 
decisions. Theories which focus on the role of policy ideas and legality as contingent 
constructs may help resolve some of these deficiencies. These cut directly to the 
significance of interpretation of judicial rulings and their implementation in a 
political context. Emphasis is placed on the processes and actors involved in 
implementing judicial decisions - and how they structure and navigate any perceived 
institutional constraints, or strategic costs and benefits to be negotiated in responding 
to judicial decisions.Rational calculations of utility and of institutional constraints are 
not seen as fixed features of policy making and judicial impact. For instance, 
institutional structures and policy making cultures are considered to be adaptable 
contexts for policy making. Ideational shifts or changes to how a policy problem is 
framed and talked about may enhance or de- emphasise structural constraints and 
change operational logics at play in policy making. As such, this approach to 
examining policy change may supplement strategic and constraint based accounts of 
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judicial impact with a more refined attention to how interpretive processes at work 
within policy making lead to policy change. According to this model of the public 
policy process, judicial decisions have no inherent authority or power over 
government prior to their translation and reconstruction in a process of 
communication within and between political and administrative actors. 
Emergent concerns 
From my overview of literature,three general observations emerge, along with two 
specific factors which guide my further enquiry. 
Firstly, a satisfactory account of judicial impact must be able to account for how and 
why the courts meet with varying responses from government. This is a resounding 
explanatory deficit in existing approaches, which tend to a reductive account of 
interests and constraints. Engagement with this question will require comparative 
consideration of varying responses to judicial decisions and their impact on policy 
change. 
Secondly, a broad conceptualisation of impact must be adopted - not simply 
compliance, constraint or its absence. This will be necessary in accounting for 
variation. 
Thirdly, compliance with the courts should be considered in the broad context of 
surrounding political and policy processes. This may involve consideration of 
judicial impact as a complex and varied phenomenon within government, subject to 
potential mutation over time. 
In addition to these general observations, two specific themes emerge from my 
overview: the need for particular investigation of the significance of the source of the 
judicial decision and whether compliance is politically contested. These are not 
proposed as explanatory variables. Rather their appearance as potentially significant 
factors in existing accounts of judicial impact suggests that they matter in some way 
- not necessarily that they are predictive of a particular outcome. Evaluating their 
place in governmental responses to the courts, as part of empirical investigation of 
judicial impact, allows consideration of their merits for a fuller understanding of the 
phenomenon. Having already observed these concerns in my foregoing overview of 
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existing literature, I will summarise them here in brief. In doing so, I endeavour to 
highlight their potential role as factors which may mediate rulings' influence on how 
governments negotiate judicial impact to legitimate the continued stability of policies 
and political authority over them. 
Politicisation 
As I have emphasised, judicial impact is a product of political responses. However, 
existing literature on judicial impact suggests a number of ways in which political 
opposition to compliance with the courts(which I will term politicisation of 
compliance) may render judicial impact on policy change unlikely or more nuanced. 
Theories of the securitisation of migration and of bureaucratic responses to the courts 
each emphasise a will to discretion and tendency to oppose unwelcome constraints 
on policy preferences(Bigo, 2002; S. Halliday, 1998; Huysmans, 2006). Similarly, 
literature on constitutional review in the US and the judicialization thesis predicate 
judicial power on a political willingness to adopt judicial framings of a policy. Put 
simply, political opposition to judicial framings, even if only rhetorical, may militate 
against their impact on policy change. In such cases, governments may delay or 
minimise compliance, opting to risk further judicial scrutiny. Equally, should judicial 
decisions activate strong political contestation in terms of constitutional and rights 
based norms, such theories suggest that political interest may enhance judicial 
impact, potentially leading to extensive policy change in line with the courts' 
reasoning(Hirschl, 2008a; Rosenberg, 2008; Silverstein, 2009; Stone Sweet, 2000). 
Indeed, political attention to a stimulus for reform is a fundamental pre- requisite 
condition in most dominant theories of policy change (Sabatier & Weible, 2007; 
True, Jones, & Baumgartner, 2007; e.g. Zahariadis, 2007). The presence or absence 
of political resistance to compliance may also reflect the level of change required, as 
suggested by certain socio -legal and administrative law studies(Creyke & McMillan, 
2004; Sossin, 2004; Sunkin, 2004). Legislative change, for example, will require 
overturning previous commitments and efforts to justify reforms in a manner 
conducive to mobilisation of widespread public and parliamentary support. 
Dynamics of political legitimation are particularlylikely to shift where compliance 
with the courts becomes the object of public, media and parliamentary scrutiny, 
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enhancing the importance of rhetoric and symbolic decisions to meet public approval 
(Boswell et al., 2011, p. 15; Brunsson, 2002; Edelman, 1988). Political posturing and 
endeavours to avoid blame for policy failures(Hood, 2010; Weaver, 1986) may lead 
to a degree of intransigent resistance to judicial impactwhich is perhaps less likely 
when compliance can be negotiated outside the public spotlight. However, 
unwillingness to pursue policy change need not be a pre- requisite for politicisation of 
compliance. Government may gladly blame the courts for unpopular policy 
change(Hirschl, 2008a). 
Particular attention must therefore be paid to cases in which judicial decisions garner 
exceptional political scrutiny or controversy, in order to better understand its role in 
shaping the resulting form of judicial impact. Put simply, it seems likely that 
`politicisation' may influence how governments negotiate and justify judicial impact 
on policy change. 
Source of the judicial decision 
When interpreting the meaning and significance of a judicial decision and its 
potential impact on policy objectives, the `source' of the ruling may also be of some 
significance (from the perspective of the implementing actor or agency). Like 
`politicisation,' the court deliveringa ruling may also comprise a mediating factor in 
determining how governments negotiate judicial impact on policy change.Prior 
attitudes to thelegitimacy of a courtwill shape responses to the rulings it hands 
down(Canon, 2004). Given the particular emphasis paid to constitutional rather than 
statutory review in much existing literature, and the contentious suggestion that the 
ECtHR may comprise a pseudo -constitutional court of final appeal for migrants, such 
potential variation in political attitudes deserves consideration. 
The need for investigation on this level is also suggested by the historical 
ambivalence of successive British governments towards the legitimacy of the ECtHR 
(Bates, 2010, p. 434; Drzemczewski, 1995, p. 174; Lester, 1998; Marston, 1993)and 
general tendency of British politics to claim exceptionalism in opposition 
to`Europeanisation'(Risse, 2001, p. 205).Consideration should be given to whether 
governments have sought to legitimate their political authority by posturing against 
`foreign' imposition of constraints by the ECtHR in a manner which 
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divergesfromtheir responses to the municipal courts. Where observed, such responses 
to the Court in Strasbourg may equally prove consistent with British governments' 
tenuous regard for the authority of the municipal courts (Griffith, 1997; Le Seur, 
1996, p. 98; Rozenberg, 1997). 
The significance of the source of rulings can be approached in terms of possible 
divergences in political and administrative reactions according to whether judicial 
decisions are on the vertical or horizontal plane (i.e. whether handed down from 
ECtHR or municipal courts). This also allows for related contribution to the debate in 
migration studies on whether it is domestic review or supranational human rights 
norms which are employed as the basis of constraints on migration and asylum 
controls. Notably, such supranational norms may be the basis for municipal review. 
It could be that political actors perceive the constraining power of rights as a product 
of the court adjudicating their application, or that the perceived power of the court 
emanates from particular political significance attached to the legal principles it 
invokes. As such, care must be taken in interrogating this factor. 
Conclusion 
This chapter began with an exposition of explanatory deficiencies in existing 
migration studies on courts' influence over migration and asylum control policies. 
Certain gaps were identified, including a need to specify variation in how judicial 
decisions may affect asylum controls. To this end, I have offered some preliminary 
insights into how governmental responses may vary, with a particular emphasis on 
policy change. However, the matter of how and why such variation occurs remains 
largely unanswered. My consideration of existing literature on judicial impact from a 
variety of disciplines has indicated a number of factors which require further 
investigation. It has also indicated the need for detailed qualitative empirical analysis 
in order to understand how and why governments respond to the courts in a 
particular manner. That is to say that we must study how change happens. This 
depends significantly upon the political context in which judicial decisions are 
interpreted and implemented. Only by careful consideration of these political 
processes can an understanding be arrived at as to how and why variation manifests 
in judicial impact on policy change and its political framing. This requires an account 
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of the relationship between plausible constitutive factors (such as source and 
politicisation) and substantive outcomes - i.e. variations in the substantive 
implementation of judicial impact and broader discursive responses. This is above all 
a phenomenon of political adjustment. As such, we must focus on processes within 
government. 
In beginning to advance my agenda for research, I have emphasised the need to 
contextualise judicial impact within its broader policy and political context - to adopt 
a `broad take.' I have also indicated the importance of taking a `long view' of 
judicial impact, which may mutate over time. This requires abandoning the idea of a 
singular, definitive impact of the courts on policy change in favour of its long term 
development in political consciousness, policy framing and practice. Beyond the 
burgeoning trend in migration studies to explain policy outcomes by recourse to such 
political processes, my approach will also contribute to the little understood matter of 
how political agents cope with unwelcome change (Schmidt, 2011, p. 122). 
As it is the focus of my next chapter, I have not attended to necessary distinctions 
betweenchanges to policy ideas and material changes to the content of legislation and 
operational guidelines as indicators of policy change. Explanatory insights will come 
from attending to the qualitative character of political responses to judicial 
imperatives, rather than from searching for a particular predictive quality of material 
or structural triggers from inside or outside the political system. The qualitative 
processes through which judicial impact on policy unfolds are very much products of 
how the political and administrative systems of government respond to the courts, 
relating to how imperatives are interpreted and acted upon within government. 
Discursive practices, or how a policy problem, such as asylum, is talked about and 
framed by government therefore matter and should be considered. Political debate 
and policy framings not only comprise an important arena in which policy options 
and underlying assumptions are deployed, explored, challenged and justified. They 
are also important sources for political analysis of policy change. Moreover, rhetoric 
and practice in government, or what is said and what is done in response to the 
courts, may differ to the point of being contradictory. For this reason, it is worth 
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considering judicial impact on both planes of government, and how these may 
intersect or diverge. 
To address these concerns and develop a suitable approach for their investigation, we 
must give due consideration to the nature of governmental processes involved in 
interpreting, enacting, coping with, and justifying change. This means looking 
carefully at how and why government functions in a given manner when presented 
with unwelcome stimuli. In doing so, my next chapter turns to consider, in detail, the 
inherent and constitutive role of political interpretation, or the `sense- making' 
function of government, in stabilising policy meanings and legitimating their 
function. In particular, I turn to consideration of policy making, not as an exercise in 
problem solving, but as a process of constituting problems (such as compliance) as 
stable objects for political action. 
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3.Interpreting policy impact as a 
discursive problem 
Introduction 
A major factor limiting the explanatory potential of existing approaches to judicial 
impact has been a common tendency to focus onwhether or not constraint happens.In 
this chapter, I argue that necessary understanding of factors leading to variation in 
judicial impact requires engagement with how the political and administrative 
systems of government respond to the courts.It is through governmental processes of 
interpreting, enacting, coping with and justifying policy change that judicial 
imperatives find political meaning and significance. In addressing these themes, this 
chapter presents the `interpretivist' approach which I have argued will facilitate 
greater understanding of judicial impact on policy change. 
I begin by conceptualising governmental function as `sense- making' in a context of 
complexity and ambiguity. This concerns the inherent and constitutive role of 
political interpretation in stabilising policy meanings and legitimating political 
authority over them. I then turn to the role of political discourse in not only 
responding to and organising political pressures, but also constituting policy 
problems (such as compliance with judicial decisions). I argue that it is through 
discursive practices of government that not only policies, but the problems they 
address are meaningfully constituted and legitimated as objects for political action 
and policy intervention. I draw upon existing literature from rhetorical psychology 
and the role of discourse in the study of policy change to present two analytical 
typologies which allow for specification and differentiation of characteristics of this 
process of sense- making in government as a discursive practice which is both 
indicative and constitutive of policy change.Finally, I turn to the particularly 
significant role of governmental documents and political rhetoric in this process. 
Although much of this discussion of governmental function is conducted in the 
abstract, I endeavour to ground my engagement with policy governance in terms of 
how it may facilitate the study of political responses to the courts. Nevertheless, the 
conceptualisation of government I present may be conducive to general studies of 
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policy change and political adjustment in response to other unwelcome stimuli for 
reform. 
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Policy making as sense -making 
From observation to interpretation 
In order to understand the impact of judicial decisions on asylum control policies and 
their framing, we first must reconsider what policy making consists of as a process. 
Many conventional approaches conceive of this process in rationalist terms(notably, 
Sabatier, 2007), whereby an objective problem comes to policy makers' attention, 
has some measurable impact on the agenda of those who may observe and select to 
engage with it, at which time interventions to solve the problem are evaluated and 
selected (Bennett & Howlett, 1992; Heclo, 1974, p. 305; Lindblom, 1959).Such 
approaches tend to focus on how objective problems are successfully promoted onto 
the political agenda(Kingdon, 1995; Sabatier & Weible, 2007; True et al., 2007; 
Zahariadis, 2007). Many alternative conceptualisations of policy as a response to 
social and political problems, notably the garbage can model(M. D. Cohen, March, & 
Olsen, 1972), offer a riposte to this rationalist approach - that policy makers often 
have preferred policy tools which they are inclined to bring to bear before fully 
considering their suitability as a response to the problem at hand. Such accounts of 
thepredispositions of political agents are similar to those which affirm the importance 
of historical and contextual factors which institutionsare to bring 
to bear in shaping and constraining the trajectory of a policy programme(Blyth, 
2002; Hall, 1993; Krasner, 1988; Pierson, 2000) 
So called new -institutionalist approaches put necessary emphasis on how policies are 
not a direct or logical response to real world problems which exist `out there.' Policy 
formulation and implementationhave conventionally been regarded as influencedby a 
complex array of interests,organisational protocols, habits, and normative 
principles(Schmidt, 2010). We may, however, go one step further to consider how, 
within this context, policy actors interpret the stimulus for policy change.Policy 
making and implementation involve a necessary process of sense -making which not 
only receives, but also translates a problem into a meaningful signal which can be 
readily acted upon within the terms of reference of the policy sub -system and its 
associated politics. This is an inescapable intermediary step between the observation 
of problems and the policy response. Policy change depends not only on the 
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opportunity to couple problems with solutions (Kingdon, 1995); discursive activity is 
required to mobilise ideas and produce arguments for this linkage, through which the 
very problem and solution are reformulated (Zittoun, 2009, p. 77). 
The meaning of policy problems 
The centrality of argumentation and its creative act of shaping the meaning of policy 
options are generally accepted ontological precepts of mainstream policy change 
theories (Benford & Snow, 1988; Kingdon, 1995, p. 482; Sabatier & Weible, 
2007).Policy entrepreneurs seek to persuade government that their understanding of a 
problem leads necessarily to a preferred solution. In this struggle over meaning, the 
"primary interest" of all actors in a policy system is to secure "a monopoly on 
political understanding concerning the policy of interest, and an institutional 
arrangement that reinforces that understanding." (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993, p. 6) 
A direct correlative of this pressure for political attention is that when governmental 
actors engage with such calls for action on "who gets what, when, how" (Lasswell, 
1936),they must interpret and reflect upon the argument posed and options available; 
they "power "and "puzzle "(Heclo, 1974),In so far as the sovereignty of the state 
resides in the "power to define and make definitions stick" (Bauman, 1991, pp. 1 -2), 
government comprises a quest for order and control over meaning(Hajer & Laws, 
2008, p. 252; van Gunsteren, 1976), guided by "the lure of stability that policy actors 
experience "(Boswell et al., 2011; Hajer & Laws, 2008, p. 251). Yet, ambivalence 
and doubt are always a part of policy making (Hajer & Laws, 2008, p. 252). For 
example, we may recall successive governments' characterisation of immigration 
and asylum control as complex and unpredictable - particularly when faced with 
intense judicial scrutiny (see chapter one). 
In a situation involving value conflicts or conflicting interpretations of facts, such as 
is often the basis of arbitration by the courts, straightforward choices between clear 
policy alternatives may not be available or attractive. This is consistent with 
rationalist conceptualisations of policy making as an exercise in efficient delineation 
of social problems from which one may infer logical solutions. However, this 
requires that policy makers interpret not only competing problem definitions, but 
also theirimplicit characterisation of thewho, what, when and how, which constitute 
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the classical vision of political decision making.This process of delineating objects of 
interest within the policy processseeks to specify not only the perceived problem to 
be acted upon, but also the actors entitled to do so. Indeed, whether a situation is 
construed as a policy problem at all depends upon how policy makers define it in 
relation to their values and aspirations (Kingdon, 1995, p. 111), as well as their self - 
perceived roles and responsibilities. Policy makers' puzzling constitutes the very 
problems upon which government acts. In doing so, the puzzling actors not only 
assign responsibility, butseek to legitimate their role as intervening agents(D. Stone, 
2002, pp. 204, 209). The study of politics therefore becomes the study of how 
government interprets, understands, and actively constitutes the who, what, when and 
how involved in diagnosing policy problems and prescribing solutions. 
From problem 'setting' to legitimating solutions 
Scholars and practitioners of policy analysis and planning have long noted that 
conflicts over the legitimate trajectory of a policy are the product of inherent and 
often divergent understandings of what the problem is and what should be done 
about it. Martin Rein and Donald Schön (1996) have termed this the "problem - 
setting narrative ": a story line which participants may or may not agree upon or 
identify with. Elsewhere, studies of social interaction and of social movements have 
engaged with interpretive schema: the organising framework or array of 
preconceptions through which individuals "locate, perceive, identify, and label" that 
which they encounter in their environment (Goffman, 1974, p. 24). The function of 
this interpretive process is not only to order and simplify social and political reality, 
but to mobilise support for a particular course of action which is held to follow from 
the schema, and to delegitimise alternatives (Benford & Snow, 1988, p. 198). As 
such, there is not only an interpretive function to policy making. Policy making also 
brings to bear a significant normative content in seeking to identify, order, stabilise 
and legitimate both proposed policy solutions (implicitly also the problem definition 
itself) and the intervening actor as arbiter and bearer of this solution.The main 
consequence of ambiguity in policy making is therefore a "constant struggle over the 
criteria for classification, the boundaries of categories, and the definition of ideals 
that guide the way people behave." (D. Stone, 2002, p. 11)This is to say that the 
meaning of social and political phenomena is dependent upon what political actors 
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take them to mean (Edelman, 1988). This approach to political meaning has its 
parallels in literary theory, which has long affirmed the constitutive role of the reader 
as co- author of textual meaning (Barthes, 1977). Similarly, it resonates with the tenet 
of psychotherapy, that "the meaning of any communication is the response it elicits." 
(Maag, 1999, p. 14) Meaning, interpretation and (re)action are often coterminous. 
Policy analysis must therefore "capture how policy actors deal with ambiguity and 
allocate particular significance to specific social or physical events." (Hajer & Laws, 
2008, p. 252)For the case of courts' influence on policy change, this requires 
engagement with how government defines the impact of a court ruling on the 
realisation of existing policy goals, and associated endeavours to make this definition 
`stick.' Suchpolicy meaning is necessarily ambiguous and unstable, as it is very 
much a product of linguistic construction in a given social context (Fischer, 2003, p. 
58). The stable meaning of policy goals, compliance and political authority over 
these, are all subject to this process of interpretation and legitimation. This is a 
process in which ideas matter - they are the content, the medium and the mode of 
influence (D. Stone, 2002, p. 11). 
It must be emphasised that such discursive influence over the meaning and 
interpretation of political ideas is not necessarily an insidious bid for political 
discretion, as implied by some approaches to political discourse (e.g. critical 
discourse analysis: Fairclough, 2001; also, critical security studies: Buzan et al., 
1998). The interpretation and framing of political problems and stabilisation of 
meanings is an inherent part of all policy making and political rhetoric in a context of 
complexity and ambiguity. In that policy ideas are both produced and indicated by 
their discursive articulation,problem definition is also a process in which political 
actors' agency over meaning can be apprehended and its effects observed. As such, I 
suggest that consideration of the discursive process of problem definition and 
justification offers great potential for understanding and identifying how policy 
change is understood and managed by government. Discourse can be approached as 
both an indicator of policy change, and a substantive plane on which it takes place. I 
therefore turn now to consider how one may go about studying political actors' 
constitutive engagement with policy problems. 
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Policy as problematisation 
Carol Baachi's approach to policy analysis, which she sums up as asking "what's the 
problem supposed to be ?" emphasises that policies represent problems in a particular 
way, rather than simply reflecting them. Her work stands against the dominant 
paradigm of evidence -based policy making and its problem solving approach. In 
doing so, it comprises an approach to policy analysis which is consistent with my 
argument in favour of attention to policy making as a process which is constitutive of 
political meaning.Baachi (2009) argues that governments do not simply react to 
existing problems, but in engaging with "the real world" in all its complexity, they 
delineate and interrogate phenomena (such as a judicial decision) in a way that fixes 
them as policy problems requiring interrogation and action. These 
"problematisations" have consequent effects upon the character and trajectory of 
policy programmes. Baachi's approach is very much grounded in the Foucauldian 
understanding of problematisation as both a social phenomenon and a methodology 
to expose and destabilise the assumptions which underpin it: 
analysing, not behaviour or ideas, nor societies and their `ideologies', but the 
problematizations through which being offers itself to be, necessarily thought 
- and the practices on the basis of which these problematizations are formed." 
(Foucault, 1985, p. 11) 
Analysis of problematisations involves uncovering the forms which it takes, and the 
practices through which it is formed - an exploration of "the way in which discursive 
practices construct and normalize particular representations of issues" (Howarth, 
2000, p. 134). Discourse theoristssuch as David Howarth (2000) have sought to 
contrast this focus on discursive practice with Jacques Den -ida's deconstructive 
method, which seeks to reconstruct the logic and intentions of textsso as to expose 
their implicit "limit points "; the oppositional, conceptual boundaries and logics 
which provide texts with an appearance of coherence(1981, p. 16). Derrida's 
deconstruction thereby seeks to specify these privileged concepts and logics and their 
necessary repression of opposing others. However, such an "oppositional' logic ", or 
normalisation, is shared by both textual and discursive meaning, which both seek to 
rhetorically delimit and render coherent a particular problematisation against implicit 
unstated alternatives (Billig, 1996). Both the Foucauldian and deconstructive 
approaches share a common goal of exposing inherent stabilisation of meaning and 
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its fundamental normative content in privileging one construction of social reality 
over alternatives. As such,both approaches - to discursive practice, and its textual 
artefact - are an inspiration for the project of exposing, specifying and thereby 
interrogating the process through which policy makers seek to delimit, stabilise and 
articulate their particular perspective on policy problems, valid policy interventions 
and appropriate intervening actors. 
The logic and function of discourse 
For the purposes of this thesis, anapproach to policy as problematisation may 
comprise looking for the `stories' government tells about compliance, judicial impact 
and asylum control. Such stories are the means through which government makes 
sense of and manages uncertainty, complexity and controversy (Roe, 1994, pp. ix -x). 
In studying these, the guiding logic and normative assumptions involved in 
constructing a narrative of cause and effect will be of particular interest: policy as the 
articulation of a "normative leap" from "is" to "ought "(Rein & Schön, 1993, p. 11)- 
an argument as to how a given problem leads naturally to a proposed 
solution.Baachi's call to engage with how problem representations are constructed is 
a good starting point for the consideration of policy change.But to understand the 
significance rather than just the substance of policy change requires an uncovering 
and engagement with the underlying assumptions and logic involved in the 
constitution of problems. This is particularly important for interrogation ofcases 
involving apparent controversy or conflict over compliance with courts.Insights into 
the guiding logic and normative assumptions which underpin policy problematisation 
may account forsuch political contestation as a product of the interpretation of 
judicial impact on policy. By recourse to discourse and its function in not only 
articulating, but assigning meaning, we may study how policy makers make sense of 
complex policy problems, uncovering the attitudes and assumptions involved. 
Although there is no single, unified method (Zittoun, 2009), analysis of discursive 
data is already an accepted approach to the reconstruction and categorisation of 
actors' beliefs and perspectives (Vennesson, 2008, p. 234). Turning to how political 
actors talk about actions or events may provide some insight into the role of 
underlying subjective meanings or motivations(Fischer, 2003, p. 141) driving policy 
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change in response to the courts. Discourse is not a transparent vehicle through 
which actors convey beliefs or value positions - although they will doubtlessly be 
privileged. Besides being the content of policy problematisations, discourse is also 
the tool through which such meaning is rendered from complex social and political 
reality, distinguishing particular aspects of a situation (Hajer, 1993, pp. 45 -6). We 
may therefore consider how political discourse selects, organises and interprets the 
problems with which it engages(Fischer, 2003, p. 143), and also provides a meaning 
context within which we understand that problem. How a problem is constructed in 
political discourse can affect whether it is presented as intractable, irrelevant, or in 
need of imperative action (Baachi, 2009). Discursive framing is also an act of 
classification which attempts to render an issue stable (Hajer & Laws, 2008, p. 253), 
guiding perceptions towards a coherent and consistent understanding of an issue, 
rather than opening it up to deliberation; an attempt at persuasive definition and 
concrete suggestion. A judicial decision calling for policy change, or more broadly, 
the parameters of human rights principles as legitimate constraints on asylum 
control, may comprise such problems considered by government in the wake of 
judicial decisions - as articulated discursively in documents and rhetoric. 
However, discourse is also an action -oriented practice which functions within a 
particular social context.For example, political discourse within government serves 
tocoordinate and communicate policy ideas. Scope for specification of meaning and 
associated legitimation of problem definitions and policy interventions are provided 
for and bounded by established rules and relationships between speakers and 
audiences.This political contextdetermines the functional logic and normative 
assumptions which guidethe role of discourse in government. In particular, thisraises 
the importance of what Maarten Hajer (2009) has termed "the authority question" in 
government: the crucial role of discourse and performance in justifying an 
authoritative response to a problem. Judicial decisions which challenge policies and 
political programmes may constitute a moment of "dislocation ", a situation "where 
political routines seem to be lifted from their solid institutional hinges." (Hajer, 2009, 
p. 5) Such dislocation requires the "re- enactment" of political authority (Howarth, 
2000). Hajer (2009, p. 7) emphasises that the highly mediatised and performative 
character of modern politics means that the most important aspect for the 
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investigation of governmental authority is the political drama and discourse which 
the public can see, rather than what goes on behind closed doors. However, we must 
remember the parallel significance of not only communicative discourses which 
intend to justify authority to constituents outside government, but also the 
coordinative discourses which serve to enact that authority within government 
(Schmidt, 2008). It is on both planes that government performatively re- enacts its 
authority as part of its inherent function. This is an ongoing process, whereby 
discourse serves to keep political routines firmly attached to their `institutional 
hinges.' In this manner, the case studies which form the basis of my empirical 
research (outlined in the next chapter) comprise a reading of governmental discursive 
sources in terms of how they function to narrate governmental capacity, authority 
and control in the face of potentially destabilising changes to a policy area, such as 
asylum control, when presented with unwelcome interventions from the courts. 
Policy as narrating political authority 
By attending to politics as performance and policy as an exercise in problematisation, 
two notable functions are emphasised. As discursive constructs, policies order 
complex and ambiguous pressures for change. In doing so, they also seek to signal 
political authority and capacity to manage change. There is a certain paradox 
involved in the tense relationship between narrating the stable continuity of political 
authority and capacity on the one hand, and the change which it must negotiate on 
the other. This tension is somewhat characteristic of politics, which involves 
demarcating a spatial sphere over which certain actors and institutions have stable 
authority, as well as managing the potentially unstable relationship between present 
social and political experience and a "horizon of expectation "(Koselleck, 1985; 
Palonen, 2006a, 2006b). Government is an endeavour to claim stable authority whilst 
constantly shifting the balance between past and possible future policy trajectories. 
Political engagement with change therefore presents a challenge to stable political 
identity; tensions between `experience' and `expectations' must be addressed, or else 
they may appear irreconcilable. Arbitration by the legal system facilitates 
equilibrium by shielding the political system from potentially destabilising disputes 
(M. King & Thornhill, 2003, p. 112; Stone Sweet, 1999).Yet the outcomes of legal 
arbitration also comprise signals whichmay disrupt this very stability, to the extent 
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that they are interpreted within the political system as impinging upon realisation of 
prior policy expectations or political authority over them(Luhmann, 1990; Teubner, 
1993). 
To return to the question of judicial impact, unless policy meanings and expectations 
are managed in light of the experience of judicial imperatives for policy change, 
political authority over the future governance of the related policy problem may itself 
come into question. This moment, where political authority must be "re- attached to 
its hinges" is one where policy exists in flux. Future policy trajectories are at least 
momentarily uncertain. Yet this condition of flux is perhaps an ongoing, perpetual 
state - given the relentless stream of judicial and other stimuli for reform with which 
government engages. In this regard, it is the constant endeavour of politics to 
stabilise policy - not only in terms of the conceptual definitions and categories which 
particular interventions draw upon, but also the authority of a broader worldview 
which underpins their meaning, significance and claims to legitimacy. This is 
practicedby means ofdiscursive problematisations, which organise unavoidably 
contingent meanings by making consequentialist arguments about cause and effect. 
This tension at the heart of politics is consistent with the observation that a central 
function of human cognition is to narrate stable self -identity in the face of constant, 
ongoing and inescapable change(Ricceur, 1981). Narrativisation of self in time 
stabilises identity, whilst allowing for accommodation of change, re- ascribing agency 
to the self. This is an understanding of sense -making in a context of ambiguity which 
Barbara Czarniayska has applied to the study of narrative's role in stabilising 
continuity of organisational functìon(1997, 2004, p. 125). Here, comprehension of 
change involves production of meaning by "imposition of a certain formal coherence 
on a virtual chaos of events "(White, 1981, p. 795).At the level of government, 
policies as problematisations comprise just such narratives, geared not only towards 
managing changes to an unstable political reality, but also towards the stabilisation of 
political identities. In this regard, policy making performatively scripts not only the 
problems with which it engages, but also the identity and authority of those who do 
this discursive work.We must therefore engage with the narrative which is being 
invested in judicial impact on policy change.This is to engage with identification not 
72 
of objective policy change, but with how participants in policy change subjectively 
identify and produce judicial impact upon it by grasping at and manipulating 
meanings (Zittoun, 2009, p. 90). 
Consideration of this interpretive process requires that the consequentialist 
arguments involved in policy as problematisation be distinguished on a case by case 
basis (the practicalities of how I analyse problematisation are attended to in chapter 
4). Put simply, we may identify judicial impact as what policy makers and politicians 
say it is. This is the `effect' which is argued to be a logical product of a 
`problematised' cause; it is the denouement which policy makers narrate as the 
solution to the problem. The way in which government responds to the courts will 
indicate not only how it understands or 'frames' a judicial decision and its impact. It 
will also indicate an orientation towards judicial impact in terms of what should be 
done about it in enacting policy change. This discursive response serves not only to 
justify a conceptual definition,value assumptions, or a material response by way 
policy solution; it does so in such a way as to ensure that the discursive construction 
of policy meaning is delimited and `bound' with political authority. This dynamic, 
involving the exclusion of alternative policy meanings, whether stated or implicit, is 
essential to reconcile the disjuncture which a judicial decision creates between its 
articulation of valid policy and implementation, and an opposing view to which 
government was previously committed and which it sought to uphold in court. Given 
the adversarial political context in which government depends upon performing its 
authority, this inconsistency must be reconciled. Compliant policy change is 
therefore a clear case of dissonance between prior policy beliefs and subsequent 
political actions in response to the courts. As such, in order to better specify and 
differentiate the ways in which governments may respond to the courts to argue for 
policy coherence, I now turn to a discursive conceptualisation of cognitive 
dissonance. 
Responding to Dissonance 
Judicial decisions may be interpreted as a potential disruption to governmental 
authority where they require that compliance be reconciled with pre- existing political 
values or beliefs. In a fairly direct manner, court rulings presenta judicial perspective 
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as a non- executive arbiter of valid policy, challenging government to reassert 
authoritative control over the meaning of policy interventions. More than this, 
however, where government has unsuccessfully defended its position on valid policy 
in court, only to receive an adverse judicial decision, there is a manifest gap between 
the government's stated beliefs and the requirement to act differently in compliance 
with the judicial decision. This is a moment where the coherence of valid political 
authority, and certainly the coherence ofa policy are ruptured - or to paraphrase 
Howarth and Hajer, political authority becomes momentarily unhinged, requiring 
action to restore it. Judicial decisions may thereforemomentary unsettle thenarrative 
of a policy.In so far as this requires the justification of political authority, 
governmental responses to the courts are analogous to the phenomenon of cognitive 
dissonance, if approached as a discursive rather than as a cognitive phenomenon. 
Cognitive dissonance theory suggests that people feel uncomfortable if their attitudes 
appear inconsistent with their behaviour, especially where they may be required to 
justify their beliefs and conduct to others. Dissonance will be stronger the more 
firmly held the beliefs are, and the greater the number of discrepancies(Festinger & 
Carlsmith, 1959),In its psychological formulation, people are considered apt to 
address this discomfort by bringing either attitudes or their behaviour in line with the 
other, or finding some other way of discounting this discrepancy(Harmon -Jones & 
Mills, 1999). Limited attempts to apply a conventional behaviouralist 
conceptualisation of cognitive dissonance theory to the problem of explaining 
compliance with court orders (Johnson, 1967; Muir, 1967) have been considered to 
offer little insight into why an individual responds in a given way (Canon & Johnson, 
1999, pp. 161 -2). This is an issue which I return to below, considering the 
importance of distinguishing the ideas articulated in a response to the court. 
However, rather than seeing dissonance as a `cognitive' problem, which is difficult 
to access by analysinglanguage or reported attitudes, it can be approached as a 
discursive phenomenon.People may be held to account for the discrepancy between 
their attitudes and behaviours and may be pressured into justifying them; again, they 
may deal with this by bringing their reported attitudes or behaviour into a state of 
consistency, or they may deal with this using some alternative rhetorical strategy - 
for example, arguing that the discrepancy is inconsequential. Politicians may be 
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particularly likely to be held to account for discrepancies between their stated 
commitments and actual behaviour, given that they are elected on the basis of what 
they claim to stand for. Executive agencies may be similarly held accountable to 
ministers and parliament.In this regard, we may also reflect on the need for 
government to perform authority both internally to institutional actors and externally 
to constituents and policy communities. 
In so far as political authority is grounded in maintenance of a consistency between 
beliefs and actions, inconsistencies between behaviour and professed ideology, 
political promises and policy objectives must be addressed(Neuman & Tabak, 2003). 
Judicial impact may therefore produce dissonance where compliant policy change 
must be reconciled with pre- existing policy narratives. Governmental actors cannot 
easily disregard or dissociate completely from judicial decisions, as they express 
values subscribed to by government (procedural justice, rule of law, human rights, 
for example)(e.g. Cabinet Office, 2010a, 2010b). Yet, these values are articulated 
and applied by adverse judicial decisions in a manner which is inconsistent with the 
realisation of pre- existing governmental policy goals. The result is two conflicting 
accounts of valid policy which must be reconciled by government to prevent 
dissonance and the associated risk of appearing inconsistent and lacking in authority. 
Any such apparent inconsistency must be addressed - not only via material changes 
to policy, but through the discursive process of delimiting the problem of compliant 
policy change, so as to legitimate political authority. Such policy coherence must be 
justified by government in a variety of fora and to a variety of audiences. For 
example, in subsequent engagement with the courts, within parliamentary debate and 
committee hearings, to international bodies such as the Council of Europe and 
perhaps above all, in statements to the public and media. Future policy trajectories 
must be made to appear coherent with the judicial articulation of legal values, as well 
as pre- existing policy goals - for example, promises to control asylum. Given the 
frequent and ongoing involvement of the judiciary in overseeing the legal legitimacy 
of government actions, and the control of immigration and asylum in particular, this 
process of justifying the reconciliation of adverse judicial decisions and prior policy 
may be considered an ongoing and characteristic feature of the process of policy 
making, rather than an exceptional disruption to the equilibrium of a policy. 
75 
Discursive approaches in social psychology conceive of social reality as structured 
around potential conflict over subjective interpretations of meaning, which 
individuals must negotiate in order to maintain a coherent discursive 
representation(Potter, 1998; Stapleton & Wilson, 2009, p. 1360). Particularly 
influential within this field is the work of Michael Billig(1996), who has argued that 
all discourse is rhetorical, in so far as its argumentation involves implicit dialogic 
justification of a position against potential opposing argumentative positions: "the 
possession of an attitude indicates a statement of disagreement as much as of 
agreement and it signifies an implicit willingness to enter into controversy" (Billig, 
1996, p. 207). In this sense, inconsistency, or dissonance, is not a problem in and of 
itself. Rather it is the potential for this inconsistency to lead to damaging criticism 
which must be warded off (Stapleton & Wilson, 2009, p. 1361). Whether or not we 
agree with such social psychologists that rhetoric structures all discourse and all 
human thought, we may agree that it certainly has a constitutive role in the case of 
justificatory discourses, and that these are central to political communication.Billig's 
description of the rhetorical aspect of discursive practice is certainly consistent with 
the delineation of bounded meaning involved in the act of problematisationas 
delimiting, excluding and undermining oppositional content(Derrida, 1981; Foucault, 
1985). Given the importance of performing authoritative governance(Hajer, 2009), 
through the pursuit of stable authority over conceptual meaning(Bauman, 1991) and 
seeking support from the public by justifying policy change(Schmidt, 2008), notable 
pressure is put upon government by the public and particularly the media to provide 
rhetorical arguments which inherently address potential dissonance. 
Incorporating dissonance strategies within problematisation 
How inconsistency between compliance with the courts and prior policy 
commitments is discursively addressed or negated will indicate political attitudes to 
judicial impact. In this regard, policy makers' engagement in the problematisation of 
compliant policy change will express a dialogic relationship between the judicial 
decision and the prior policy commitments. This is not to repeat my previous 
argument that analysis of policy as problematisation requires investigation of the 
discursive construction of cause and effect, its guiding logic and associated 
normative assumptions. The problem of dissonance is specifically related to how 
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such discourse seeks to reconcile policy incoherence and political authority. As such, 
in analysis ofpolicyas problematisation, it is very important to identify and 
differentiate the discursive strategies involved in addressing dissonance. 
Billig's objective in the study of discourse is the investigation of how competing 
expectations and reasons (logoi) are resolved or dismissed "without any fundamental 
changes in belief' (Billig, 1996, p. 194). Prior beliefs may in fact even be 
strengthened in the face of dissonance (Stapleton & Wilson, 2009, p. 1361). Whether 
beliefs prove more fluid in the face of controversy is, I believe, an empirical 
question. The beliefs, assumptions and values which structurea discourse may 
change in the course of justifying political authority. However, the central idea of 
political authority itself is certainly a pre- requisite value which must be sustained 
bypolitical rhetoric. Acting in compliance with the courts to change a policy leads to 
the question of whether this means that the objective goals, function or anticipated 
impact of a policy have changed in line with compliance. Rhetorical justifications are 
not necessarily logical. A politician may reasonably, if not logically, argue that 
compliant changes to a policy will not get in the way of successfully realising the 
policy goals, despite the constraint imposed. As my concern is not with whether 
political discourse is rational, what matters most is to identify the strategic 
argumentation involved in resolving, disregarding or dismissing such 
inconsistencies. 
In applying Billig's model, Karyn Stapleton and John Wilson(2009, p. 1364) identify 
three typical discursive strategies for dealing with dissonance: 
1. Explicit denial that change has taken place; 
2. Discursive reworking of what might appear to be changes (such that 
these, ultimately, do not constitute change); 
3. Some acknowledgement that change has occurred, followed 
immediately by minimisation or rejection of this proposition. 
Many immediate parallels are striking between these distinctions and the typologies 
of bureaucratic response to judicial decisions which I addressed in the previous 
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chapter. Notably, we may seek to relate this discursive approach to William 
Muir's(1967) typology of behaviour in bureaucracies which are unwillingly charged 
with reform by the courts: 
1. Denying the existence of the judicial decision; 
2. Depreciating the decision by interpreting it to be inapplicable; 
3. Dissociating himself or herself from the field covered by the decision; 
4. Becoming indecisive; 
5. Keeping the original attitude and derogating from the law 
6. Accentuating the original attitude and derogating from the law; 
7. Converting to the legal attitude; 
8. Diminishing the importance of or eliminating an originally equivocal 
attitude. 
(Canon & Johnson, 1999, based on Muir 1967 and Johnson 1967) 
Indecision and derogation from the law, although hypothetically possible 
(particularly in a bureaucratic context where public scrutiny is less pervasive), are 
suggestive of temporary strategies for responding to the courts.In a liberal - 
democratic state purporting to adhere to the rule of law, we may reasonably expect 
delays or derogation to be followed by further escalating litigation or judicial review, 
leading to mounting pressure for a more robust engagement with the problem of 
compliance and how it should be reconciled with other political commitments. The 
added value of a rhetorical approach to this issue of dissonance is the consideration 
that government may pursue a strategy of both dismissing a court ruling whilst 
keeping its original attitude, and yet also comply (not derogating from the law). 
Similarly, conversion to the `legal attitude' need not necessarily require abandoning 
other, potentially conflicting beliefs. As scholars of the US Supreme Court have 
noted, politicians may willingly emphasise the coercive effect of judicial decisions as 
a means of renouncing responsibility for contentious policies, or "passing the 
buck "(Hirschl, 2008a). In this respect, the suggestion that when responding to the 
courts government may seek to diminish the importance of prior, conflicting attitudes 
seems pertinent. Government may equally seek to diminish the apparent 
inconsistency of a court ruling with its ongoing commitment to prior policy 
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objectives, so as to `contain' judicial impact(Conant, 2002). In accounting for these 
considerations, I arrive at the following typology as a basis on which to distinguish 
judicial impact on policy according to how government responds to the courts: 
Typology of responses to a judicial decision: 
dismissal of the applicability of the judicial decision; 
depreciation of its significance to a particular policy goal; 
dissociation of the given political actor or institution from the domain of 
the decision; 
amplification of the coercive effects of the judicial decision, whilst 
keeping the original attitudes to the policy issue; 
conversion to the legal attitude; 
containing impact, by seeking to diminish the apparent discrepancy 
between policy before and after the judicial decision. 
(Based on Canon & Johnson, 1999; Conant, 2002; Johnson, 1967; Muir, 
1967; Stapleton & Wilson, 2009) 
Specifying the discursive strategy pursued in response to the courts cannot directly 
account for why government pursued one approach over any other(Canon & 
Johnson, 1999, p. 162). However, it provides a compelling means to distinguish 
forms of judicial impact on policy change, as understood by government. From the 
identification of judicial impact according to its discursive construction, we may also 
identify the reasoning and assumptions involved. This is to say that we can trace the 
construction of cause and effect from a governmental perspective according to how 
judicial impact is problematised. In order to understand why government responded 
to the courts in a given manner (leading to a particular strategy for dealing with 
dissonance), it will be necessary to also distinguish the ideas `at stake' in the 
rhetorical dialogue between policy and compliance. As such, I now turn to the utility 
of differentiating levels of generality of ideas involved in policy problematisation, as 
a means of distinguishing arguments which are involved in different cases of judicial 
impact. 
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Ideas as the content of problematisation discourse 
Again we face the problem of explaining how and why change happens. 
Consideration of policy change as an exercise in problematisation will indicate 
significant aspects of the reasoning which motivates particular responses to judicial 
decisions. However, we still lack a means of concisely differentiating and expressing 
the factors which are at stake in motivating this response. This deficiency is 
analogous to that charged as characteristic of the majority of `new -institutionalist' 
approaches to the study of policy change: good at describing what and when change 
happened, but largely silent on how and why this result came to pass. The work of 
political economist, Vivien Schmidt, has sought to address this problem. In 
particular, her engagement with the constitution of policy through discourse, and the 
ideational content of discourse are promising for the purposes of specifying the 
content of policy change in a manner which is conducive to problematisation 
analysis. 
Ideas as mediating and constitutive of political reality 
Schmidt's work, which she brands discursive institutionalism, takes as its starting 
point that discourse is the interactive process in which ideas are represented and 
exchanged. Discourse encompasses not just what is said, but also the context where, 
how and why it is said (Schmidt, 2008, p. 305 c.1). As such, political institutions are 
constituted through communication as a process of intersubjective creation of 
meaning. Whilst actors' cognition is important to this process, it is through the 
discursive articulation of ideas that politics takes place. Schmidt holds that 
investigating policy change according to rational calculations, path dependence or 
cultural norms, tends to facilitate explanations of institutional and policy stasis. 
However, we may do well to consider that these and other factors are both realised 
and enacted in a discursive meaning context. Discursive interactions in government 
and beyond constitute an intersubjective meaning context in which preferences, 
historical paths and cultural norms are not static structures which pre -figure political 
outcomes, but rather dynamic constructs (Schmidt, 2008, 2011). This claim is 
consistent with my characterisation of policy as problematisation - a discursive 
practice which is constitutive of political meaning. 
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Policy ideas expressed in discourse include actors' beliefs about both the material 
and normative facets of the context in which they function and their interaction with 
it: institutional configurations, normative constraints and prospective sanctions, roles, 
responsibilities, appropriate behaviour, and so on. To co -opt rationalist terms, ideas 
prefigure political actors' understanding of the environmental factors from which 
they interpret the `rules of the game' and their role in it; they also constitute a fluid 
expression of the preferences to be mobilised in determining appropriate action. 
Context and ideas have a dialectic relationship. Context informs political actors' 
ideas, which in turn inform strategic behaviour which transforms the political context 
(Hay, 2002, p. 214). From this social -constructionist perspective, non -ideational 
variables "only do explanatory work when unpacked as ideas or beliefs." (Bevir & 
Rhodes, 2004) When it comes to political analysis, it is only to the extent that such 
factors are perceived as significant by political actors engaged in policy change that 
they have any traction in explaining it. Moreover, these ideas are only rendered 
meaningful and observable in their discursive articulation. We may, therefore, attach 
some significanceto those ideas which are invoked in discourses on policy change. 
Ideas are the blocks which build political discourse, and such discourse is the basis 
for the discursive enactment of a policy domain. 
This is not to say that factors such as interests, path- dependence and norms are 
unimportant. Rather than objective material factors, they are subjective ideas, 
internalised within the cognitive and discursive frameworks which govern a 
particular policy context. As such, they are not static factors, but changeable as a 
result of how actors apply ideas in a particular context, and according to their 
discursive abilities in communicating them. Political actors' interpretation of the 
world around them will also partially be inherited from political traditions (Bevir, 
1999, pp. 187 -99). However the scope for explaining where these beliefs come from 
and how they are transformed through political practice is unclear (Hay, 2004). 
Ideas as a basis to interrogate policy change 
Whilst it is difficult to explain why political ideas change, it is possible to consider 
ideas not as dependent variables, but as explanatory factors which may help us to 
infer the role of meaning and interpretation leading to political actions (Hay, 2002, p. 
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213). In calling for an explanatory role for interpretive political analysis, Colin Hay 
emphasises the importance of just such a shift of focus: from simply recovering "the 
beliefs which inform actions" (Bevir & Rhodes, 2004), which amounts to an interest 
in "understanding per se ", towards explaining "the role played by particular 
understandings in motivating the political conduct of particular actors." (Hay, 2004) 
The task here is to identify how ideas lead to actions.In this case, how ideas about 
asylum control or judicial constraint lead to a given response to the courts. 
Apprehending these ideas is essential to understanding the internal trajectories which 
lead to divergent policy outcomes (Bleich, 2011). 
Schmidt emphasises that policy making takes place through discursive interaction. 
As such, the most observable and meaningful factors for analysis of the policy 
process are the "particular set of ideational rules and discursive regularities in a given 
meaning context following a particular logic of communication" (Schmidt, 2008, p. 
314 c.2). These discursive regularities and the associated logics and rules which 
underpin them are the governing ideas which constitute discourse. This comprises 
more than the common refrain that ideas matter (Hay, 2004, 2006); their significance 
to policy analysis derives from their role in structuring discursive interactions which 
are the driving force behind policy change. These ideas are the referents and logical 
units building the problematisation discourse through which political actors make 
sense of complex stimuli and reconcile policies with judicial decisions - whether as 
part of an explicit or implicit chain or reasoning. 
Therefore, by studying the ideas expressed in political discourse about policy, we 
apprehend the content driving the process of policy change. By analysis of the 
process of subjective political reasoning involved in discursive problematisation, we 
may construct a narrative to explain links between the ideas which govern policy and 
the response to the courts which characterises judicial impact on policy change. This 
is, in effect, to expose a "constitutive logic "(Wendt, 1999), which I consider to have 
not only descriptive but explanatory potential (Hay, 2004; c.f. Bevir & Rhodes, 
2004). This potential comes from the possibility of linking a narrative account of 
subjective meaning within the political system (Bevir & Rhodes, 2004) to the 
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rhetorical orientation adopted in response to the courts; the discursive articulation of 
ideas and beliefs can account for political outcomes (Hay, 2004). 
Here, I am essentially posing the question of what changes when policy 
changes ?Ideas comprise the building blocks of policy as problematisation, by means 
of which policy meanings are experimented with to maintain plausible connections 
between problems and solutions (Zittoun, 2009). Such ideas are therefore indicative 
of the subjective, strategic reasoning according to which political actors discursively 
identify policy change, order and impose meaning upon it. Certainly, there are 
material transformations to the practices of government, and the 
legislative,institutional and operational frameworks within which these take place. 
However, the composition of these material outcomes and the process through which 
they are both delineated and transformed are prefigured and enacted by discursive 
processes; through interactive and rhetorical contestation over meaning. Ideas about 
valid policy are rhetorically constituted and mobilised through discourse. It is these 
ideas which comprise the building blocks of policy, and it is therefore ideas which 
are the ideal indicators or units of analysis to identify policy change. These are the 
ideas which both constitute and govern the function of a particular policy 
domain.Moreover, as we apprehend their articulation by the actors involved in policy 
governance, they constitute a direct insight into the subjective construction of 
meaning by those directly involved in enacting policy change; they indicate what key 
actors perceive to `be at stake' in policy change intended to comply with the courts. 
Differentiating policy ideas 
To derive some explanatory traction from ideas in political discourse on judicial 
impact and policy change, we require some means of differentiating variance in the 
ideas which are invoked as `at stake' when responding to a court ruling. In this 
regard, I once again wish to draw upon Schmidt's distinction of three levels of 
generality of ideas engaged with in political science (as in chapter 1): 
1. Policies: the specific solutions proposed by policy makers; 
2. The more general programmes which `underpin' these policy ideas - 
theunderlying programmatic logic which defines the problem to be solved; 
and 
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3. The foundational `public philosophies'which ground these (J. L. Campbell, 
1998) - the rarely contested assumptions and values on the ordering of 
knowledge and society. (Schmidt, 2008, p. 306) 
The cognitive and normative content of these ideas orient policy discourses in terms 
of what is good or bad about a situation and the actions which must be taken to deal 
with it (Schmidt, 2008, pp. 306 -7). There are clear parallels between this 
specification of ideas and my previous discussion of problematisation. However, 
Schmidt's typology serves to add a notable differentiation of the ideas `at stake' in 
the problematisation discourse. Because each type is of differing fundamental 
generality, this provides a means of indicating how great a `problem' government 
perceives judicial impact to be in each case. We may therefore distinguish the `level' 
or extent to which a judicial decision is perceived within government as impacting 
policy coherence and political authority. This distinction may prove helpful in 
explaining variance in how governments have responded to the courts to reconcile 
judicial impact with asylum control policies. 




Where political actors perceive the integrity or continued function of ideas governing 
a policy to be challenged by compliance with judicial decisions, the outcome may or 
may not be their constraint or reformulation. In either case, a pre- existing policy 
commitment at any of the above three levels of ideas may be perceived as having 
been brought into question by judicial decisions. Given the importance of an 
authoritative rhetorical response which justifies the coherence of policies, political 
actors are held (per the above typology of responses to the courts) to respond in such 
a way as to seek to reconcile policy change with the governing ideas which they have 
committed to. It is important to understanding the broader outcomes of judicial 
impact on policy change that a distinction is made as to whether governing ideas are 
constrained or challenged. However, the very challenge to the integrity of such ideas 
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may be sufficient to aid in accounting for why government responds in certain ways 
to judicial impact. As such, the typology of level of impact is not merely a useful 
means of descriptively articulating the ideas involved in policy discourse. It is also a 
tool to be used in tandem with the response typology to interrogate whether variation 
in the level of impact may account for variation in governmental responses. 
Engaging with the ideas which political actors consider to be `at stake' in policy 
problematisations provides a compelling way to explain attitudes and responses to 
judicial decisions. These substantiate a relationship between policy preferences and 
judicial impact, and are referents in the justification of how dissonance between them 
may be reconciled. However, where Schmidt's discursive institutionalism is 
somewhat lacking, is the practical question of how to actually study discourse and 
identify ideas. In my research, this is addressed by integrating her typology of ideas 
within the study of discursive problematisation. However, it is still necessary to 
consider where and how this discursive practice unfolds. Discursive meaning is very 
much a product of the practices through which policy making and politics take place. 
As such, I now turn to governmental documents and political rhetoric as the primary 
discursive practices through which government publicly engages with and responds 
to policy problems. These provide `practices' which may 
deconstructed to expose ideas invoked in the articulation and justification of policy 
problematisations. 
Government Documents and Political Rhetoric 
So far, I have largely discussed sense making and discourse in government in a fairly 
abstract fashion. I now wish to ground this discussion by relating it to documentation 
and rhetoric as the substantive practices through which policy as problematisation 
takes shape in government. Documents and rhetoric are both tools and processes 
through which government interrogates and responds to social and political 
complexity. Their deployment of language serves to stabilise reference points for 
action.They are "operational routines ", which mobilise accepted rules and norms of 
government to bring coherence to the social world (Hajer & Versteeg, 2005, p. 
177).As discursive practices,documentation and rhetoric ground problem 
constructions in a meaning- context which is oriented toward very specific 
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institutional and political functions. Namely, this is to specify and justify policies as 
valid, efficacious and authoritative responses to problems, and therefore legitimate 
governmental capacity to control them. It is through documents and rhetoric that 
government specifies policy problems and justifies them; both to audiences within 
government, such as executive agencies and parliamentary committees, and also to 
outside audiences such as the public, media, policy stakeholders and international 
observers. In the wake of an adverse judicial decision, it is the production of 
documents and rhetoric responding to the courts and surrounding policy issues which 
construct the problem of compliance and judicial decisions' broader impact on 
asylum control. 
As noted above, in my brief discussion of Derrida's approach, discursive texts such 
as documents and rhetoric can be studied for their bounding of content and 
exclusionof alternative perspectives.Such a powerful role is already ascribed broadly 
to discursive practices in the sociology of knowledge (Berger & Luckmann, 1991; 
Keller, 2008, 2011). However, in this section, I justify political rhetoric and 
government documents as ideal points of reference for the analysis of political 
understandings of policy change and judicial impact. I turn firstly to political 
rhetoric, as its role in constitution of meaning is clearer, given that one of its 
definitive functions is to persuade others to accept the speaker's value position or 
argument. I then turn to elaborate how the production of governmental documents 
can be considered to serve a very similar function. 
Political Rhetoric 
Politicalrhetoric often directly and explicitly seeks to justify proposed or ongoing 
policy change, as well as the legitimacy of the underlying political programme, 
institutions and government. Statements to the media and in parliamentary debates 
typically revolve around such justifications of political authority and capacity. I wish 
to emphasise that political rhetoric is not simply a transparent indicator of material 
policy change - which it articulates and justifies. Rhetoric can be conceived of as a 
distinct plane of politics which may be impacted by judicial decisions quite apart 
from their substantive effect on material policy change. It is a commonplace to assert 
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that what politicians say often has little relationship with what they do, but this 
should not prevent consideration of such a divergence. 
Rhetoric is integral to symbolic politics, serving as a tool to manage public 
expectations and beliefs(Edelman, 1988). Democratic politics inevitably produces 
contestation between competing narrative responses to a problem. In so far as 
political authority is at stake, this comprises a "dilemma "(Bevir & Rhodes, 2003),in 
which political power depends on the capacity to influence the "dominant 
discourse "(Fairclough, 2000, p. 3; van Dijk, 1993, p. 254) to exercise control over 
not only the parameters of the issue, but how it is understood as a problem which 
authorises the speaker as arbiter of the appropriate response. Rhetoric may address 
and seek to justify substantive policy change - extant or proposed. Or it may rather 
circumvent the entire question of policy change, in order to focus more directly on 
legitimation of the speaker, political regime or institution. Recourse may be made to 
the authoritative quality of rhetorical persuasion as a practice, rather than 
legitimating governmental authority by means of justifying the logical coherence of 
policy change. As such, it is quite possible for a discrepancy to exist between 
rhetorical and material responses to the courts, because political rhetoric is 
fundamentally an art of persuasion as much as it is a tool for justification of 
governmental practice. Notably, in a highly mediatised environment, substantive 
changes to policy are often less visible than rhetorical statements. 
Nevertheless, the persuasive structure and intent of rhetoric, as a bid to shape 
political meaning, is common to both the symbolic and substantive visions of its 
function. Political rhetoric seeks to demonstrate convincing authority over a policy 
problem in a bid for dominance over its discursive construction.Central to the 
function of rhetoric is its narrative ordering of meaning. Rhetorical arguments bid to 
popularise a subjective vision of "how we got here and of where we are going" 
(Finlayson, 2007, p. 557). Such arguments are not merely indicative of the beliefs of 
political actors, but also constitute actions themselves(Austin, 1962), endeavouring 
to bring about particular political outcomes: "acting on others by acting on their 
conceptions "(Finlayson, 2007, p. 553). The persuasive act of leading an audience to 
the necessity of a particular understanding of a problem, or a given course of action, 
87 
depends upon the creative definition and re- description of ideas, actions and events 
(Skinner, 1996, pp. 138 -180), as well as a characterisation of who is involved, how 
they are involved and what they think they are doing (Riker, 1986).What appears to 
be a simple "statement of the facts" can therefore be understood as an endeavour to 
naturalise a particular narrative sequence of events with clear -cut characters, in order 
to "manipulate" the evaluation of outcomes towards that preferred by the speaker 
(Shepsle, 2003). 
Classical analytical approaches to rhetoric largely focus on its persuasive potential 
and therefore evaluate its stylistic features (Furley & Nehemas, 1994). This is 
typically an exercise in taxonomy of how meaning is conveyed, and is not 
particularly instructive on how the construction of meaning is arrived at. My interest 
in political rhetoric derives more from its role as a practice of interpreting and 
constructing, rather than disseminating governmental meaning. This makes its 
substantive content apt for more general discursive analysis of the policy 
problematisation involved. In turn, I take this to be indicative of governmental 
attitudes and understandings of policy meanings and judicial impact upon them. As 
such, I approach political rhetoric as part of problematisation analysis by 
interrogating "the ways in which fundamentalprinciples and ideas are (re)formulated, 
expressed and then (re)developed in argumentative action." (Finlayson, 2007, p. 553) 
This approach has some parallels with critical approaches to discourse analysis 
which seek to uncover the reasoning behind political ideologies or common sense 
assumptions which are accepted by the public (Fairclough, 2000; Howarth, Norval, 
& Stavrakakis, 2000). However, I do not evaluate the extent to which examples of 
political rhetoric I engage with may have proven particularly persuasive or accepted. 
Rather, I interrogate their content solely for indications of beliefs and the logic 
behind their discursive construction. Even if we side -step the question of whether an 
example of rhetoric has successfully persuaded its target audience, it can still be 
considered as having an active role as a practice which shapes and reshapes 
specifically governmental narratives of meaning.This is to say that political rhetoric 




Similar to political rhetoric, the production of governmental documents can be 
understood as a discursive practice which, in the Foucauldian sense, serves a 
constitutive and normalising function of apprehending and stabilising meaning by 
specifying terms of reference for readers. Although documents are typically 
approached by political scientists as two- dimensional indicators of political attitudes, 
we may note that in media studies(McLuhan, 1964; Ong, 1982), science and 
technology studies(Callon, Law, & Rip, 1986; Latour, 1987), and organisational 
studies (Atkinson & Coffey, 1997; Cooren, 2004; R. Freeman & Maybin, 2011; 
Riles, 2006), there has been sustained engagement with documents as exerting a 
constitutive effect on meaning as agents in social life. These approaches share a 
common concern for documents as both mediating and performing meaning. The 
practice of documentation, requiring that a contextually situated format be followed 
for the preparation and presentation of ideas, necessarily shapes and delimits the 
presentation of meanings. Consistent with my engagement with discursive 
dissonance above, I wish to emphasise that this is a necessarily rhetorical and 
argumentative practice, which justifies content against implicit opposing 
perspectives. This is a process in which meaning takes shape through the discursive 
practice of engaging with stimuli from the social and political world to state beliefs 
on paper in preparation for their interrogation by a variety of audiences. 
Documents perform a significant function in seeking to provide stable points of 
reference which may be drawn upon in political debate and implementation of 
policies, as well as their judicial scrutiny. In anticipation of contestation over 
meaning, political documents demonstrate a concern over conceptual categories, 
relationships between organisational actors involved in a policy domain, and 
justifying the appropriateness of policy responses. The success of a policy may hinge 
upon either precise and stable definitions, or a `looseness' which provides for more 
discretionary interpretation and action. In either case, we may infer a common goal 
of seeking to enable political authority and discretion over the determination of 
appropriate policy measures. Governmental documents, in particular, provide a 
recorded legacy of how conceptual meanings and policy problematisations were 
represented as a basis on which to authorise policy actions. In this sense, documents 
89 
may be read not just for their content, but equally well for their function (R. Freeman 
& Maybin, 2011). In responding to judicial decisions and preparing policies, this 
function involves problematisation - whereby policy objects, rationales for 
intervention, roles and responsibilities are constituted and reconstituted in dialogue 
within and between documents. Governmental documents (like political rhetoric) act 
to stabilise conceptual categories, definitions, and legitimate intervening actors and 
actions.They serve a particular function in translating social and political pressure, 
and indeed judicial decisions, into meaningful referents for bureaucratic or political 
action. 
To a significant extent, it is through a network of inter -related documents that 
government speaks to itself, determines and ascribes its sense of meaning and 
function. In this process of policy making as sense -making, documents serve both as 
referents to stabilise meaning and also as a discursive practice which actively 
performs and shapes cognition in government, with documents prepared in response 
to other documents. In the wake of judicial decisions, just such a network of inter- 
related documents is typically produced in order to articulate and manage policy 
meanings and strategies for action across different areas of government; notably, for 
the benefit of the executive and parliamentary committees. Even the oral 
contributions of politicians and bureaucrats to committees are documented, and 
inform the production of summary reports which further document the committee's 
interpretations, reasoning and conclusions. Such documents are intended to inform 
subsequent debate which may arise within government or parliament, and which will 
in many cases lead to the production of further documents to address outstanding 
uncertainties or doubts about a policy issue. 
Published documents are primarily indicative of the public face of government - as 
opposed to the closed and inaccessible deliberations preceding public statements. 
However, access may also be gained to a network of inter -related internal documents 
which are typically prepared as part of an often lengthy process of policy 
problematisation before and after dissemination of more public statements by 
governmental departments and parliamentary committees. What political actors write 
and institutions publish is, of course, only part of a long process of prior and 
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subsequent deliberation. In particular, where there is apprehension about future 
accountability, documentation may be purposefully avoided in favour of informal 
oral discussions. Anecdotally on this matter, one government employee informed me 
that a notable amount of discussion about policy change is conducted by leaving 
post -it notes on colleagues' computer monitors, rather than sending emails to which 
they may later be held accountable. Documentary texts are unavoidably partial 
indicators of governmental reasoning. There is only so much that we can feasibly 
observe from outside the policy process. However, government documents, 
especially where several are accessible from various levels of consultation, dialogue 
and dissemination of policy ideas, nevertheless provide very significant indicators of 
what reasoning and meaning constructions governmental actors were ultimately 
willing to commit to type. As such, we may invest some confidence in the authority 
and significance of documentary discourses, so long as this involves questioning the 
status of texts, who wrote them and why. 
In summary then, political rhetoric and documents are considered in this research not 
merely as vehicles for the articulation of governmental beliefs and perspectives. 
Rather they areunderstood as serving to actively shape the constitution of policy 
meanings. They not only indicate the puzzling that's involved in politics (Heclo, 
1974); they are constitutive practices which shape and structure this process through 
which political actors and institutions seek to render stable meaning from an 
environment characterised by indeterminacy and ambiguity.As discursive practices 
of problematisation, their articulation of meaning is fundamentally constitutive. The 
practices of documentation and rhetoric are part of the cognition of government; in 
making sense of problems, they construct them by framing them in a particular way 
and proposing a particular solution as legitimate. This is especially the case where a 
networked body of documents and rhetoric accumulates(R. Freeman & Maybin, 
2011), which together may be regarded not only as articulating, but actively shaping 
and delimiting policy in flux; responding to, constituting and stabilising shifting 
meanings. As such, they constitute excellent indicators of policy problematisations, 
and therefore of judicial impact on policy change as understood within government. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that policy change is ultimately best understood from 
the perspective of those involved in the process of making it happen. To this end, I 
have endeavoured to conceptualise and present a plausible agenda for the study of 
policy change by recourse to its discursive articulation and justification within 
government. Such discourses do not merely reflect, but actively constitute policy 
problems and seek to legitimate governmental authority over them. Judicial decisions 
comprise just such a policy problem, which must be interpreted, translated into a 
politically meaningful stimulus and then ordered as anobject which can be acted 
upon. Judicial decisions are a potential political problem because they may challenge 
not only the lawfulness of policies and their implementation, but also the integrity of 
pre -existing narratives of governmental intervention in a policy domain. They are 
also a problem in the sense that they are "problematized" by governmental 
interrogation of their meaning, significance and effect in determining an appropriate 
response. 
By engaging with the political construction of policy meanings (by interrogating 
policy as problematisation) we may expose their contingent claims to stability, and 
how they function to resist the potentially destabilising effects of judicial rulings and 
compliance on policy narratives and political authority. This requires acceptance of 
the associated epistemological and ontological positionwhich underpins 
suchconcerns over problematisation: that problems do not exist out there in `the real 
world,' but are a product of political actors' interpretation, and that it is possible to 
identify and deconstruct this process by careful analysis of discursive content and 
practices. The judicial impact of a court ruling in this conceptualisation is notan 
objective truth, but a discursive construct which may even change over time 
according to governmental interpretations of policy meanings. 
To understand the quality and perceived extent of judicial constraint on policies we 
must therefore look to the ideas expressed in the discursive framing of the `problem' 
of compliance and the justification of how this should be reconciled with other policy 
goals. The way in which particular ideas make up this discourse can be differentiated 
according to whether they relate to the particular solution proposed, the logic 
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underpinning this policy intervention, or the public philosophy of government which 
the policy serves to uphold. Where present in problematisation discourse, these ideas 
reflect the issues which political actors believe to be of significance, and which may 
be perceived as `at stake' should they be impacted upon by compliance with a 
judicial decision. How these ideas are expressed indicates the character of judicial 
impact from the perspective of government. Judicial impact on policy change is 
therefore most clearly indicated by the way in which government discourses express, 
respond to and justify the perceived challenge to these policy ideas, so as to stabilise 
and legitimate their meaning and governmental authority over them. 
Discursive engagement with these ideas preconditions and may therefore explain 
governmental attitudes to judicial constraints on political discretion and prior policy 
goals. The product of these discourses - on what the problem of compliance is - may 
vary in terms of how government orients itself to reconcile the ruling with prior 
policy goals. Distinguishing the level of generality of governing ideas invoked in 
problematisation discourses, and whether they are presented as jeopardised, may well 
account for divergence in the way governments have responded to particular judicial 
decisions. Political rhetoric and government documents are central processes through 
which this process of managing policy change is discursively enacted. 
In presenting this approach to the specification and differentiation of judicial impact 
on policy change and its political framing, I believe it may be the only feasible 
means for its observation. The significance of court rulings to the governance of a 
policy issue are fundamentally a product of how they are apprehended, understood 
and reconciled by those coping with such unwelcome calls for change. Having said 
much about how to conceptualise policy making as such a process of sense -making, 
and judicial impact as part of this process, the next chapter provides a methodology 




In the preceding chapters, I have firmly characterised judicial impact as a problem 
relating to how government responds to the courts; not just in the form of material 
actions, such as legislation and procedural rules effecting policy change, but also in 
the way this response is discursively constituted and justified. This chapter advances 
a methodology for investigation and analysis of these governmental responses to the 
courts. 
I begin the chapter with an overview of my ontological and epistemological approach 
to research. I then set out my use of comparison within a single case study and 
consider the scope for my approach in developing theoretical insights into judicial 
impact on policy change. I continue by narrating the process through which my 
research unfolded. After describing how cases were selected, I present them in the 
form of a table, according to politicisation of compliance and source of the ruling. 
These were identified in chapter two as potentially significant factors in shaping 
judicial impact. I then discuss how appropriate sources were identified; my chosen 
methods for data analysis, and the reasoning behind their selection. Finally, I close 
the chapter with a reminder of the analytical typologies presented in chapter three, 
indicating how they have been deployed in my research as a means of mobilising 
data from analysis of governmental discourse in response to the courts to analyse 
variation in judicial impact. 
My ontological and epistemological position 
Conceptualising judicial impact as a process whereby political actors interpret, 
negotiate and articulate meaning, I have not simply approached policy change in 
terms of substantive material alterations to policy structures (legislation, operational 
guidelines, etc.) but also focused in greater detail on a more extensive investigation 
of the discursive construction and justification of such changes by political actors. As 
argued in my previous chapter, investigation of this discursive component of policy 
change bears significant potential for gaining insights into how judicial decisions are 
mobilised and acted upon within government. 
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My dual concern for identifying material policy changes and their discursive framing 
is perhaps suggestive of an ontological position between realism and 
constructionism. However, it should be noted that my investigation of judicial impact 
on policy change considers material changes to policy as very much the product of 
how political actors interpret, respond to and act upon subjective understandings of 
judicial decisions. My research is therefore a study of "meaning in action" 
(Wagenaar, 2011). I conceive of policy problems and their solutions as constantly in 
a state of flux, as changing political interpretations continually reconstitute them 
(Bryman, 2001, pp. 17 -18; R. Freeman, 2012). This is a rejection of the positivist 
conceptualisation that "social phenomena and their meanings have an existence that 
is independent of social actors" (Bryman, 2001, p. 17). As such, this research is 
informed by both a constructionist ontology and interpretivist epistemology, in that it 
seeks to understand judicial impact on asylum control as a construct enacted by 
political actors' interpretation of its meaning as a guide to action. The central object 
of investigation is therefore the meaning which political actors ascribe to judicial 
decisions and policy change, within the broader context of asylum control. This is to 
say that political actors can and do influence the meaning and impact of judicial 
decisions on policy change, beyond the objective legal basis of a given court ruling. 
Interpretive policy analysis 
In this respect, my research follows the vision of interpretive policy analysis 
described by Peregrine Schwartz -Shea and Dvora Yanow. They describe interpretive 
analysis as like tracing the ripples caused by a stone cast into a pond. Even where the 
stone which caused them may no longer be visible: 
we can surmise that a stone had been there when we see the ripples, and we 
can `look' to clarify aspects of the impact it had as it passed... `interpretive 
looking' from a position among the ripples. (Schwartz -Shea & Yanow, 2012, 
pp. 31 -2) 
To apply this metaphor to my research, the "ripples" caused by judicial decisions 
cast into governance of asylum are political actors' interpretations of the ruling as a 
call to action. These "meanings in action" reverberate from the judicial decision, 
spreading throughout government. They are observable as articulated in 
governmental discursive sources, even though the initial impact (the stone or causal 
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significance of a judicial decision) is not directly observable. Given that access to 
governmental processes of policy making, documentation of legal advice and 
evaluation of policy options are all embargoed by government, and therefore 
unavailable to researchers, investigation of political interpretations and 
communication of judicial decisions' meaning and impact presents a meaningful and 
more importantly, feasible approach to researching the topic (Fischer, 2003, Ch.7). 
Within case comparison 
Given the paucity of theoretical and conceptual tools available to the study of how 
and why judicial decisions lead to varying impacts on policy change and its framing, 
my research design treads a middle path between abductive, and inductive reasoning. 
In designing the research, I took my starting point from the theoretically inspired 
factors which appeared to be potentially significant in shaping judicial impact: source 
of ruling and whether compliance was politicised (see chapter 2). These factors 
informed my selection of four `episodes' or cases in which UK governments have 
responded to judicial decisions with ramifications for policy change (two cases in 
which compliance was politicised, two in which it was not; of these, two UK court 
cases, two from the ECtHR). In single case study research, explanatory leverage 
requires within -case comparison such as this (Collier, Mahoney, & Seawright, 2004, 
p. 101) to explore the processes involved in shaping variations in policy change and 
its framing, following judicial decisions. As discussed in my introduction to the 
thesis, asylum control in the UK, particularly where it concerns deportation and 
removal, can be considered both a hard case (Eckstein, 1975) in which to find a 
significant constraining judicial impact on policy, as well as a normatively important 
case. I must emphasise, however, that my intention was not to construct a strict 
comparative case study design of the sort which may be used to deductively test the 
significance of source and politicisation in isolation as predictive of judicial impact. 
By choosing to focus in detail on variation in political responses within this single 
case study, my aim was to arrive at detailed qualitative insights into the process by 
which judicial decisions impact upon substantive changes to asylum control policies 
and their framing in political discourse. 
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Consistent with my interest in arriving at detailed qualitative insights into how policy 
and its political framing are impacted upon by adverse judicial decisions, source and 
politicisation comprised a starting point to guide the research and evaluation of data. 
They did not serve as strictly formulated independent variables for evaluation. In this 
manner, I "blurred the line" between theory evaluation and theory development 
(Vennesson, 2008, pp. 236 -7). The case study structure and selection of initial 
factors for investigation comprised a spring board for further investigation.The 
starting point in developing my research was, after all, the pursuit of an "intellectual 
puzzle" (Mason, 2002): that of certain cases which involved politicisation of judicial 
impact alongside compliant policy change. Existing theory offered little help in 
explaining such unwelcome judicial impact, requiring that I remain open to 
unexpected insights arising from the research process. 
Abductive aspects of my research 
Such "abductive" reasoning has been held to be a hallmark of interpretive policy 
analysis (Schwartz -Shea & Yanow, 2012, pp. 26 -34). Characterised by a search for 
answers through "dialogue between data and theory mediated by the researcher" 
(Blaikie, 2010, p. 156), abductive reasoning is suited to research where existing 
theories fail to account for empirical evidence - acknowledging this puzzle and 
iteratively developing new concepts in an "inferential process from surprise toward 
its possible explanation(s). "(Schwartz -Shea & Yanow, 2012, p. 33): 
we start collecting pertinent observations and, at the same time, applying 
concepts from existing fields of our knowledge. Instead of trying to impose 
an abstract theoretical template (deduction) or `simply' inferring propositions 
from facts (induction), we start reasoning at an intermediate level 
(abduction).(Friedrichs & Kratochwil, 2009, p. 709) 
This process is analogous to that of grounded theory: 
(1) creating and refining the research and data collection questions, (2) 
raising terms of concepts, (3) asking more conceptual questions on a generic 
level, (4) making further discoveries and clarifying concepts through writing 
and rewriting (Charmaz, 1990, p. 1161). 
Abductive reasoning leads to the execution of these tasks in an iterative fashion, 
alternating between theory and data. Iteration has been considered not only to 
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differentiate abduction from inductive approaches, but to result in theory which is 
"an intimate part of the research process" (Blaikie, 2010, p. 156). It strikes me as 
only intellectually honest to note that my position as researcher, interpreting data and 
seeking to derive theoretical traction for its explanation and understanding, will have 
a role in shaping this process. Moreover, to the extent that I endeavour not only to 
understand and explain historical events (Howarth, 2000, p. 131), but also to explain 
the qualitative character of judicial impact, this project blurs epistemologies (Miles 
& Huberman, 1994, pp. 4 -5). This is consistent with a movement in public policy, 
among a variety of other fields, such as organisational studies and international 
relations, towards an interpretive mode of "constitutive analysis ", where context is a 
crucial variable in understanding how "social facts" come into being, yet which does 
not consign these to abject relativism (Pouliot, 2007, p. 373; Searle, 1995; Wendt, 
1998). For my research, this involved the interrogation of judicial impact on a policy 
area as a "social fact" produced by political understandings, rather than some 
inherent or inevitable property of judicial rulings. 
Inductive aspects of my research 
In pursuing this goal of constitutive analysis, I agree with the central non -positivist 
tenet of interpretivist methodology: that explanations generated by research are 
contextually situated (by both the specificities of the data and the researcher's 
subjective position). However, I do not fully subscribe to the argument that it is 
therefore impossible to induce more generally applicable "principles or propositions" 
(Schwartz -Shea & Yanow, 2012, p. 28). From emergent theory which is refined 
throughout the research process, ideal types can be constructed as abstract models 
which work towards theoretical explanations (Blaikie, 2010, p. 156). My inductive 
development and use of two descriptive -analytical typologies to compare the 
qualitative character of judicial impact across cases is an example of such a research 
output (I return to these below). This process of "analytical theory driven induction" 
(George & Bennett, 2004, pp. 240-2) was pursued as a means of providing for a 
nuanced typology of variance across my cases. I have used these typologies to 
account for the differing and complex means by which judicial decisions have 
impacted upon policy change and its framing in my cases. I propose that this is an 
example of emergent theory creation, which has the potential to advance 
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understanding of (albeit contextually situated) factors underpinning qualitative 
variation in judicial impact on asylum policy in the UK and its framing by 
government. 
It is important to distinguish here, however, that generalizability was not the 
objective goal guiding the research process. Rather, theory development was a 
product of detailed insight into contextual factors which characterise my case study, 
emerging as commonalities underpinning individual episodes of judicial impact 
therein. In this regard, the typologies which were outlined conceptually in chapter 
three, and methodologically below, served to supplement my initial investigation of 
source and politicisation. In my final analysis, I compare findings across the four 
cases of judicial impact studied, to evaluate the significance of the source of judicial 
decisions (UK or ECtHR) and whether compliance is politicised, as key factors 
shaping judicial impact on policy change. Although the generalizability of my 
findings is necessarily limited, due to the contextual specificity of my research and 
the inescapable reflexive flavour which is a product of my perspective as researcher, 
this is typical of qualitative research in general (Blaikie, 2010, p. 217). The resultant 
understanding of judicial impact in my chosen case is, as Schofield says of 
qualitative research generally, "to produce a coherent and illuminating description of 
and perspective on a situation that is based on and consistent with detailed study of 
that situation" (1993, p. 202). This is middle -range theory, which may enhance 
understanding of both processes and outcomes by specifying the conditions under 
which these outcomes occur, contributing to "development of a rich, differentiated 
theory about that phenomenon." (George and Bennett 2004: 216) The relevance of 
these "conditional generalizations of limited scope" (George and Bennett 2004: 216) 
to other policy domains or polities may be assessed in future research according to 
the comparative differences and similarities of the case under investigation (Blaikie, 
2010, p. 217; Schofield, 1993, p. 207). 
How cases were chosen 
Politicisation and source as a basis for case selection 
In my prior consideration of existing theoretical approaches to the impact of court 
rulings on government, politicisation of compliance and the source of the judicial 
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decision were distinguished as a starting point for selection of comparative examples 
for this research. As noted earlier, my intention is not to suggest these factors are 
explanatory variables which may directly account for variation in the form of policy 
change or its political framing. Rather, consideration of the significance of 
politicisation and source was a starting point to structure the investigation of the 
broader process of policy change and its political framing, which may or may not 
vary according to such factors. Given that politicisation and source initially appeared 
to be of some plausible significance to judicial impact, it could be said that they 
informed my selection of cases as a theoretical typology (Leuffen, 2007, p. 151), 
where each case corresponds to a different type for comparison.In this respect, each 
chosen case is inherently paradigmatic, in so far as it is "exemplary of a concept or 
theoretical outcome" (Gerring, 2001, p. 219).My intention was, however, to enhance 
theoretical and empirical insights into the process of judicial impact and its 
justification by using these initial types as a launch -pad for consideration of 
politicisation and source alongside other emergent factors of potential significance 
which arose during the process of data collection and analysis. 
Four judicial decisions (or more accurately, the political responses these court rulings 
met with) were chosen for analysis. Two of these `cases' involved judicial decisions 
from the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), whereas two were handed 
down from the British senior courts. Of these four, one of each of the ECtHR and 
British judicial decisions were considered to have been politicised, whereas the 
remaining two were not. Selection of these four cases allowed me to employ a 
qualitative case study based approach to contrast responses to judicial decisions on 
the basis of whether they are handed down from the ECtHR or a UK superior court, 
and whether politicisation (ostensibly due to national security concerns, in my 
chosen cases) was a potential mitigating factor in judicial impact. These judicial 
decisions were chosen so as to provide for both `hard' cases in which we may expect 
governmental intransigence (particularly due to politicisation), and also less 
controversial cases, more conducive to acceptance of judicial impact on policy by 
government. 
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Consistency and comparability of cases selected 
As far as possible, I sought to identify classes of potential cases which concerned 
common, comparable policy issues. To the extent that restrictions on asylum control 
and antipathy towards the courts have been consistent predilections of all UK 
governments from at least the late 1980s to date, I did not find it necessary to limit 
selection of cases to a single government for them to be considered comparable. 
General attitudes of the political and administrative systems have been consistently 
populist and restrictive of asylum, with variations from this baseline apt for 
consideration on a case by case basis. I also sought to identify municipal judicial 
decisions which were not primarily based on ECtHR jurisprudence, so to avoid 
diminishing the value of a comparison of ECtHR cases with municipal cases which 
could be considered as merely interpreting and applying ECtHR jurisprudence 
`through the back door.' 
Identification of cases 
To select cases on this basis, I first conducted a broad ranging overview of judicial 
decisions which not only ruled against the UK government, but could also be said to 
call for changes to the content or execution of immigration or asylum policies. The 
identification of such examples emanating from the ECtHR was quite 
straightforward, due to online cataloguing of jurisprudence by the Council of Europe. 
Recent annual reports by the Ministry of Justice to the Joint Committee on Human 
Rights, on the status of compliance with judicial decisions, were also a helpful point 
of reference for identification of recent cases from both the ECtHR and municipal 
courts. Case selection was also informed by a necessary parallel process of getting to 
know and understand the rather complex technical details and historical development 
of the law and politics of immigration and asylum in the UK, and associated human 
rights and procedural law. I therefore became aware of potential cases via legal 
textbooks, case law databases, and consultation with legal academics, immigration 
practitioners, and expert organisations such as the Refugee Council, Scottish Refugee 
Council and Immigration Law Practitioners' Association (ILPA). This also required 
that I keep up to date with recent developments in immigration and asylum law via 
mailing lists, government and practitioner websites and blogs (for example, the 
UKBA website and notably, FreeMovement.org.uk and UKHumanRightsBlog.com). 
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This broad approach to familiarising myself with the topic benefited my research by 
allowing me to track the perceived significance of jurisprudence over time - as 
understood by practitioners and legal experts. Where more recent judicial decisions 
cited previous cases, these were considered (at least from a legal perspective) to be 
significant. I then used key word searches for these cases in online archives of 
government documents and parliamentary debates. This was necessary not only to 
assess the significance of cases to asylum politics and policy (as opposed to legal 
practice), but also to ensure that adequate sources were available to assess 
governmental responses. 
Consideration was given to the limited number of cases which resulted in a 
declaration of incompatibility under the Human Rights Act, since it came into effect 
in 2000. Whilst these constituted the clearest examples of judicial decisions calling 
for policy change, I also sought to identify cases with a more general impact on 
legislative change (not necessarily confining myself to the HRA as a mechanism 
driving such change) and cases with an impact on operational policies on 
immigration control (i.e. not necessarily requiring changes to primary statute). This 
required tracing potential judicial impact beyond the abundant volume of significant 
new primary legislation on immigration and asylum, to identify changes to the 
Immigration Rules and UKBA Operational Guidelines, in line with judicial 
decisions. 
Case selection was ultimately driven by my desire to compare cases involving 
reasonably similar policy questions, which could confidently be characterised as 
meeting with politicisation or its absence - this required identification of two 
apparently uncontroversial cases of compliance, and two in which government was at 
least discernibly reluctant, if not intransigent in responding to the courts. At the time 
of my case selection, limited media attention and lobbying by ILPA pointed to the 
failure of the government to promptly comply with a series of judicial decisions (ECJ 
2008; 2011; UKCA 2010b; UKHL 2008; UKSC 2011a; 2011b). However, the policy 
questions addressed in the majority of these cases concerned rather technical issues 
relating to the implementation of a variety of areas of immigration law and European 
law. In contrast, the issues involved in my chosen cases can be characterised as 
102 
reasonably consistent and rather straight forward, yet fundamental to the governance 
of asylum control: whether or not an individual may be removed from the country, 
and if not, what restrictions in- country are lawful; as well as the procedural and 
human rights responsibilities falling upon government as a consequence. 
My focus on deportation, removal and associated restrictive controls 
Notable media attention has, in recent years, highlighted political controversy over 
the detention and deportation of children, foreign national prisoners, and suspected 
terrorists, as well as government capacity over removals in general. The particularly 
controversial issue of government capacity to expel foreign nationals where this may 
be legally constrained by the ECHR made deportation and removal particularly apt 
for identification of politicised and non -politicised cases, as well as cases which 
made their way to the ECtHR. The involvement of national security concerns in two 
of my chosen cases (Chahal v. UK and the Afghan Hijackers case) made compliance 
particularly controversial, suggesting politicisation. 
My preference for cases relating to deportation and removal was motivated in part by 
a desire to investigate the fundamental question of judicial challenge to governmental 
authority over inclusion and exclusion of foreign nationals within the nation state. 
Moreover, certain significant rulings regarding deportation and removal have 
become somewhat definitive of both asylum law and asylum policy. Several of these 
cases may reasonably be assumed to have preconditioned governmental attitudes 
towards the courts (at least in the area of immigration and asylum). I therefore 
considered historical cases producing notable jurisprudence on asylum control, as 
well as more recent examples of adverse judicial decisions with potential impact on 
policy change. Asylum was truly differentiated from immigration control in response 
to an ECtHR case (1991) concerning deportation ( Vilvarajah v. UK) - resulting in 
the legislation of appeal rights which institutionalised previously tenuous judicial 
oversight of asylum control. This case therefore presented a logical historical starting 
point for my research. My end point considers recent judicial decisions and 
government endeavours to reconcile foreign nationals' access to justice with policy 
goals on asylum control and expedient removals. 
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Cases which either directly concerned deportation or removal, or which otherwise 
sprung from judicial constraints upon these powers, were also a compelling subject 
for investigation due to their tendency to create seemingly intractable conflict 
between government and judiciary over the legitimate parameters of asylum control. 
Such cases were also compelling due to their engagement with procedural justice and 
human rights principles as constraints on the exercise of such sovereign powers as 
expulsion of foreign nationals - suggestive of probable non -compliance, yet 
consistently followed by implementation of the judicial decision. 
My case studies as a narrative of asylum control, 1990 -2012 
Selection of case studies which span twenty -two years, from shortly after the genesis 
of asylum control as an independent policy area in the UK, to almost the present day, 
has allowed insights to be drawn into the development of governmental attitudes 
towards compliance and policy change over time. Insights into how government 
responded to particularly controversial judicial decisions in the past may help derive 
general insights into the politics of judicial impact on asylum control of potential 
benefit to practitioners concerned over recent examples where judicial decisions do 
not meet with the straightforward compliance which litigants and advocacy groups 
may have hoped for. 
My chosen cases can be said to chart a story of the judicialization of asylum control, 
and an associated political backlash, which has at times led to the politicisation of 
law. Beginning in the early 1990s, the British government pre -empted the ECtHR's 
ruling in the Vilvarajah case (EComHR 1990; ECtHR 1991) to self -impose certain 
procedural constraints on its policy for the removal of asylum seekers. This pre- 
emptive constraint may be contrasted with the subsequent reluctant implementation 
of significant changes to the underlying logic of asylum removals, following the 
Chahal case (ECtHR 1997), in which the ECtHR ruled that expulsion to a prospect 
of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, as prohibited by ECHR article 
three, would not be permissible under any circumstances, even where the individual 
concerned may pose a threat to national security. Of particular interest in considering 
this case, are subsequent governments' attempts to have the constraint imposed by 
Chahal overturned or diminished. In responding to decisions from the municipal 
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judiciary in the `Afghan Hijackers' case (UKHC 2006; UKCA 2006) (on access to 
work and welfare where removal was barred by the ECHR), politicians lashed out at 
the judiciary, rejecting the legitimacy of their intervention into policy matters held to 
be the prerogative of a sovereign parliament. My final case introduces a less 
bombastic response to the Medical Justice rulings (UKHC 2010a; UKCA 2011 a) on 
a policy which ostensibly sought to limit access to judicial oversight prior to the 
removal of certain categories of foreign national. Compliance appeared to follow this 
case in a somewhat straightforward manner, in sharp contrast to responses to Chahal 
and the Hijackers. 
This overview of cases is presented in Table 1, below, which more clearly delineates 
key distinctions along the axes of politicisation, and whether the decision in question 
was handed down from the ECtHR or a municipal court. I also provide a brief 
summative indication of the issues involved in each case. 
Table 1: Case studies according to politicisation and source 
I. ECtHR / Politicised - Chahal v. UK (and subsequent `saga' of responses) 
Deportation at all costs; 
2. UK / Politicised - ̀Afghan Hijackers' 
Ad -hoc status excluding access to welfare and employment; 
3. ECtHR / Non -politicised - Vilvarajah v UK 
Limits on access to appeals (at first in- country; latterly if `manifestly 
unfounded'); and 
4. UK / Non -politicised -Medical Justice v. S.o.S. 
Exceptions to seventy -two hours' notice of removal as a limitation on 
access to legal advice and judicial oversight. 
Non -politicized Politicized 
Vilvarajah v. UK Chahal saga 
Jul 1990 -Jan 1996 Oct 1996 - Apr 2011 
ECtHR Chahal: Unlawful to balance prohibition on Justiciability of removal under 
refoulement to prospect of torture against ECHR in the absence of an in- 
country asylum appeals 
perceived security threats. 
mechanism. Saga: Backlash against Chahal, given 




Medical Justice y S.o.S. 
Jul 2010 - Oct 2012 
Constitutional right of access 
to legal advice / judicial 
oversight prior to removal. 
"Afghan Hijackers" 
Jun 2004 - May 2008 
Ad -hoc restrictive immigration status in lieu 
of deportation deemed ultra- vires. 
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Collection of sources 
Initial challenges 
In beginning my data collection, I was greatly concerned that governmental sources 
on judicial impact on policy change may be extremely scarce due to the thirty year 
embargo on public access to documents relating to policy formulation and litigation, 
and the complete embargo on legal advice provided to government. Given my 
interest in the recent and current politics of asylum control, and the fact that asylum 
had only truly been differentiated from broader immigration control since 1993, 
looking back more than thirty years was not an option. My initial strategy for dealing 
with this challenge was to pursue an extensive number of interviews with individuals 
involved in both responding to the courts and effecting policy change; notably within 
the Home Office, UKBA and Ministry of Justice. It was readily possible to identify 
and target civil servants and politicians working on asylum policy and litigation both 
currently and at historic junctures. I was encouraged in this endeavour by initial 
support from ILPA to facilitate access to key contacts in UKBA and the Home 
Office. Unfortunately, this support fell through when ILPA became wary of its own 
relationship with the government during a series of scandals involving UKBA in 
2011, putting the organisation on the front page of newspapers for several weeks. My 
own persistent efforts to obtain willing interviewees resulted in a blanket silence on 
all fronts. My network of non -governmental research contacts initially made 
available to me one relevant contact in UKBA and one from the Ministry of Justice. 
However, in light of the controversies surrounding immigration and asylum control 
at that time, little came from these contacts. 
It would have been advantageous to be able to consider the subjective articulations of 
meaning in interviewees' accounts of judicial decisions and policy change. However, 
whilst my research agenda was shaped by the impossibility of gaining interview 
access, thankfully it remained possible to investigate the impact of court rulings on 
policy change by recourse to governmental documents and political rhetoric as 
expressive of this change and its justification. These sources readily provided 
discursive data for analysis of how problems were constructed in government, even if 
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it was not possible to identify and interrogate the role of material processes engaged 
in responding to the courts. 
Process tracing 
Having selected my four cases for investigation, I began to trace the series of events 
leading up to and beyond each judicial decision. Compiling a detailed narrative of 
events allowed for immediate reflection on what contextual and historical factors 
required consideration in order to specify and understand judicial impact on policy 
change and its framing. This process tracing was also essential to identify what 
political institutions and actors were involved in responding to the courts and in 
implementing any pursuant changes to asylum policy. The written account of the 
case included within each judicial decision, and print media reports on the ruling and 
political response, were initially very helpful in setting out the characters and plot of 
this narrative. Print news articles drawing on official governmental press statements 
also provided notable examples of rhetorical responses to the courts and justifications 
of associated policy change. As each of my chosen cases had gone through at least 
one, if not multiple prior rounds of litigation, rising through at least the Court of 
Appeal before reaching a final determination, the judicial decision itself often gave 
an extremely candid indication of the government's response to the initial decision 
under appeal in the higher court. Press releases and policy primers produced by 
advocacy organisations, such as the Refugee Council, and Medical Justice also aided 
in this initial process of understanding the legal and political issues, and political 
`players' involved in each case. 
Identification of sources 
This initial overview was followed by an exhaustive search of government databases, 
collecting documents and rhetoric associated with the `impact' of each ruling. 
Hansard, parliamentary committee proceedings and reports, reports by government 
departments and Commons research reports were all iteratively searched using 
keywords derived from the judicial decision and from successive readings of 
associated legal commentaries and political sources produced in response to the 
courts. This process was also applied to current and archived versions of the websites 
of the Prime Minister's Office, the Home Office and UKBA. Citations and passing 
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references in one source often led to a cascade of other sources to be sought out. As 
the detailed chain of events became more apparent for my chosen cases, it became 
possible to request specific documents from the Home Office, which were not 
otherwise publicly available. 
To my surprise, these documents were readily provided. These included a limited 
number of equality impact assessments and consultation letters to key `stakeholders.' 
I chose at an early stage not to pursue Freedom of Information requests (FOIs) as a 
basis to obtain sources. This decision was guided partly by an initial concern not to 
`rock the boat' before first gaining access to potential interviewees in the asylum 
policy and litigation strategy divisions which have in recent years floated between 
the Home Office and UKBA. Ultimately, all persistent requests for interviews, at all 
levels, were met with an enduring wall of silence. Whilst advocacy organisations 
suggested to me that FOIs tend to be met with a similar disregard or perfunctory 
dismissive response, I must note that the Home Office's willingness to provide 
specified documents on request suggests that there may be merit to pursuing 
submission of FOIs to the Home Office as a strategy in future research - especially 
as it is now fully responsible for policy matters previously dealt with by the 
unresponsive UKBA. 
Given my interest in assessing the government's discursive articulation of judicial 
impact, it was necessary to follow this rather broad initial data collection by 
distinguishing sources which provided actual discursive data. These sources 
ultimately comprised a limited but rich data set for each case. Predictably, for my 
non -politicised cases, there were fewer sources available for analysis than for the 
more politically controversial cases. However, I endeavoured to ensure that all 
chosen cases provided for adequate sources to substantiate the government's 
response to the judicial decision in question. 
How data was analysed 
Framing analysis 
Having identified documents and rhetoric as sources for analysis, a suitable method 
had to be chosen to interrogate them for meaningful data on judicial impact on policy 
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change. This was required to be compatible with my engagement with the content 
and practice of documentation and political rhetoric as discursive exercises in policy 
as problematisation (as discussed in chapter three). As a general approach in political 
analysis, framing analysis seeks to discern how a given actor or institution 
understands or constructs a perceived problem, its causes, what should be done about 
it and who should intervene to do so (Baachi, 2009; Benford & Snow, 2000; Bleich, 
2011; Hajer & Laws, 2008; Menashe & Siegel, 1998; Rein & Schön, 1993; Verloo & 
Lombardo, 2007; Verloo, 2005). Although there is a certain degree of cross -over 
between framing analysis and other approaches to discourse, investigation of framing 
fits well with the nature of the problem of judicial impact as I have posed it. Analysis 
of issue framing has the potential to provide great insights into sense -making (Weick, 
1995) as conducted and expressed through problem definition, reasoning and 
justification by government (Baachi, 2009; Hajer, 2009). Specifically, I have made 
use of critical framing analysis, or CFA (Verloo, 2005), as a method which is 
particularly well suited to the task of interrogating policy as problematisation. CFA 
provides a very clearly articulated template for coding and analysis of the content of 
discursive sources, in order to understand the process of sense -making in 
government. This variant of framing analysis is also particularly suited to my 
purposes due to its amenability to the study of political interpretation of meaning, as 
opposed to strategic manipulation of meaning by political actors. 
CFA draws on existing templates for investigation of strategic issue framing by 
social movements seeking to make a persuasive case for policy change, to ask how 
policy makers themselves understand and construct a policy problem as an object for 
action by government. This approach also interrogates implicit value assumptions 
and normative frames which are employed in arriving at such problem diagnoses and 
prognoses (Verloo & Lombardo, 2007; Verloo, 2005). A `frame' may therefore be 
conceived of as: 
1. an analytic construct which describes; 
2. an act of classification (Hajer & Laws, 2008, p. 253), which is in itself; 
3. a bid for legitimation of action by policy makers (Baachi, 2009). 
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Frames describe and enact political attempts to render understanding of an issue 
stable by simplifying cause and effect and specifying the parameters of legitimate 
interventions into the problem domain, rather than opening it up to deliberation. 
They represent an attempt at persuasive definition and concrete suggestion of action 
or inaction. My interest in frame analysis is not that of many authors concerned with 
identifying how one framing of a problem proves more dominant, persuasive, or 
incompatible with others it is in conflict with (e.g. Benford & Snow, 2000; Rein & 
Schön, 1996; Roe, 1994). Rather, I am drawn to the potential of CFA as a method for 
identifying, specifying and making explicit otherwise hidden significances in policy 
documents or rhetoric (Verloo, 2005). By means of CFA, I have endeavoured to 
make apparent the reasoning which both underpins and is elaborated in government 
documents and rhetoric as indicators of policy. This offers the potential to uncover 
and specify how governments have interpreted the meaning and significance of 
judicial decisions, and the reasoning and value assumptions which are deployed in an 
attempt to justify proposed responses to the courts. 
In employing this approach, I have sought to uncover divergences in how the 
`problem' of compliance with an adverse judicial decision is understood or acted 
upon at the levels of executive politics and administration. Conflicting or divergent 
ideas, values, or reasoning on how problem definitions lead to legitimate actions, 
who should intervene and why, may exist across government (Fischer, 2003, p. 143). 
This can be determined by investigating how various examples of rhetoric and 
documents frame the judicial decision, or to employ the language of CFA, by 
specifying their diagnosis, prognosis, and normative orientations. This mapping 
exercise may go beyond offering much needed descriptive clarity of detail on 
government orientations and attitudes. It may also offer insights into potential 
inconsistencies between the orientations and attitudes (framings) held across time 
towards judicial impact, and across government actors, on a case by case basis. Such 
analytical insights have the potential to move understanding of judicial impact 
beyond a perceived conflict between government and judiciary, or seemingly 
"intractable policy conflict" (Rein & Schön, 1996), towards deeper insights into how 
this conflict is a product of internal problematisations across government, where 
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framings are constructed in an attempt to order governmental attitudes and 
behavioural strategies for dealing with judicial decisions. 
Application of Critical Framing Analysis 
Appendix two presents a detailed template for critical framing analysis of documents 
and rhetoric. This template provides a specific series of questions which were 
considered for each governmental source. Answers to these questions, in aggregate 
across a body of sources, provided data which built a broader overview of 
governmental attitudes towards a given judicial decision, or "super- text" (as opposed 
to a sub -text), and its impact on policy change, elucidating key themes, which may 
otherwise remain implicit. In this manner, qualitative detail on problem definition, 
reasoning and justification of interpretations and actions were elicited from 
government documents and rhetoric. Frame analysis thereby interrogated what 
government understood the selected judicial decisions to mean in terms of necessary 
policy change. Without replicating the detail provided in appendix two, I will 
emphasise here that application of CFA primarily comprises specification of a 
process of sense making in government in terms of problem diagnosis and prognosis: 
what is the problem; 
who is responsible; 
what should be done about it; and 
who should do it. 
This data was elicited by analysis of governmental documents and also statements by 
politicians (rhetoric) prepared in the wake of judicial decisions. These sources 
included examples which directly addressed questions of compliance with particular 
judicial decisions, and others which were more broadly concerned with relationships 
between asylum control, the role of the courts, and associated issues, such as 
balancing concerns over individual human rights of migrants, migration control, and 
concerns over collective security. Employing CFA to uncover problem diagnoses, 
prognoses and normative assumptions, helped to specify governmental 
understandings of judicial decisions and their perceived impact on asylum control; 
both at the level of politics and administration. I therefore present critical framing 
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analysis of problematisation as an effective avenue to discern and explain factors 
which influence how government responds to the courts. 
Data on discursive problematisations obtained by CFA was considered as it related to 
the particular speaker or author, but also in terms of how sources could be regarded 
together as comprising an "aggregated narrative" of judicial impact on asylum 
control, which is more generalizable to processes of collective decision making (van 
Eeten, 2007, p. 254). In this manner, for each of my case studies, consideration was 
given as to whether there was evidence of a consistent trend among sources oriented 
towards audiences within government, towards the public, and in general. This data 
was then related to my theoretical typologies: how government responded to rulings 
to reconcile them with its past and future policy trajectory; and the level of generality 
of policy ideas which political actors perceived to be impacted upon by the decision 
and compliant policy change (see chapter three). Throughout the entire process of 
critical framing analysis - from engagement with individual discursive sources and 
the aggregation and comparison of data, to the relation of this data to my analytic 
typologies - consideration was given to the potential significance of politicisation of 
compliance and the source of a judicial decision, as well as the potential for other 
emergent factors to offer insights. 
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Application of my analytical typologies 
Following critical framing analysis of documents and rhetoric, resulting data was 
further considered through the lens of the two analytical typologies which I outlined 
in chapter three. The first of these concerns the manner in which government 
responded to judicial decisions (the variety of response). The second concerns the 
level of generality of ideas underpinning asylum control and deportation which were 
constructed as `at stake' in governmental discourse problematising judicial impact 
(the governmental perception of the `depth' of impact). This secondary data analysis 
sought to build upon and articulate findings from the prior critical framing analysis, 
to further explore and specify governmental strategies for reconciling and justifying 
judicial decisions and the pursuant response in relation to policy goals. These 
analytical typologies performed an important function in cutting through the variety 
and complexity of data obtained from critical framing analysis, to provide a coherent 
expression of how government responded to the courts and begin questioning why it 
did so in a particular way. 
Response 
In chapter three, I combined existing approaches to differentiating governmental 
responses to the courts with an account of how this involves discursive dissonance 
relating to judicial impact on policy goals. In doing so, I emphasised that discursive 
responses to the courts serve not only to specify and justify a particular political 
solution to a problem (in opposition to alternatives, whether stated or implicit), they 
also seek to reconcile the disjuncture which a judicial decision makes apparent 
between compliant policy change and the plausibility of continued governmental 
authorityover pre- existing policy goals. The variety of response exemplified by 
government has been considered in each of my case studies as indicated by the 
aggregate narrative of the problem of compliance arrived at by means of CFA of 
governmental discursive sources. This aggregate orientation elicits an account of 
how government proposed to deal with the perceived inconvenience of compliance. 
This orientation to the `problem' concerns not so much the policy response required 
to implement a court ruling, but rather how to justify and reconcile what the court 
ruling means with what government claims to be doing in the area of asylum control. 
Linking evidence from frame analysis to the response typology provides a specific 
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account of how government has sought to position itself in relation to a judicial 
decision. 
115 
As detailed in chapter three, aggregated data from CFA may indicate one of the 
following responses: 
dismissal of the applicability of the judicial decision; 
depreciation of its significance to a particular policy goal; 
dissociation of the given political actor or institution from the domain of 
the decision; 
amplification of the coercive effects of the judicial decision, whilst 
keeping the original attitudes to the policy issue; 
conversion to the legal attitude; 
containing impact, by seeking to diminish the apparent discrepancy 
between policy before and after the judicial decision. 
(Based on Canon & Johnson, 1999; Conant, 2002; Johnson, 1967; Muir, 
1967; Stapleton & Wilson, 2009) 
This classificatory exercise served to facilitate comparison of judicial impact across 
my case studies in terms of varying responses to the courts. On its own, such a 
typology cannot account for why a political actor or institution responds to the courts 
in a given way. However, by linking it to prior frame analysis, this provided 
qualitative detail of the reasoning which led to the adoption of such an orientation. 
For the purposes of interrogating factors leading to a particular response, my second 
analytical typology - relating to the level of governing ideas at stake in responding to 
the problem of compliant policy change - allowed for a concise articulation of the 
complex and diverse data obtained from CFA. This served to specify how 
governmental actors (in aggregate) considered the underlying ideas governing 
asylum control to be impacted upon, challenged or constrained by a judicial decision 
and compliant policy change. This is what I have termed, depth of impact. 
Depth of Impact 
This layer of analysis marshals data from critical framing analysis to more coherently 
express what political actors perceive to be `at stake' in compliant policy change, 
responding to the courts. Depth of impact is indicated by the content of discourse. 
However, it is made more discernible by CFA of problematisation discourse, as 
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indicated by the discursive construction of what the `problem' was perceived to be 
and what was to be done about it. It could be said that analysis on this plane concerns 
distinction of how fundamental the problem of policy change in compliance with the 
courts was perceived to be by government. As indicated in chapters one and three, I 
have distinguished three levels of governing ideas: 
1. Policies: the specific solutions proposed by policy makers; 
2. The more general programmes which `underpin' these policy ideas 
theunderlying programmatic logic which defines the problem to be solved; 
and 
3. The foundational `public philosophies'which ground these (J. L. Campbell, 
1998) - the rarely contested assumptions and values on the ordering of 
knowledge and society (Schmidt, 2008, p. 306). 
One or more level of ideas may be challenged or constrained by compliance with a 
judicial decision.I have applied the typology of depth of impact, not merely as a 
useful means of descriptively articulating data from critical framing analysis, but 
furthermore, as a tool to be used in tandem with the response typology to interrogate 
whether variation in the level of impact may account for variation in governmental 
responses. 
Ideas governing UK asylum control 
In concluding chapter one, I sought to summarise the practice of asylum control over 
the past thirty yearsaccording to the three general levels of governing ideas which I 
have discussed above. Although this served as a descriptive exercise, I have also 
made the case for such classification as a basis for interrogating the ideas `at stake' in 
how governmental actors have sought to reconcile dissonance produced by 
compliance with judicial decisions which impact upon the realisation of pre- existing 
policy goals. Before heading into my empirical analysis of case studies in the 
following three chapters, I will re -state these governing ideas as expressive of the 
governance of asylum control in the UK over the duration of my case studies: 
Public philosophy: Restrictive asylum controls. 
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The state seeks to exercise coercive controls necessary to restrict inclusion (and 
therefore enforce the exclusion) of certain foreign nationals, including asylum 
seekers. This is pursued in opposition to a more expansive humanitarian philosophy 
of asylum control. 
Programmatic Logic: Executive discretion. 
Demonstration of authoritative governance of inclusion and exclusion requires 
discretion to execute asylum controls. This is reflected in a governing logic of 
balancing political expediency against potential liberal constraints. The executive 
therefore seeks discretion over a balancing of inclusion /exclusion, individual /state, 
liberty /security, expediency /review. 
Policy: Deportation, removal and restrictions on rights in- country 
The public philosophy and programme of asylum control are implemented by means 
of certain policy tools: expulsion and other forms of coercive control of unwanted 
foreign nationals, such as placing limitations on their human rights within the 
country. Policies may also seek to limit barriers to expedient and authoritative 
governance of asylum, notably by restricting access to judicial oversight. 
Conclusion 
I have presented critical framing analysis as a suitable and incisive method to engage 
with and analyse governmental discourse on policy as an exercise in 
problematisation. This serves as a method to look for judicial impact, both as 
expressed and implicit in the normative assumptions, problem diagnoses and 
prognoses which constitute governmental discourse on judicial decisions and policy 
change. Consistent with my agenda for research, this facilitates engagement with 
judicial impact as constructed within government, from the perspective of those 
engaged in its interpretation and enactment. I have also indicated the role played by 
my application of the response and depth typologies to data obtained by CFA of 
governmental documents and political rhetoric for each of my case studies. This has 
facilitated consideration of judicial impact in terms of how government responded to 
the `problem' (to resolve it) and the governing ideas perceived to be `at stake' in 
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doing so. This level of analysis also facilitates further consideration of the role of 
politicisation of compliance and the source of the judicial decision (as indicated by 
CFA of sources) in determining these forms of judicial impact. 
Having set out an agenda for the study of judicial impact on asylum control policy as 
it is manifest in governmental discourse, and a methodology for its investigation, the 
following three chapters present the analysis of my four chosen case studies. By 
recourse to CFA of problematisation discourse in documents and rhetoric, and 
application of my analytical typologies, I analyse the outcome of judicial impact on 
policy change in each case. In chapter eight, I then compare impact across each of 
my four case studies in terms of typological variation and the apparent significance 
of politicisation and source. 
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5. The Afghan hijackers 
Introduction 
On the 6th of February 2000, nine members of the political opposition to the Taliban 
in Afghanistan arrived in the UK to claim asylum by hijacking an airliner. That same 
day, the Home Secretary promised to deport them. Yet, over six years later, the men 
were still in the UK. Having been denied asylum due to their crimes, the Asylum 
Tribunal invoked ECHR Article 3 as a barrier to their deportation - holding that the 
great publicity surrounding their escape to the UK made them liable to execution or 
torture should they be returned to Afghanistan. Subsequently, the High Court ruled 
that the Home Office's handling of the men's case demonstrated "conspicuous 
unfairness amounting to an abuse of power" (UKHC 2006). Restrictions on the 
men's rights within the country in lieu of deportation, under a regime of temporary 
admission, were deemed beyond the powers invested in the Home Office by 
parliament (ultra vires). Having publicly promised and failed to deport the men, 
further obstacles to restricting their rights and status in- country presented a very 
serious dilemma for the government and Home Secretary: what to do about the 
Afghan hijackers? 
In this chapter, I consider how governmental discourse framed the policy problem 
posed by the courts. Of particular significance to my subsequent comparative 
consideration of how the judicial decisions impacted asylum control policy and its 
framing, is the question of why compliance was ostensibly so politicised, and what 
significance, if any, may be attached to the municipal source of the rulings. The 
`Hijackers' case involved a significant and highly public politicisation of compliance 
with municipal court rulings (UKHC 2006; UKCA 2006), in response to which 
prominent members of the government directly questioned the authority of the 
courts. In this respect, I consider the Hijackers case to be a compelling starting point 
for consideration of judicial impact; it appears to be an especially `hard case,' in 
which judicial impact on policy change appears unlikely due to political opposition. 
The Hijackers case will also facilitate later comparison of judicial impact according 
to the source of the judicial decision. In this instance, the courts made recourse 
primarily to British common law, rather than depending significantly upon the 
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European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), to rule on the lawfulness of 
immigration and asylum controls. 
Engaging with these issues, I seek to gain insight into the phenomenon of reluctant 
policy change which is characterised by a tension between oppositional political 
rhetoric and compliance in practice. Towards this end, I interrogate judicial impact 
by means of critical framing analysis of "what the problem is supposed to be" from 
the governmental perspective (Baachi, 2009; Verloo, 2005). I begin by presenting a 
brief outline of the facts of the judicial decisions on the Hijackers' status. I then 
locate the ruling within the context of broader governmental priorities for asylum 
control and its relationship towards judicial scrutiny in this area. This historical - 
contextual prelude sets up subsequent engagement with primary sources on judicial 
impact for the Hijackers case. Drawing upon this presentation of governmental 
framings of the issue, I then reflect on the nature and significance of the 
government's response towards the Hijackers rulings, and the impact these have had 
on the ideas governing asylum control. 
Facts of the case 
On the 6`h of February 2000, nine men arrived in the UK from Afghanistan by 
hijacking an internal flight. Surrendering to the British authorities after a three day 
stand -off, the men claimed asylum as opponents of the Taleban regime. They were 
subsequently jailed in December 2001 for the hijacking, possession of firearms and 
explosives, and false imprisonment of passengers on their arrival in the UK. 
However, in June 2003, these convictions were overturned on grounds of a mistrial, 
as the jury had been misdirected by the judge on the defence that the hijacking was 
conducted under duress (UKCA 2003). As the majority of the men had already 
served out the duration of their sentences, there was no retrial. At this point, the 
Home Secretary refused the men's claims for asylum, Humanitarian Protection, and 
Discretionary Leave to Remain in the UK, on the basis that it was safe to return them 
to Afghanistan. 
In June 2004, a panel of Adjudicators dismissed an appeal against refusal of asylum, 
on the grounds that the hijacking gave reason to consider the men to have committed 
a serious non -political crime outside the country of refuge, excluding them from the 
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protection of the Refugee Convention under Article 1F(b). However, the adjudicators 
upheld the men's appeal against deportation on the basis that ECHR Article 3 
prohibited their expulsion to Afghanistan, no matter their conduct, as their high 
profile flight and political opposition to the Taleban would render them at a real risk 
of torture, if not death, on return (thereby applying the constraint imposed by the 
ECtHR in Chahal, to which I turn in my next chapter). This required that the Home 
Secretary award the men Discretionary Leave to Remain in the UK. This protection 
comes not from refugee law, but from application of the Human Rights Act and 
associated jurisprudence of the ECtHR and British senior courts as a constraint on 
deportations and removals. However, the substantive question considered in this 
chapter is the ruling, based primarily in common law, which arose when the senior 
courts subsequently ruled on the Home Office's failure to provide Leave to Remain. 
The Immigration Appeal Tribunal refused the Home Secretary's appeal against the 
decision, which a senior Home Office official publicly described as "mind boggling" 
(McGrory, 2004, 4). This tone of disbelief, and implicit challenge to the legitimacy 
of legal arbitration, was to prove characteristic of many subsequent responses to 
litigation on the men's status. The Secretary of State did not, however, apply for 
judicial review of the decision to refuse him a right of appeal against the tribunal's 
decision that the hijackers should be given leave to remain in the UK. Also notable 
about the Home Office's response to the Tribunal's scrutiny, is its statement that 
"there were no reasonable grounds for regarding the individuals as a danger to the 
security of the UK, nor as constituting a danger to the community of the UK." (JCHR 
2006b, s.2.19) 
At this point, the litigation appeared to be over. The men awaited their award of 
discretionary leave, which should have stabilised their status in the UK. But they 
were to be kept waiting. Over a year after the Home Secretary had declined to pursue 
litigation, with no change in the men's status, the Asylum Policy Instructions on 
exceptions to Discretionary Leave to Remain were revised, empowering the Home 
Secretary to deny leave where "the person has committed... a crime considered 
serious enough to exclude the person from being a refugee in accordance with Article 
1F(b) of the Refugee Convention." (Immigration and Nationality Directorate decision 
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letter to claimants' solicitors (03.11.05); UKHC 2006, 38). Whilst the policy 
recognized that ECHR Article 3 was "absolute" and required that leave should be 
awarded, it created a new discretionary power that: 
Ministers may decide that it is inappropriate to grant any leave to a person 
falling within the excluded category in the light of all the circumstances of 
the case. Where it is decided that leave should not be granted the individual 
will be kept or placed on temporary admission or temporary release. (Asylum 
Policy Instructions on Humanitarian Protection and Discretionary Leave, 30th 
August 2005, s.2.6) 
The revised policy was justified as follows: 
The revised policy on the grant of Discretionary Leave forms part of the 
Government's commitment to deterring terrorists and others who pose a threat 
to national security, public safety and the lives of innocent people. The 
Secretary of State considers that it is self -evident that hijacking poses a grave 
threat to the life and safety of innocent passengers and crew and that there is 
an overwhelming public interest in deterring such activities... In making his 
decision, [the Home Secretary] has had regard (amongst others) to the 
following factors... the public interest in deterring acts such as hijacking. 
(Immigration and Nationality Directorate decision letter to claimants' 
solicitors (03.11.05), UKHC 2006, 38) 
The effect of this newly devised policy of a temporary status was to indefinitely 
continue the hijackers' ongoing `limbo' by prohibiting them from working, 
restricting access to certain welfare support, prohibiting them from applying for 
travel documents to meet with family in a safe third country, and imposing 
requirements on residence and reporting to the police (UKHC 2006, 20). The 
decision to devise a new policy on temporary admission, rather than comply with the 
Tribunal's decision, was explicitly intended to signal a symbolic political 
commitment to deter any future asylum seeker from employing unlawful means to 
enter, particularly hijacking. Beyond this symbolic gesture, the effect of the new 
policy was to empower the Home Secretary to make temporary admission the default 
position for those excluded from the Refugee Convention, unless he or she deemed 
that Discretionary Leave was appropriate. In effect, this was to empower the Home 
Secretary to deny the de-jure presence of specified foreign nationals, excluding them 
from access to employment and certain forms of welfare support, which are 
contingent upon Leave to Remain. 
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High Court 
With the Home Office's refusal to grant leave awarded by the Tribunal, the case 
came before the High Court. There, the Home Office argued that its newly 
formulated powers were consistent with the sovereign prerogative to exercise 
immigration controls, and empowered by the Immigration Act 1971, s.21(1). In 
scrutinising this argument, however, Justice Sullivan argued that they constituted no 
less than a "paradigm of a minister being given unfettered administrative discretion 
to depart from published policy whenever he thinks it appropriate to do so." He 
branded the case one of "conspicuous unfairness amounting to an abuse of power... 
at the highest level ", with the Home Office acting outside the law "as laid down by 
parliament and the courts" (UKHC 2006, 102, 121). The High Court found the Home 
Secretary's decision not to grant Discretionary Leave (in favour of temporary 
admission) to be unlawful on four grounds: for its defiance of the asylum 
Adjudicators' decision; as unfair and an abuse of power, in deliberately delaying a 
decision on status until new policy was enacted to empower refusal of Leave to 
Remain; for interfering with ECHR Art. 8, in being both disproportionate and not in 
accordance with the law; and finding both the decision and the revised Policy 
Instructions on which it was based to be inconsistent with the Immigration Act 1971, 
because temporary leave could only be applied pending deportation, which was 
unavailable in this instance. Concluding the matter of costs, Justice Sullivan also 
chastised the Home Office for its "inexcusable" conduct before the court 
proceedings, including, "a deliberate wall of silence "; submissions without "any 
argument of substance "; and a "wholly unacceptable" manner of defence, "far short 
of the standards expected of a public authority..." (UKHC 2006, 116 -17) Such 
judicial discourse on the public interest in preventing arbitrariness of executive 
actions stands as an interesting contrast to the Home Office's argument that such 
discretionary powers served the public interest. 
Court of Appeal 
The Home Secretary appealed the High Court's ruling that the revised Asylum 
Policy Instructions of August 2005 were unlawful. In doing so, he sought to have the 
policy upheld, so that when the Hijackers' status next came under six monthly 
review, he could then move them onto the temporary status, rather than Discretionary 
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Leave (UKCA 2006: 3). Further revisions to the policy instructions in January 2006 
had sought to make temporary status the default position in such cases, unless the 
Home Secretary should otherwise find Discretionary Leave appropriate (UKCA 
2006: 48). Both revisions were held by the Court of Appeal to give "ministers an 
arbitrary, unfettered power to interfere with respondents' rights" in a manner 
inconsistent with recent municipal jurisprudence on ECHR Article 8(1), on the right 
to private and family life. The court affirmed that provided "the arbitrary elements of 
it are removed ", parliament could introduce a statutory category such as that which 
the Home Secretary had attempted to innovate via the Asylum Policy Instructions. 
This was beyond the powers of the Home Secretary, without parliamentary authority, 
which could have been sought in the "ample" time available during the delays in 
providing the Hijackers with a legal status in the UK (UKCA 2006, 47, 51). In so far 
as this instance of judicial review did not directly concern the status of the Hijackers 
(on which the government had already complied with the High Court), but sought to 
overturn the High Court's prior ruling against the Asylum Policy Instructions, it can 
be said that the government was appealing against judicial impact on policy change, 
and against the prospect of applying such policy constraints beyond the case of the 
Hijackers. This was reflected in Home Secretary John Reid's argument to the Court 
of Appeal that, in general, failed asylum seekers who remain in the UK only due to 
ECHR rights, do not deserve Leave to Remain. 
Response 
In the next section, I seek to locate the Hijackers' case within the contemporary 
context of governmental priorities in asylum control and the role of the courts. This 
provides a backdrop to subsequent detailed consideration of how the government 
responded to these judicial decisions. However, it is worth noting first that the 
substantive response from government was to seek the authority from parliament 
which the courts had ruled necessary for the policy to be lawful. A "Special 
Immigration Status" was legislated for as part of the Criminal Justice and 
Immigration Act2008, s.130 -7, providing optional restrictions on rights associated 
with Leave to Remain, which were consistent with the temporary status ruled ultra - 
vires by the courts. This empowered the Home Secretary to impose special 
restrictions upon specified foreign nationals as an alternative to deportation, where 
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this proved constrained by the ECHR. However, part ten of the act, which provides 
for use of the special status, is not currently in force. Some eight years after the Court 
of Appeal's ruling, the Hijackers continue to languish in limbo with regards to 
regularisation of their presence in the UK, pending the outcome of further judicial 
scrutiny of their renewable leave, which has been consistently postponed by the 
Home Office (interview with barrister and correspondence with solicitor). 
Governmental priorities regarding asylum control and judicial 
scrutiny 
Interpreting the government's response to the judicial decisions on the status of the 
Afghan Hijackers within the UK, it is impossible to set aside the context in which 
judicial impact unfolded. Much can be gained by distinguishing, firstly, 
governmental priorities with regards to the politics of asylum- controls; secondly, a 
distinctive backlash against the judicialization' of this politics by sustained scrutiny 
from the courts. Consideration of these factors will facilitate later reflections on how 
governmental priorities were impacted upon by the court rulings. 
Being seen to be in control of asylum 
It is possible to distinguish three noteworthy preoccupations underpinning asylum 
controls in this period: national security; media relations; and the challenge of being 
seen to be in control. 
As noted in my introduction to the thesis, restriction of perceived asylum "abuse" 
was a priority of the Labour government (see also, Home Office, 1998, p. 147; B. 
Kelly, 2011, p. 147). Policy documents and ministerial statements placed explicit 
emphasis on "control ", "confidence" and expediency as objectives in building public 
trust in the governance of asylum (Blunkett, 2002; Home Office, 1998, 2002b, 2005; 
ND, 2006a). Significance was attached to not only the practical concern of asylum 
control per se, but also the broader, symbolic, political significance of being seen to 
be in control. Yet, despite some progress in realising Tony Blair's "tipping point 
target" on asylum - to halve applications and remove more applicants than arrive 
(Spencer, 2007) - the government had great difficulty in demonstrating that it was 
"in control of asylum" (Pollard, 2005, p. 290). Government policy was to pursue 
removals wherever possible, including returning failed asylum seekers to 
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Afghanistan, despite the war there (Sawyer & Turpin, 2005, p. 705). The inability to 
deport such high profile and iconic figures as the Afghan Hijackers fed into 
controversy over failures to remove hundreds of thousands of "illegal immigrants" 
(BBC News Online, 2006d) and epitomised by the Sun newspaper's campaign to "rip 
up the Human Rights Act" (JCHR, 2006b s.2.12). 
The explicit intent of the new Asylum Policy Instructions as a deterrence against 
entry to the UK by Hijacking reflects these symbolic concerns over control and 
deterrence of `abuse.' Similarly, its justification according to Home Office discretion 
over security, the public good and asylum control sought to affirm executive 
authority in these areas. Nevertheless, the tabloid media and political opposition were 
aligned in regarding the failure to deport the Hijackers as a "policy failure "(JCHR, 
2006c) and in voicing concerns that the role of the HRA as a barrier to deportation 
had impeded efforts to protect national security (Cameron in BBC News Online, 
2006b; Davis in Slack, 2006b). 
The relevance of national security concerns 
Due to these evident concerns over symbolic political capacity and organisational 
legitimacy as they relate to immigration control, I am sceptical as to the potential for 
insights to be gained from considering the Hijackers' case in terms of governmental 
priorities in national security and handling of foreign criminals - as has been the 
tendency of limited academic commentary on the case (Kneebone, 2009, p. 306; 
O'Sullivan, 2009, p. 260; Paoletti, 2010, p. 10). Although significant debate exists as 
to whether immigration and asylum controls were at this time subordinated to 
broader concerns over national security, there is no clear consensus (Boswell, 2007a; 
Hampshire, 2009; Huysmans & Buonfino, 2008; Schuster, 2005). Indeed, 
government sources vary on whether security was, or was definitively not a concern 
in the Hijackers case. Invocationsof national security and public safety can, however, 
be regarded as subordinate aspects of the government's evident and more 
fundamental desire to affirm authority to expel unwanted foreign nationals. This 
assertion is consistent with Paoletti's (2010, p. 10) labelling of the type of restrictions 
on rights associated with Leave to Remain in the Hijackers case as "escamotage ": 
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where such people cannot be deported, the government's intention was to make them 
disappear -a form of civic death within the state, in lieu of expulsion from it. 
Whether one considers security to be a trump card which government may succeed in 
playing to subordinate the courts, or as a gambit the judiciary is unlikely to tolerate 
(see e.g. Hampshire, 2009, p. 121; UKHL 2004b), parliament has shown willingness 
to `overrule' judicial decisions by legislating in favour of prior governmental 
priorities, even in cases not involving such high politics as national security (L. 
Morris, 2009). What matters most, is therefore how government responds to the 
courts. The study of such responses will indicate much as to what motivates policy 
change in the wake of unwelcome judicial scrutiny. 
Attitudes to judicial oversight 
It must be noted that judicial review was a very important driver of the political 
controversy over government incapacity to deport unwanted foreign nationals. 
Although there was a significant rise in the number of failed asylum seekers leaving 
the UK at this time (Gibney et al., 2011, p. 550), the Asylum Tribunal and courts 
were also balancing "an expansive approach" to providing human rights based 
protections to asylum seekers, alongside care over a "traditional predisposition 
towards judicial deference." (Stevens, 2004, p. 364) Of course, this deference is not 
to the executive, but to parliament. 
The legal substance of the High Court and Court of Appeal rulings in the Hijackers' 
case did not concern deportation. However, we may nonetheless consider the 
judiciary's involvement in deciding the legitimate treatment of unwanted foreign 
nationals such as the Hijackers to have frustrated the government's desire to 
demonstrate authoritative capacity to control asylum and deportation. This is 
especially pertinent in light of the Hijackers rulings' direct engagement with 
delineation of limits on executive discretion under parliament and the courts. Indeed, 
the government may be regarded as having already been highly sensitised by a prior 
conflict with the judiciary over restrictions on the right of late applicants for asylum 
to access welfare support (L. Morris, 2009; UKHL 2005). During this asylum 
`welfare saga,' Home Secretary David Blunkett had accused the judiciary of 
breaching parliamentary sovereignty, stating it was "time for judges to learn their 
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place" (Constitution Committee, 2007, p. 54). His recriminations were levelled at 
Justice Sullivan, the same High Court judge who ruled against the Home Office in 
the Hijackers case. As in the Hijackers case, that decision was subject to legislative 
overrule (Sunkin, 2004, p. 48). Subsequent unsuccessful attempts had also been 
made to legislate a "revenge package ", including an `ouster' clause to preclude the 
judiciary from jurisdiction over determinations of asylum and immigration status 
(Rawlings, 2005, p. 379). 
In short, at the time of the Hijackers rulings, the government's regard for the 
judiciary's role in determining the legality of asylum controls had never been at a 
lower point. This contemporaneous political backlash against a judicialization' of 
asylum control should not be neglected in considering the government's response to 
the Hijackers rulings. Indeed, the continuation of such recrimination towards the 
courts will be apparent as I now turn to consider primary sources which indicate how 
the government interpreted these rulings and located their meaning and significance 
according to the broader context of its policy agenda. 
Analysis of Primary Sources 
Nature of Sources 
Primary sources for this case included a significant body of political rhetoric. 
Comments directly responding to the court ruling,in addition tomore general rhetoric 
on human rights constraints arose in statements by leading members of the 
government to the media, to parliament and to parliamentary committees. Primary 
documents included ministerial submissions to the Joint Committee on Human 
Rights (JCHR), reports from the Home Office and Department of Constitutional 
Affairs on the role of the Human Rights Act and judicial oversight in government, 
and also the government's official response to the JCHR's investigation of the 
handlingof the Hijackers case and governmental attitudes to human rights. 
Departmental documents and letters were also considered. These concerned both 
specific legislation and broader policy responses to the courts; for example, an 
impact assessment for proposed legislation, UKBA policy instructions, a Ministry of 
Justice letter to the Law Society, and a private letter from the Prime Minister to the 
Home Secretary which was leaked to The Observer newspaper. My engagement with 
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the complex array of policies on Leave to Remain also benefited from 
correspondence with immigration solicitors and banisters involved in the Hijackers 
case. This communication sought to ensure accurate representation of the legal facts, 
and was not a source of primary data. 
Rationale for presentation of analytical findings 
To present my findings on the impact which the Hijackers rulings have had on 
asylum control and its framing, I have separated governmental discourse on 
compliance and associated concerns into two largely sequential `episodes.' These 
episodes broadly distinguish the immediate and longer term impact of the Hijackers 
ruling. The first is primarily characterised by tough political rhetoric which 
immediately followed the court ruling, voicing dismay at judicial interference in 
immigration control; yet also, a parallel process of consolidation within government, 
seemingly supporting the ongoing function of the Human Rights Act and even the 
legitimacy of the judicial decisions in the Hijackers case. For the purposes of 
analysis, I have separated these two components of the government's response. 
Where this first episode includes ostensibly contradictory responses, it is all the more 
important to consider the longer term substantive changes to relevant policy 
measures and their framing. To this end, I also consider framing of judicial impact in 
a second, subsequent episode, wherein new legislation and policy instructions 
effectively over -ruled the courts' decisions in the Hijackers case. In delineating this 
episode, I give consideration to how the legislation and subsequent changes to 
immigration control policy were justified. This data on how the government framed 
the `problem' posed by the Hijackers ruling will then facilitate my subsequent 
determination of a more unified account of how the Hijackers case impacted upon 
and was reconciled with broader asylum control policies. 
1. Recrimination and Consolidation 
A hostile first response 
When considering how the government responded to the High Court and Court of 
Appeal rulings on the Hijackers' status, it is crucial to recall that it had, for six years, 
been publicly committed to their deportation. Immediately after the arrival of the 
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hijackers, then Home Secretary Jack Straw, stressed to parliament that the men 
would be deported: 
While I must and will act in accordance with the law, I am determined that 
nobody should consider that there can be any benefit to be obtained by 
hijacking. Subject to compliance with all legal requirements, I would wish to 
see removed from this country all those on the plane as soon as reasonably 
practicable... As I have made clear, we are faced with a clash of international 
obligations and public policy: obligations in respect of refugees, and the 
clearest possible obligations in respect of the prevention and deterrence of 
hijacking and other international terrorism. I have made it clear where I 
believe the balance must lie. (HC Debate (10 Feb) 2000, c.418, 442) 
Straw explicitly invoked a discourse of balancing international obligations against 
public policy. Promising deportation before the men's criminal or asylum cases 
could even be arranged was a stated attempt to make it "clear" where "the balance 
must lie" and moreover, whom should be responsible for executing such a balancing 
act. It is important tobear this commitment in mind whilst considering the 
government's response to the court rulings which six years later required that the 
men be allowed Discretionary Leave to Remain in the UK. In particular, this prior 
commitment may help account for the consistent engagement of political rhetoric 
with the question of deportation, despite the substance of the court rulings being 
about the Home Office exceeding its powers in applying a policy of temporary 
admission without parliamentary authority. The judicial challenge to the legitimacy 
of this discretionary status is anathema to the assertion that it is for the Home 
Secretary to determine where "the balance must lie." As we shall see, when I turn to 
the second `episode' in this case, it was coincidentally Jack Straw who seven years 
later, as Justice Minister, sought before parliament to justify the reinstatement of 
such discretionary powers (HC Debate (8 Oct) 2007, c.69). However, for present 
purposes, I wish to emphasise the government's explicit engagement with the 
question of balancing legal obligations and public policy from the outset of this case. 
Direct governmental responses to the judicial decision 
Above all else, what distinguishes this case study is the government's immediate and 
somewhat recriminatory response to the High Court ruling. As Prime Minister, Tony 
Blair set the tone on the day of the ruling. He charged that in denying an opportunity 
for deportation, the judgement was "an abuse of common sense "; it was out of touch 
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with the instincts of "reasonable people" in Britain (Blair, 2006b). This concern over 
deportation capacity arose despite the judgement not being about deportation at all. 
The courts' concernwas over Home Office actions as ultra vires, failing to correctly 
apply legislation on leave to enter and remain (Immigration Act1971) and thereby 
relating to governmental respect for the rule of law. Blair's preoccupation with 
human rights law as a barrier to deportation does, however, reflect the media's 
misrepresentation of the case as involving the use of the Human Rights Act in 
something close to a judicial coup d 'état(Constitution Committee, 2007 para 145). 
The following day, Home Secretary John Reid echoed the tone of Blair's rhetoric by 
labelling the judgement both "bizarre" and "inexplicable ". In doing so, he 
emphasised his concernthat the "system is not working to protector in favour of the 
vast majority of ordinary decent hard -working citizens in this country. "(BBC News 
Online, 2006a) Blair and Reid's rhetoric invoked an oppositional binary between the 
protection of "decent" British people, and protecting the rights and safety of 
undeserving hijackers. Furthermore, they implied that the judicial decision was not 
only unsound, but beyond the bounds of reason. 
The manner in which these dismissive and somewhat recriminatory claims were 
made is particularly interesting for what it indicates as to governmental 
interpretations of the issues at stake in the Hijackers' case. Immediately striking, is 
Reid's somewhat incongruent implication that the "system" of judicial oversight of 
immigration controls and human rights law might conceivably function to "protect... 
decent hard -working citizens ", as opposed to engaging with the substantive legal 
basis of the judicial review. The case was about the legality of government actions in 
the treatment of foreign nationals whom even the Home Office agreed could not be 
deported due to real risks of execution or torture on return. This was a clear 
discursive bid by Reid to reframe the meaning of protection as it functions within the 
context of the case. Reid's statements to the press shift emphasis from judicial 
engagement with treatment of the individual (as the basis of international refugee and 
human rights law), to the question of perceived risk to national security and public 
good, over which the Home Secretary has discretion in immigration control. This is 
despite national security not being raised as part of the legal substance of the case. 
Nevertheless, Reid invoked the logic of balance between individual rights and the 
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public good, according to which the Home Secretary must protect the national 
community. By extension, Reid positioned arbitration of the Hijackers' case 
according to a different logic to that applied in the "system" of judicial review; a 
discretionary understanding of protection, the determination of which is the 
prerogative of the executive, not the courts. This is reminiscent of his predecessor's 
commitment to balance a public policy on deportation against asylum law when the 
Hijackers first arrived in the UK. 
This framing of the judicial decision served to shift emphasis away from its 
substantive concern with unlawful behaviour by the Home Office. Blair's response, 
in particular, concerned constraint of deportation, whereas the basis of the High 
Court ruling was that Home Office had overstepped its discretion in applying an ad- 
hoc policy of temporary admission to the Hijackers. That such political rhetoric 
should appeal to the integrity of the national community is no less significant, given 
that the effect of the ad -hoc policy deemed ultra -vires by the courts was to prevent 
any form of integration into the community by the Hijackers, through access to work, 
welfare support, or opportunity for settlement for more than six months at a time. 
Blair on battling the courts and resetting HRA's balance of powers 
Reid's appeal to the supremacy of Home Office discretion in immigration control 
does not appear to be the full extent of what the government perceived to be at stake 
in the Hijackers case. Indeed, far more extensive concerns over executive discretion 
in the face of judicial constraints were raised. 
Within a matter of days after the High Court ruling, in a leaked private letter from 
Blair to Reid, the PM outlined the "most urgent policy task" of rebalancing rights 
from the individual towards collective security(quoted in Temko & Doward, 2006). 
He called for new governmental powers to override the courts, as he was determined 
to find a way around "barmy" rulings, such as that preventing deportation of the 
Afghan Hijackers. Again invoking the discourse of a balancing act, Blair justified his 
plans as necessary to ensure that "the law abiding majority can live without fear ". 
This,he suggested, may mean amending the Human Rights Act, or even withdrawing 
from certain clauses of the ECHR, to redress judicial failures to consider a "balance 
between the rights of the individual and the rights of the community to basic 
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security." Such a requirement would clearly be in violation of the constraint imposed 
inChahal(ECtHR 1997). However, the government was, at this time,awaiting the 
outcome of its intervention in cases pending before the ECtHR,to have the court 
overturn itsChahal jurisprudence (ECtHR 2009a). In this respect, upholding the 
policy of temporary admission which had been challenged by the Hijackers case 
would have facilitated immediate deportation of the men if the ECtHR ruled in 
favour of the government (which it did not). 
Blair's letter indicates that in light of controversy surrounding the hijackers, serious 
consideration was given to suspending the effect of certain ECHR rights. It is worth 
recalling the judicial committee of the House of Lords' previous opinion (UKHL 
2004b) that despite governmental concerns, even international terrorism did not 
constitute a threat to the life of the nation sufficient to invoke national security as the 
basis for an exception to the ECHR (to indefinitely detain foreign national terrorist 
suspects who could not be deported). In this respect, Blair's reference to court rulings 
which put "community safety" at risk constitutes a somewhat curious shift in the 
discourse justifying exceptional measures to set aside human rights. There is a 
significant difference between this expansive and somewhat nebulous communitarian 
discourse of risk, and the legally circumscribed principle of a threat to the life of the 
nation which would be required to lawfully justify an exception to the ECHR.The 
implication is clear, that by association with the unpopular HRA and ECHR, it was 
not simply the foreign national whom the courts rule cannot be deported, but the 
judiciary itself which was held guilty of putting the national community at risk. Such 
an assessment is supported by Blair's prior criticism of "traditional court processes 
and attitudes to civil liberties" as ill- suited to modern exigencies of government in an 
age of "vast migration" and "dangerous threats" (Blair, 2006a). 
Political rhetoric in response to the High Court ruling constituted a clear attempt to 
reassert executive control over the discourse of risk involved in deportation;to affirm 
the legitimacy of executive discretion to constrain not only leave to remain in the UK 
(in the Hijackers case), but also certain fundamental rights, such as the absolute 
prohibition on removal to a prospect of torture. Blair's letter to Reid sought to 
position government as arbiter between individual rights and communitarian safety. 
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At the heart of this dichotomy is an affirmation of the role of the government in 
policing inclusion and exclusion from a community of rights where it cannot 
physically enforce expulsion from the national community.In these respects, it is 
apparent that judicial constraint on executive discretion was of major concern to the 
government in its consideration of how to respond to the Hijackers ruling. 
After the Court of Appeal ruling 
Although the Court of Appeal upheld the High Court ruling against the government, 
the Home Secretary was effectively intransigent in his desire to apply only a 
temporary status not only in lieu of deportation, but also in cases of removal: 
I continue to believe that those whose actions have undermined any 
legitimate claim to asylum should not be granted leave to remain in the UK...I 
plan to bring forward legislation to do this(John Reid in BBC News Online, 
2006f). 
Reid's public response to the Court of Appeal ruling is distinctly pragmatic in its 
engagement with governmental capacity to govern asylum control; particularly when 
contrasted with Blair's broader concern over the Hijackers case as emblematic of 
"dangerous threats" posed by migration. Reid promised retroactive legislation to 
remove Leave to Remain from the Hijackers. As observed by the courts, this 
perceived need for legislation was despitethe fact that the government already had 
six years in which it had failed to do legislate. Although Reid promised to overrule 
the court's constraint of the existing policy on exclusion from Discretionary Leave, 
his determination to seek legislative approval through parliament is also consistent 
with the requirements of the judicial decision. 
In considering this stage of the governmental response, it is important to attend to the 
role of security referents in the government's framing of the problem of compliance 
with the judicial decision. The problem of judicial impact in the Hijackers case is 
clearly not a straightforward concern over security. At the High Court hearing, the 
Home Office had "accepted that there were no reasonable grounds for regarding the 
individuals as a danger to the security of the UK, nor as constituting a danger to the 
community of the UK." (cited in JCHR, 2006b, s.2.19) However, to a significant 
extent, political rhetoric on the Hijackers subsequently began to merge into broader 
concerns over the courts' engagement with counter -terrorism policies. This 
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occurrednot only in the government's statement of a preference for deportation of 
foreign national suspects, but also in response to adverse judicial decisions on the 
legality of the government's regime of imposing Control Orders to restrict the rights 
of foreign and British suspects(Clarke and Brown in Slack, 2006a). John Reid, in 
turn, argued that critics of the government, including the judiciary, had failed to 
recognise the serious nature of security threats facing Britain.Specifically, Reid 
claimed that the UK was "at risk in national security terms" so long as the 
government remained "unable to adapt our institutions and legal orthodoxy as fast as 
we need to." (quoted in Travis, 2006) 
Even where we may observe clear executive concerns over the viability of certain 
counter -terrorism policies in the face of judicial scrutiny, it appears to be the 
underlying function of the judiciary and its application of the constraint on 
deportation derived from the Chahal jurisprudence with which the government was 
most concerned at the time of the Court of Appeal's ruling on the Hijackers case. 
WhereasHome Secretaries spoke of national security, the week after the second 
Hijackers ruling, Blair spoke directly of his desire for a policy of presumed 
deportation for foreign national prisoners, "irrespective of any claim they have that 
the country to which they are going back may not be safe. "(BBC News Online, 
2006c) At this time, the government was not merely concerned with foreign nationals 
suspected of terrorism, nor with its capacity to deport prisoners. Blair's comments 
arose in response to ongoing debates on the government's overarching capacity to 
remove illegal immigrants and failed asylum seekers (of which the Hijackers were a 
very prominent example) (BBC News Online, 2006d). Blair's rhetoric on deportation 
was decisive in its disregard for existing rights -based constraints on deportation and 
removal. The statement resulted in prominent headlines. In contrast, the more careful 
caveating of his position by the PM's official spokesman only appeared in reports as 
a diminutive, if cautious, afterthought that such a policy may not well apply in "very 
few exceptional cases" where there was a known threat to the individual (BBC News 
Online, 2006c). 
This comparatively discreet qualification from within the executive was not unusual 
in its attempt to nuance the gross generalisations which were characteristic of 
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political rhetoric at this time. Indeed, I now wish to draw back from this prominent 
and highly charged political rhetoric, to consider other internal communications 
which took place between parliament and the executive regarding the Hijackers case 
and associated concerns over the role of the Human Rights Act. 
Discourse within government on the Hijackers and URA 
In parallel to the very prominent political rhetoric on the Hijackers rulings and 
broader role of rights and judicial review as constraints on government, an extensive 
number of internal communications unfolded within and between the government 
and parliament. Whilst this internal discourse was less recriminatory than 
corresponding political rhetoric, it nonetheless supports my previous suggestion that 
the government was concerned over limiting judicial interference in the wake of the 
Hijackers rulings. 
Context: JCHR investigation 
A matter of days after the High Court ruling on the Hijackers status, the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights (JCHR), launchedan inquiry into "the case for the 
Human Rights Act "(JCHR, 2006b s.1.3). The enquiry gave consideration at length to 
the government's response to the Hijackers case, including the significance of 
ministerial statements that the HRA was a barrier to deportation. Only a few months 
before the JCHR hearings, the minister for Constitutional Affairs had openly 
dismissed the significance of the committee's work (JCHR, 2006a). However, the 
committee successfully obtained a significant body of documentary and oral 
evidence from government departments and ministers from the Home Office and 
Department for Constitutional Affairs (DCA). The committee also considered 
opposition proposals that it should recommend that the HRA be scrapped (JCHR, 
2006c). However, its final report focused on concerns over the government fuelling 
public misperceptions of the HRA; using the act "as a scapegoat for administrative 
failings of [government] departments "; and tacit advocacy of "deportation to face a 
real risk of torture or death." (JCHR, 2006b, ss.2.18, 2.21). 
The discursive content of the oral and documentary submissions to the JCHR are 
unsurprisingly less accusatory than the political rhetoric which both preceded the 
hearing, and to some extent ran in parallel to it. Presentation of evidence was liable 
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to further questioning from the committee, inviting justifications to be given. In this 
respect, submissions to the committee constitute a particularly compelling account of 
how certain departments and ministers sought to articulate and justify their 
understanding of the relationship between policy goals, including the role of the 
HRA, and how these were impacted by the Hijackers case. 
Contrasting evidence from within government 
Notable amongst the evidence submitted to the JCHR, was correspondence in which 
Tony Blair asked the Lord Chancellor to "devise a strategy, working with the 
judiciary, which maintains the effectiveness of the Human Rights Act, and improves 
the public's confidence in the legislation" (quoted in JCHR, 2006b, s.1.2). The tone 
and content of this request is remarkably different to that of Blair's letter to John 
Reid, in which he suggested the need for powers to overrule the courts and for the 
HRA to be re- balanced in favour of collective security (as discussed above). 
However, this request for Lord Falconer to manage the judicial and public mood 
coincided with Blair ordering a Home Office review of other EU Member States' 
interpretation of the ECHR, to "consider whether primary legislation should be 
introduced to address the issue of court rulings which overrule the 
government. "(JCHR, 2006b, s.1.2). As a consequence of these dual missions on 
which Blair set government departments, there is discernible tension between the 
resulting evidence which the JCHR obtained from the Department of Constitutional 
Affairs and Home Office. 
Before turning to these below, it first worth noting that here, again, Blair's 
justification for potential legislative changes to how the HRA is implemented 
concerned a desire for finality of governmental authority when faced with scrutiny 
by the courts. It was not primarily grounded in the seemingly subordinate question of 
whether there was an issue of public safety requiring such a reconfiguration of 
human rights (as had appeared in his letter previously leaked to the press). 
Evidence from Lord Falconer and the DCA 
As Lord Chancellor, Falconer's response to the JCHR may well have been coloured 
by his newly acquired statutory duty to maintain the function and independence of 
the judiciary (Constitutional Reform Act2005: s.3.1). Indeed, the JCHR considered 
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this very judicial independence to have been threatened by the government's 
response to the Hijackers case (JCHR, 2006b s.2.20). Claiming to represent the 
unified view in government, Falconer stated his support for the HRA, promising 
there were no plans for its repeal. He also confirmed to the JCHR that the Hijackers 
posed no threat, that they should remain in the UK due to the risks they would likely 
face if returned to Afghanistan, and that therefore, "the question of a balance does 
not arise. "(JCHR, 2006c, question 1) Yet, Falconer's conclusions were offered to the 
committee despite having openly initiated a DCA review into "problems" with the 
implementation of the HRA, involving "the need for clearer cross -government 
guidance on the balance that needs to be struck by officials when making decisions 
with human rights implications, ensuring that public safety is at the forefront of 
decision making. "(Lord Falconer, 2006) 
This emphasis on rebalancing a dichotomous tension in the impact of human rights 
of the individual versus the safety of the national community is also reflected in the 
report submitted to the committee by the Department for Constitutional Affairs 
(DCA). In its review into implementation of the Human Rights Act, the DCA 
concluded that the Act had "not seriously impeded the achievement of the 
government's objectives on crime, terrorism or immigration, and has not led to the 
public being exposed to additional or unnecessary risks" (DCA, 2006, p. 4). 
However, it nevertheless replicated the same appeal present in political rhetoric of 
the time, that there was imperative need for a rebalancing of executive discretion 
over its application and function: 
Deficiencies in training and guidance have led to an imbalance whereby too 
much attention has been paid to individual rights at the expense of the 
interests of the wider community. (p.29) 
Further concerns were also raised over difficulties arising from decisions of the 
ECtHR (DCA, 2006, p. 10). Although the HRA was not the basis of the Hijackers 
decision, the broader role of the judiciary and asylum tribunal in applying the 
absolute constraint imposed on deportation by the ECtHR's Chahal ruling rendered 
the meaning and significance of the Hijackers case inseparable from broader debate 
on the HRA. 
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Plans to disempower judicial constraint of deportation 
The predominance of this linkage within government is further indicated by evidence 
leaked to the BBC, and subsequently considered by the JCHR, that the Home Office 
was conducting an internal review into possible "examples of where the Human 
Rights Act had been found to impede decision -making." (JCHR, 2006c, s.6) This 
found that: 
...an area where the impact of the interpretation of the Convention is problematic 
and presents a blockage to the effective delivery of policy relates to the pre - 
Human Rights Act case of Chahal. In this case the European Court of Human 
Rights found that the absolute protection provided by Article 3 prevents a State 
from considering the protection of the public as a balancing factor when 
deciding whether or not to deport a dangerous person. The European Court has 
always recognised that the European Convention is a "living Instrument ", and we 
are therefore working with our partners in Europe to challenge this judgement. 
(Home Office, 2006a, emphasis added) 
The JCHR voiced concerns over a prospect that the government was conflating 
public safety with national security as a basis for exceptions to constraints on 
deportation(2006b, s.6).However, one may go further to consider that where 
individual rights areframed as not legitimately a part of deportation and asylum 
control, the foreign national threatened withexpulsionis already excluded from access 
to the privileges of a national community of rights, even before being physically cast 
outside of the nation's borders. 
In light of the foregoing evidence of both rhetorical challenges to the integrity of the 
HRA and reports from government departments calling into question its function (not 
to mention the scathing findings of the Committee), the executive's official response 
to the publication of the JCHR report is unremarkable; expressing its pleasure with 
the findings and agreement with the committee that the HRA is not a significant 
impediment to public policy objectives after all(DCA, 2007, p. 3). Yet, despite the 
purported consolidation of support across government for the HRA and the judiciary, 
Reid and Blair continued to voice their support for a rebalancing of rights in favour 
of the national community. Before retiring as PM, Blair publicly lamented as 
"misguided and wrong" that we "have chosen as a society to put the civil liberties of 
the suspect, even if a foreign national, first." (in N. Morris, 2007) Once again, the 
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implication was that the exercise of such a balance by the judiciary had put the rights 
of the British public in danger. Yet again invoking the Afghan Hijackers ruling 
among others constraining deportation, John Reidmarked his exit from government 
by encouraging an inquiry into a prospective British bill of rights to reform the 
anachronistic ECHR, which had failed to address large scale threats to the national 
community(in Carlin, 2007). 
Although the Hijackers were not deemed to be a threat to national security, their 
continued presence within the UK and place within the debate about the future of the 
HRA allowed invocation of the future risk of hijacking as a basis to bring public 
safety into the discourse on the role of rights in government. This discursive shift 
towards a vision of rights in terms of the right to life and safety of the national 
community comprised one of the most significant manifestations of the judicial 
impact of the Hijackers cases. It led to a direct challenge to the legitimacy of the 
constraint imposed by Chahal and to the legitimation of a broader political discourse 
which questioned the applicability of human rights principles to certain unwelcome 
foreign nationals. An apparent fixation on not only the role of human rights but also 
their adjudication by the courts as constraints on governance of immigration and 
asylum, indicate that the government was deeply concerned over maintaining its 
discretionary authority and capacity to control inclusion and exclusion from the 
national community following the Hijackers ruling - both literally, in the form of 
expulsion, as well as in the more abstract sense of excluding foreign nationals from 
the national community of rights. In support of this observation, I now wish to turn to 
consider the government's subsequent legislative response to the Hijackers ruling. 
2. Legislative over -rule and bureaucratic policy innovation 
The Special Immigration Status 
Shortly after the conclusion of the JCHR's investigation, as part of a Bill primarily 
addressing reforms to the criminal justice system, the government proposed 
discretionary powers to reinstate the policy deemed ultra -vires a year earlier by the 
Court of Appeal in the Hijackers case. The timing of the Bill is interesting, following 
a period of extensive internal reviews and reporting on the government's support for 
human rights. The effect of the Special Immigration Status (SIS) introduced by the 
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Criminal Justice and Immigration Bi112007 (part 11) was, however, to provide 
parliamentary authority for the Home Secretary to restrict certain foreign nationals' 
right to employment and welfare support associated with Discretionary 
Leave. I Although the government "reassured" parliament that the SIS would not 
apply to refugees (HC Committee (27 Nov) 2007, c.647), this referred simply to the 
fact that application of the status held where the Home Office had excluded an 
asylum seeker from theprotections of the Refugee Conventionaccording to Article 
1F: "serious reasons for considering" guilt in a non -political crime contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations. This had been the basis on which the 
Hijackers were excluded from the Convention and from all other forms of Leave to 
Remain within the UK, including Humanitarian Protection and Discretionary Leave. 
Moreover, it was the basis on which the government had recently incorporated an 
expansive definition of engagement in or support for terrorist acts "actual or 
inchoate" as a means for exclusion from asylum (Asylum, Nationality and 
Immigration Act 2006, s.54). In this respect, the Home Secretary was empowered 
with free -standing discretion to both classify a foreign national as a threat to national 
security on the basis of her suspicions, and to deny both the protections of the 
Refugee Convention and alternative statuses within the UK as she saw fit. 
The objective of applying the SIS to an individual or familywas expressed as 
reducing them to a state of mere subsistence, with a guarantee of public support only 
where there was a risk of destitution (HL Committee (10 March) 2008, c.1353). The 
SIS was explicitly stated on several occasions to be a necessary response to the 
"anomaly" imposed by the judicial decision on the Hijackers'status in the UK (HC 
Committee (16 March) 2007, c.22). It was to be a means to "disentitle" the Hijackers 
from "all the advantages" which derive from leave to remain in the UK. (HC 
Committee (27 November) 2007, cc. 641 -2; 645 -6) Yet, in introducing the SIS to the 
Commons, Jack Straw (then Justice Minister) explicitly invoked public safety and 
national security as the basis for the new powers to control the men he had failed to 
deport as Home Secretary: 
'Passed into law as part 10, s. 130 -7 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. 
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...the freedoms that we enjoy in this country should never be abused. The 
new special immigration status will ensure that foreign criminals and 
terrorists who cannot be deported cannot expect a settled status in this 
country. (HC Debate 08/10/07: Co1.69) 
Despite this introductory framing of the Bill, clear emphasis was made in later 
readings that a perceived threat to national security was not to be a necessary 
condition for the SIS. Past conduct was to be the basis for determining application of 
the status, without "additional requirement to assess whether they currently represent 
a danger to the national community." (HL Debate (30 Mar) 2008, c.284 -5) This 
justification is consistent with the formulation of the Home Secretary's powers to 
exclude a foreign national's access to the asylum system. 
In its Regulatory Impact Assessment of the Bill, the Home Office invoked the well 
tested distinction between good and bad migration; between "law abiding migrants" 
and criminality or terrorism.Arguing once more that the constraint imposed in the 
Court of Appeal judgement was not "right ", the document cited concerns over danger 
to the community (Home Office, 2007, p. 156).These were not concerns expressed at 
any previous juncture in the adjudication or judicial review of the case. Nor were 
such concerns the basis of the Ministry of Justice's rationalisation of the new SIS in a 
letter to the Law Society. Rather, this emphasised the right of the executive to 
legislate and to maintain the integrity of immigration controls by denying leave to 
those excluded from the Refugee Convention, "whether or not they represent a 
continuing risk to the UK. "(Ministry of Justice, 2007, p. 25). 
As an indefinite status which facilitates deportation at the first opportunity for the 
government to dispel concerns over ill -treatment on expulsion, it is quite apparent 
that the operative concern behind the SIS was not so much combatting perceived 
criminality or threats to security, as engaging with the problem of what to do in cases 
where deportation is constrained by the courts. Whereas the JCHR did not advise any 
revisions to the proposed SIS (JCHR, 2008),concerns were raised in parliament about 
the special status being unnecessary, unfair (HC Committee (27 Nov) 2007) and 
needlessly costly (Commons Debates (8 October) 2007, c.84). However, no changes 
were made. 
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Despite being rushed through parliament, the legislative provision for these powers 
has never been activated. Earlier that year, Immigration Minister, Liam Byrne joked 
about his purported "instinct" to "seek wide, sweeping powers... for which there was 
no purpose..." (HC Committee (6 March) 2007, c.204) Although the Special 
Immigration Status has not been put to use, this does not discount significance of its 
legislation as a symbolic, public response to the dual problem of what to do with the 
Hijackers and how to reassert Home Office authority following scathing 
condemnation of its conduct in the case. Equally, we may speculate that the SIS is 
effectively unworkable without inviting further judicial review of its operation. 
To a significant extent, the justifications of the new SIS by the Home Office and 
Ministry of Justice were characterised by ambiguity as to whether it was grounded in 
concerns over national security and whether the Hijackers presented such a threat - 
either to the community or to national security. However, each of the seemingly 
disparate framings of the problem to which the SIS was posed as a solution - 
national security, disentitlement of asylum seekers from the Refugee Convention, the 
executive's prerogative to legislate on Leave to Remain in the UK - are characterised 
by a significant degree of executive discretion. The executive had concluded from its 
engagement with the JCHR over the future of the HRA that the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR was the true impediment to achieving its policy goals. Yet in presenting the 
SIS as a direct response to the Hijackers ruling, the government demonstrated clearly 
that it took issue with the constraint of its powers by the municipal courts. Moreover, 
in this case, the constraint emanated from British common law, and not the courts' 
application of the HRA or ECHR jurisprudence. Given the common theme of 
executive discretion in the government's justification of new powers, we may 
conclude that the problem at hand in responding to the Hijackers case was very much 
governmental capacity to appear in control of immigration and asylum. 
Further Policy Instructions on Restricted Leave to Remain 
As a final note on the impact of the Hijackers rulings on immigration and asylum 
controls, I wish to give brief consideration to later changes to Asylum Policy 
Instructions on Restricted Leave. Executive discretion to regulate foreign nationals' 
presence has been enhanced in recent years by the creation of a variety of statuses 
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which provide leave to enter and remain. Although the SIS was not activated, the 
Home Office has recreated for itselfcertain analogous powers to restrict foreign 
nationals' access to welfaresupport and employment. Since September, 2011, policy 
instructions require that first consideration begiven to whether "restricted leave" can 
be applied, rather than simply a time limited discretionary leave (Policy guidance on 
discretionary leave s.2.5.3 -4). This applies to all asylum applicants excluded from the 
Refugee Convention under Art 1F,who cannot be deported due to the ECHR. Some 
restrictions of the SIS are replicated in the restricted leave policy, including the six 
month renewable status as a form of enforced limbo as a barrier to integration (due to 
the perpetual prospect of non -renewal of leave); also, via an independent board, the 
ability to restrictemployment; andHome Office discretion to restrict the place of 
abode and education. 
Above public security and maintenance of international rule of law, the primary 
justification for the policy instructions was stated as, "public interest in maintaining 
the integrity of immigration control(UKBA, 2012, s.1.10),In contrast to the symbolic 
legislation of the SIS, this bureaucratic development was a far less publicised policy 
innovation. Considering that it was the lack of parliamentary authority for similar 
restrictions which led to the adverse judicial decisions in the Hijackers case, it is 
quite remarkable that these Asylum Policy Instructions again lack such approval, 
having been self -authorised by the Home Office under the Immigration Act1971, 
s.3(1)(c), which allows restrictions to be placed on those subject to limited leave to 
enter or remain. This is despite subsequent rulings of the UK Supreme Court (UKSC 
2012a, 2012b) which dismissed the Home Secretary's argument that new substantive 
requirements of immigration control do not need to be put before parliament. Such 
considerations suggest a clear willingness on the part of the Home Office to take 
legal risks pending prospective judicial scrutiny. Nevertheless, despite the great 
controversy surrounding the courts' constraint of government in the Hijackers case, 
the Home Secretary retains discretionary powers analogous to those which the 
judiciary deemed unlawful. 
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Classification and discussion of judicial impact 
Having considered key findings from critical framing analysis of primary discursive 
sources, I now wish to further develop my analysis of judicial impact in this case 
according to the analytical typologies of response and depth of impact. In doing so, I 
will also consider the apparent significance of politicisation and the municipal source 
of the rulings to judicial impact on policy change. 
Beyond the material changes to the legislative regime of asylum control, which over- 
ruled the prior judicial constraint, I have endeavoured to develop a more subtle 
understanding of how and why government understood the meaning and significance 
of the judicial decision with regards to its policy agenda. I begin by specifying how 
the government responded according to my typology of how compliance may be 
reconciled with prior policy commitments. Next, I consider the level of ideas 
governing asylum control at which judicial impact can be established. I then move on 
from these classifications to build an argument that the level of ideas impacted may 
have significant potential to explain the government's response. 
Judicial impact in terms of the government's response 
In determining the government's overall response to the problem posed by the 
Hijackers rulings, it is first necessary to account for apparent divergences between 
the tone of political rhetoric and certain internal governmental communications. 
Prominent members of the government publicly questioned the appropriateness and 
even the legal legitimacy of the High Court ruling, branding it an "abuse of common 
sense." Yet, coordinative discourse within government did not follow political 
rhetoric in framing the Hijackers as a security threat. Furthermore, certain internal 
sources affirmed that there was no question of individual rights being balanced 
against the public good. However, in both the internal and external discourses which 
comprised each `episode,' there was a consistent re- framing of the criteria invoked to 
justify the restriction of foreign nationals' in- country rights in lieu of deportation. 
This was expressed as public safety- as opposed to national security and public 
good, which are established principles for justifying deportation. This re- framing 
emphasised Home Office discretion, and comprised a somewhat `looser' framing, 
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which may allow government to move more freely in its discourse between reference 
to the public good and national security. 
Political rhetoric oriented towards the media and a majority of internal 
communications within government also shared a common discursive framing of 
human rights in terms of a tension between the national community and certain 
migrants undeserving of such rights protections, due to associations with criminality 
and security risks. This framing positioned the judicial decisions in the Hijackers 
case as an unwarranted and unreasonable impediment to a necessary balancing of 
foreign nationals' rights against collective security. Moreover, it sought to affirm the 
executive as the natural arbiter of this balance. 
In these respects, we may identify a consistent governmental response - which was 
to `amplify'the coercive effect of the judicial decision as an unwelcome impediment 
to this executive balancing act. In the context of intensive media scrutiny of 
governmental control over asylum and deportation, `amplification' may have served 
to `pass the buck' of responsibility for failures to the judiciary as a scapegoat. 
However, the particularly emphatic focus of political rhetoric on the importance of 
unfettered deportation capacity can more readily be taken to indicate an attempt to 
shore up the government's commitment to at least prospectively achieving 
authoritative control over asylum. Amplification may be considered as part of the 
government's symbolic plea to enhanced executive discretion over the pursuit of a 
policy of restricted leave, free from judicial constraint (as was realised in both new 
legislation and Home Office policy). Moreover, my consideration of the 
government's discursive construction and justification of its response indicates a 
desire to challenge the more general legitimacy of human rights and judicial scrutiny 
as constraints on governmental discretion to exercise asylum controls. 
Level of impact 
The policy tool of restrictions on rights associated with leave to remain within the 
UK was initiallyconstrained following the High Court ruling that it was formulated 
and implemented without parliamentary authority. This prevented the Home Office 
from restricting access to work and welfare without new legislation.However, 
parliament provided for just such powers to restrict rights within the UK in lieu of 
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deportation, in the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act2008. Although the relevant 
legislative provision has not been activated, the Home Office also subsequently 
created similar powers for itself in the form of Asylum Policy Instructions. 
As such, we may surmise that the underlying logicof the government's policy 
programme was not constrained in responding to the Hijackers rulings. The 
discretionary power of the Home Office to balance migrants' rights against policy 
priorities was actually enhanced; both in legislation and policy instructions, and also 
in political framing which justified these according to an executive discretion over 
restrictions on rights associated with Leave to Remain. Concerns over the 
maintenance of this governing logic nonetheless clearly informed the government's 
response to the courts. Problematisation of the ruling in governmental discourse was 
dominantly framed in terms of a balancing act: between rights and public safety; 
between executive discretion and judicial scrutiny; between rights associated with 
inclusion in the national community, and exclusion from this community of rights. 
Governmental concern over this matter is also reflected in the justification of the 
Special Immigration Status according to the need for asylum controls - an otherwise 
incongruouslybroad and overarching policy concern, which extends beyond the need 
to address small numbers of foreign criminals who cannot be deported. 
The core public philosophyguiding asylum control wasalso seriously challenged by 
the deeper impact of the Hijackers ruling on the appearance of the government as 
incapable of controlling inclusion and exclusion. Intense publicity surrounding the 
case made a media spectacle of the government's inability to deport the Hijackers, 
despite public pledges to do so. This profound impact of the judicial decisions on the 
governing ideas underpinning asylum controls was reflected by the fixation of much 
political rhetoric on the issue of deportation, irrespective of the legal substance of the 
case. Indeed, governmental focus on the question of deportation capacity may have 
served to distract attention from the very direct and substantive judicial constraint of 
executive powers under constitutional principles from common law (ultra vires), 
rather than the Human Rights Act or European Convention on Human Rights, which 
had become scapegoats for a string of government failures. 
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This case cannot be said to have produced a judicial constraint of the practical tools 
of asylum control; the restrictions on Leave to Remain were reinstated by parliament 
and the executive. Yet, the rulings did exert a significant impact on the government's 
ability to demonstrate authoritative control over immigration and asylum (due to the 
very public inability to deport, despite promises to do so). New symbolic powers 
were created, affirming executive discretion in the granting of status within the UK 
to foreign nationals. But these did not address governmental incapacity on 
deportation, which the rulings had publicly highlighted. In light of this problem 
posed by the Hijackers' case, the government's recriminatory rhetoric may be 
understood as having sought to affirm a plausible willingness to deport the Hijackers, 
both despite and because of the very public constraint on such a measure in practice. 
The role of politicisation and source of ruling in policy impact 
Politicisation and amplification as results of the level of impact 
In responding to the Hijackers case, compliance was highly politicised by both 
government and opposition. Amplification of the rulings' perceived coercive effect 
was a dominant attribute of this discourse. However, this response to the courts may 
best be understood by attention to discursive construction of the problem of judicial 
impact. Politicisation of compliance reflected the effect these rulings were perceived 
to have upon the government's capacity to demonstrably exercise symbolic control 
over the inclusion and exclusion of unwanted foreign nationals; balancing their 
human rights and access to justice against expedient and authoritative immigration 
and asylum control. The Afghan Hijackerscase challenged the continued and 
demonstrable exercise of these governing ideas. As I have already suggested, the 
authority of the Home Office to balance rights against the exclusion of unwanted 
migrants wasparticularly challenged.By engagement with the governing ideas 
impacted by judicial decisions in this manner, we can appreciate that this is an 
integral factor leading to politicisation of compliance. 
To the extent that certain classes of deportation and removal actions involving ECHR 
Article 3 concerns have been constrained in practice by jurisprudence of the 
municipal courts and ECtHR, hard political rhetoric assuring a policy commitment to 
remove more migrants, faster, have sought to sustain the public legitimacy, if not the 
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integrity, of asylum controls. In this respect,it can be said that whilst the guiding 
public philosophy may have been challenged in practice by judicial scrutiny, this 
governing idea has certainly not been constrained in political rhetoric. This is 
particularly significant in the context of the highly mediatised and performative 
character of the politics of asylum. Here, the rhetorical image of control may matter 
more to political legitimacy than substantive policy outputs. Indeed, such rhetoric 
may serve to excuse or distract from sustained public, media and political attention to 
deficiencies in practice. 
Significance of the source of the ruling 
It is similarly apparent that the source of the judicial decisions (i.e. the UK's senior 
courts) does not appear to have any direct significance to the subsequent judicial 
impact on policy framings. Governmental responses can be better understood as a 
consequence of the broader`depth of impact'which the rulings had on the ideas 
governing asylum control. Governmental discourses on compliance with the 
Hijackers ruling revolved around the perceived excessive constraints on asylum 
control imposed by the ECtHR, despite the fact that the legal issue concerned 
common law principles relating to the executive overstepping its discretionary 
powers. In this respect, the mismatch between the legal substance of the ruling and 
much of the political framing of judicial impact in this case renders the significance 
of the source of ruling to judicial impact highly questionable. 
Ultimately, it is not possible to discern whether political actors truly understood the 
legal facts of the case. However, as already suggested, emphasis on constraints on 
deportation and removal imposed by the ECtHR may have served as a convenient 
scapegoat for government failures, as could recriminatory comments on unwarranted 
interference by the municipal judiciary. Both, however, may well have served to 
distract from the substantive constraint in common law which the courts had sought 
to apply. In this respect, at least, it was the sustained scrutiny of the municipal courts 
which resulted in the pervasive judicial impact on the policy ideas governing asylum 
control which is demonstrated in this case. 
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Conclusion 
On the surface, the impact of the judicial decisions in the Hijackers case appears to 
be have been very limited. The rulings met with a recriminatory political response, 
and were overruled by parliament. In this respect, despite their stern wording in 
places, the rulings could easily be dismissed as "courteous requests" to a sovereign, 
as opposed to "pronouncements of truth from on high." (Gearty, 2006, p. 96) Yet, on 
closer consideration of how government actually interpreted the significance of the 
rulings, and responded to them, the picture of judicial impact becomes much more 
nuanced and significant. 
My data on discursive framing shows judicial impact in this case to have been driven 
by concern over political discretion - which is a common underlying facet of the 
politics of both security and asylum control. Whilst it is interesting that the fixation 
of some political rhetoric on security is not replicated in the government's internal 
orientation to the ruling, it is perhaps more important to note the reframing of the 
issue in innovative terms of public safety. It is significant that this framing was 
deployed in such a way as to justify a broader regime of political discretion over 
asylum control. The dominance of political discourse which sought to affirm 
executive discretion over asylum control is perhaps unsurprising. Nevertheless, this 
framing was integral to the successful justification of material changes to policy 
following the ruling, and perhaps more importantly, is indicative of the extent to 
which the government was challenged in its authority over asylum control by the 
judicial decision. The viability of the government's capacity to demonstrate 
authoritative control over asylum control appears to have been challenged in this 
case. This is reflected at the level of discourse which affirmed a governing logic of 
executive discretion to balance policy priorities and migrant rights towards the 
realisation of an underlying philosophy of exclusion from the national community 
and its associated rights. 
In this high profile case, there was little judicial constraint of the practical tools of 
asylum control (which were legislatively reinstated). Yet, there was significant 
judicial impact on the government's ability to demonstrate authoritative control over 






In November 1996, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled against the 
UK in the Chahal case (ECtHR 1996)that no matter the state's justification, it is 
unlawful to expel a foreign national to a real risk of torture, cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment, as prohibited by Article 3 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR). The effect of this ruling was not simply that it was unlawful 
to deport a person accused of posing a threat to national security due to the particular 
risks which may be faced on return. The ruling strictly curtailed the discretionary 
authority of the Home Secretary to balance national interests in deportation and 
removal against the prohibition on refoulement to a prospect of Article 3 ill - 
treatment. In effect, Chahal prohibited deportation `at any cost' to the individual as a 
tool of national security and immigration control. 
Compliance with the constraint imposed by Chahal led to significant changes to the 
appeals mechanism in place for deportations driven by security concerns. More than 
this, however, a `saga' of policy innovations followed, with government 
endeavouring to devise alternative means of restricting the movements and liberties 
enjoyed by foreign national security suspects who could not be deported. Such 
policies became subject to frequent and sustained scrutiny from the British courts - 
for example on indefinite detention without charge (UKHL 2004b), sufficiency of 
diplomatic assurances from receiving states (Larsaeus, 2006) and Control Orders 
designed to restrict individuals' liberties (Ewing & Tham, 2008). This saga of policy 
change, its engagement with further judicial scrutiny, and an associated 
governmental discourse on the role of judicial constraint of deportation and counter- 
terrorism policies, readily allows for interrogation of how successive governments 
interpreted the problem posed by compliance with Chahal over time. 
In this chapter, I consider how governmental discourse framed the problem posed by 
Chahal. The government's response considered in this case study was both more 
complex and spanned a greater period in time than in the Afghan Hijackers case. 
Indeed, I trace a `saga' of policy innovations which sought to `fine -tune' or negotiate 
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the impact of Chahal over time. As in my treatment of the Afghan Hijackers, this 
chapter concerns a case in which compliance was highly politicised. Although 
compliance was at first rapid, comprehensive and uncontested, by considering 
governmental framing of the meaning and implications of Chahal over a longer 
duration (here, more than fifteen years), it is possible to observe a growing political 
opposition to the constraint Chahal imposed on deportation and removal. Indeed, the 
British government eventually made an unsuccessful appeal to the ECtHR to 
overturn the constraint (ECtHR 2009a). The Chahal saga also provides some 
important historical and jurisprudential context which helps us to better understand 
the events in the Hijackers case. By looking not only to the original response to 
Chahal, but also forward, beyond the events in the Hijackers case, to consider 
Chahal's long term and enduring impact, it is possible to further contextualise and 
explore the question of governmental conflict with the judiciary over constraints on 
deportation and alternative restrictions within the state. In tracing this framing of 
judicial impact over time, particular attention is also paid to the significance attached 
in political discourse to the supranational provenance of the judicial decision, and 
what significance may be attached to its source in explaining governmental 
responses. Towards this end, I have sought to locate my analysis within the broader 
context in which British governments, in little over ten years, moved from 
incorporation of the ECHR into UK law, to eventually calling for varying degrees of 
radical reform to the role of human rights law, the ECHR and the ECtHR. 
To some degree, my engagement with this case considers a governmental response 
which is the inverse of that observed in the previous chapter on the Afghan 
Hijackers; moving from an initial willing compliance, towards increasingly 
acrimonious framing of judicial impact. My focus is on interrogating the construction 
of judicial impact in government documents and rhetoric, over time, and within a 
context of how the UK's relationship with the ECHR and ECtHR are framed. 
Approaching governmental sources in this manner, I seek to arrive at an 
understanding of judicial impact according to how government oriented itself 
towards not just the direct question of compliance, but also upon deportation and 
asylum control, as well as the role of human rights and judicial review as constraints 
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on the realisation of executive priorities. In effect, this narrates how successive 
governments `coped' with the constraint imposed by Chahal 
I begin by presenting a brief outline of the facts of the case and judicial decision in 
Chahal v. UK. This is followed by briefly locating the ruling within the context of 
governmental attitudes towards the supervision of the ECtHR at this time. Doing so 
also allows consideration of expectations suggested by existing literature on the 
ruling, as to how judicial impact may be understood in this case. This historical - 
contextual prelude sets up subsequent engagement with primary sources on judicial 
impact. My engagement with primary sources is divided into four episodes: the 
initial response and policy innovations; diplomatic attempts to certify deportations; 
an attempt to have Chahal overturned by the ECtHR; and finally, consideration of an 
enduring political backlash against judicial scrutiny. Drawing upon this presentation 
of governmental framings of judicial impact, I then advance analytical reflections on 
the nature and significance of the government's orientation towards the Chahal 
ruling, and its impact upon the ideas governing deportation and asylum control. 
Facts of the case 
In 1990, Karamjit Singh Chahal, an Indian national with Indefinite Leave to Remain 
in the UK, became subject to a deportation order on the grounds of national security. 
This was based on the Home Secretary's suspicion that he was involved in terrorist 
activities against India, such that his return there for investigation was in the British 
national interest. Arguing that his return would put him at risk of torture by the state 
authorities, Mr. Chahal was unsuccessful in a claim for asylum. An asylum appeal 
tribunal had recently been established as part of the Asylum and Immigration Appeals 
Act 1993, against a backdrop of the case of Vilvarajah v. UK (ECtHR 1991). 
However, where a foreign national came to be labelled as a potential threat to 
national security, this meant that no access was allowed to the tribunal. Barred such 
opportunity to appeal, Mr. Chahal's deportation was instead confirmed by the Home 
Office panel known colloquially within government as the "three wise 
men "(Constitutional Affairs Committee, 2005, p. 79), which advised the Home 
Secretary on such security related deportations. This panel operated in a highly 
secretive manner; it did not disclose the case against appellants, and did not provide 
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appellants or their legal representatives with security relevant intelligence on which it 
based its decisions. 
Both the High Court and Court of Appeal dismissed claims for judicial review of the 
order to deport Mr. Chahal, due to the courts' limited authority to supervise the 
Home Secretary's decision. Although conceding that it did not have "all the relevant 
facts" due to the use of secret intelligence, the Court of Appeal determined that "in 
any event, the judicial process is unsuitable for reaching decisions on national 
security." As such, the court affirmed the Home Secretary's discretion in weighting a 
balance in favour of "risks to this country" over the safety of Mr Chahal (quoted in 
ECtHR 1996, para. 41). 
Although previous jurisprudence required that foreign nationals may only be 
detained pending a reasonable prospect of their timely removal from the country 
(UKHC 1984), Mr. Chahalhad already been detained for six years before the ECtHR 
heard his case. This is a notable foreshadowing of the UK government's later 
willingness to indefinitely detain foreign national security suspects who could not be 
deported. 
Appealing to the ECtHR, Mr. Chahal contested the lawfulness of his deportation, as 
well as his detention pending deportation. Finding in favour of the appeal against 
deportation and for release from detention, the ECtHR also ruled that in withholding 
the basis for Mr. Chahal's detention, the existing Home Office panel did not 
constitute an effective domestic remedy for review of detention and deportation 
within the terms of ECHR, Article 13. With regards to the lawfulness of deportation, 
the court ruled that although ECHR Article 1 establishes a duty on states to secure 
the rights of all individuals "within their jurisdiction ", the absolute character of 
ECHR Article 3's prohibition on torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
should be taken into account. Extending its previous interpretation of ECHR Article 
3 (ECtHR 1989; 1991; 1992), the court ruled that its absolute character meant that 
expulsion to a risk of such treatment in the receiving state would constitute a breach 
of the Convention by the sending state. Therefore, neither assurances from the 
receiving state, nor matters of national interest - even concerns over a risk posed by 
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the individual to national security - could be weighed against the prohibition on 
removal to a risk of such treatment (ECtHR 1996, para.79). 
Governmental priorities regarding deportation, asylum control and 
judicial scrutiny 
In setting up contextual expectations as a lead into subsequent analysis of primary 
sources, I will focus upon governmental attitudes and priorities with regards to 
deportation, asylum control and supranational judicial supervision of policies at the 
time of the Chahal ruling. I also consider contentious debate as to the implications of 
Chahal for the politics of national security. 
A rising tension between humanitarian protection and restrictive asylum 
Previous to the Chahal ruling, the Conservative government had recently 
implemented an array of severe restrictions on access to and enjoyment of asylum in 
the UK on the basis of the Refugee Convention. This trend towards more restrictive 
asylum controls was continued under the subsequent New Labour government 
(Bloch, 2000), making international protection more temporary and increasingly 
conditional upon conduct requirements imposed by the state (Joly, 1999). Although 
appeals against initial asylum instituted in the Asylum and 
Immigration Appeals Act 1993, this legislation, and the Asylum and Immigration Act 
1996 had enhanced the Home Secretary's discretion to `fast track' a variety 
categories of applications and appeals, so as to expedite removals (Stevens, 2004, pp. 
170 -74). As noted in my discussion of the Hijackers' case, a discourse emphasising 
the importance of demonstrable control and capacity over asylum and deportation 
flourished in government throughout the 1990s and 2000s. 
Against this backdrop of growing executive discretion over restrictions on asylum 
seekers, the effect of the Chahal rulingwas remarkable in offering a greater degree of 
protection than was offered by theRefugee Convention(Harvey, 1997). Whereas 
Chahalaffirmed an absolute prohibition on refoulement in cases involving a real risk 
of Article 3 ill- treatment, executive discretion over the public good provided a basis 
for exclusion from all protections offered by the Refugee Convention. It is no wonder 
that commentators pondered the gap between the UK's increasingly restrictive 
asylum controls and the developing importance of Article 3 as a basis for 
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humanitarian protection. Matthew Gibney speculated that these historical 
developments "may well signal the beginning of the end for the kind of discretionary 
authority that has been characteristic of state practice since 1945." (2004, p, 
128)Whilst hindsight suggests that political support for restrictive asylum controls 
has proven unchanged, the British judiciary have not merely had regard for Chahal 
jurisprudence, but required that it be consistently applied (UKHL 2004a). 
A tenuous relationship with the judiciary at home and in Strasbourg 
During the 1990s, growing confidence on the part of the British judiciary over 
administrative law, including deportation and asylum support, met with uneven 
compliance (UKHL 1994) and legislative overrule (UKCA 1996). Judicial scrutiny 
was not at all welcome. Only a year before the judgement in Chahal, the municipal 
judiciary met with "hostile" and "vitriolic" criticisms from the Home Secretary and 
backbench MPs (Le Seur, 1996, p. 8). As regards the ECtHR, although the UK had 
since 1966 recognised the right of individual petition, in 1994 British diplomats 
advocated withdrawal of the right, leading todebates at cabinet level in 1996(Bates, 
2010, p. 434; Drzemczewski, 1995, p. 174). Clearly, the scrutiny of the ECtHR was 
no more welcome at this time than was that of the British courts. 
It has often been noted that successive Home Secretaries and Prime Ministers came 
to revile the constraint imposed by Chahal (e.g. Bonner, 2012; T. Kelly, 2012; 
O'Sullivan, 2009).Yet, at first, and despite clear antipathy towards the ECtHR, 
Chahal met with almost immediate and full compliance. David Erdos (2009) has 
noted a tendency for new governments to wash away the sins of their predecessor 
with enhanced guarantees of human rights. Given the recently elected New Labour 
government's incorporation of human rights into UK law, compliance with the 
ECtHR on Chahal is perhaps unsurprising. Before the Human Rights Act 1998 came 
into effect, the UK had been one of the most frequent defendants before the ECtHR - 
arguably due to the British courts' reluctance to review extensive executive 
discretion (Jackson, 1997)and lack of a domestically enforceable bill of rights. The 
result was a higher than average number of judgements on the right to a fair trial 
(Council of Europe, 2011, 2013). Incorporation of the ECHR into UK law as well 
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aslegislation to comply with Chahal arose against the backdrop of this strain on the 
UK's relationship with the ECtHR. 
However, much explaining remains to be done as to how and why the government's 
attitude towards of the impact of the Chahal ruling changed over time from 
acceptance to acrimony. Incrementalism in the ECtHR's jurisprudence may have 
enhanced its authority over interpretation of Article 3 (Helfer & Slaughter, 1997, p. 
314), preparing the UK for acceptance of Chahal. However, this says nothing of how 
the government interpreted and adjusted to its effects on deportation and asylum 
control. Ostensible compliance has given rise to the view that supranational courts' 
jurisprudence, including Chahal, has become "embedded" in the UK's institutional 
function, as policy guidelines, for example (Jacobson & Ruffer, 2003, pp. 88 -9). Yet 
this embeddedness must be interrogatedas a question of how actors within such 
institutions of the state interpret and act out the constraint in practice (Çali, 2009; 
Wagenaar, 2004). 
The intersection of security with deportation and asylum control 
It cannot be ignored that the Chahal ruling related to an act of government justified 
in terms of interests in national security. A commonality between governmental 
attitudes to judicial scrutiny at this time, and the governance of security is, however, 
an appeal to political discretion free from the imposition of external constraints. 
Indeed, this is a central tenet of literature claiming that immigration control in the 
UK was at least briefly `securitised;' whereby labelling of foreign nationals as a 
threat to the national community was pursued to enhance political discretion to enact 
exceptional measures (e.g. Hampshire, 2009; Huysmans & Buonfino, 2008; Squire, 
2009). Yet, even where such a security framing is pursued this does not mean that we 
should assume it prevails. For example, although the New Labour government under 
Tony Blair appealed to exceptional circumstances relating to counter -terrorism to 
detain foreign nationals whom it could not deport (Hampshire, 2009), this policy 
measure met with stern judicial condemnation leading to its withdrawal(UKHL 
2004b; ECtHR 2009b). Moreover, these exceptional measures were justified in terms 
of necessity caused by judicial constraints on deportation. To the extent that such 
measures relate as much to immigration control as to security concerns, it would be 
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imprudent to presume the dominance of a `securitarian' framing in government 
(Boswell, 2007a) when considering responses to Chahal's constraint of deportations. 
As such, I consider national security as pertinent to this case study only whereit 
comprises part of the government's interpretation of judicial impact; in particular, the 
constraint placed by courts on governmental discretion to apply matters of national 
interest to deportation and restrictions on foreign nationals' human rights. 
Without reducing the matter to sole consideration of national security, Tobias 
Kelly(2012, ch.4) has argued that the British government's approach to deportation 
and removal throughout this period was characterised by an attempt to reframe the 
absolute prohibition on torture as a function of risk. Unlike a delimited appeal to 
exceptional circumstances (as postulated by many studies of securitisation), this 
comprises a generalised discourse, seeking to affirm governmental discretion to 
pursue deportation, provided it can either justify or mitigate such risk to the deportee. 
This approach to judicial scrutiny may be interpreted as indicating a desire to 
circumnavigate the constraint imposed by Chahal. However, David Bonner 
(2012)has argued that the government's counter -terrorism policy, including 
deportations, following Chahal were characterised by adapting to its constraint, 
recognising and reluctantly working with judicial constraints. In contrast, Adam 
Tomkins (2010, p. 548)has argued that governmental discretion may have been 
unintentionally enhanced by the judicialization of security deportation, due to 
subsequent municipal jurisprudence (UKHL 2003a)that decisions on what is in the 
interests of national security are exclusive to the Home Secretary and not reviewable. 
Whilst such discretion over the definition of national security may have been 
retained, this cannot necessarily be said for executive discretion over any pursuant 
deportation order. 
As we shall see from attending to primary sources, the government's discursive bid 
to reframe the debate in terms of a manageable risk (T. Kelly, 2012), facilitating its 
discretion over a balancing of foreign nationals' rights against their deportation and 
detention was not entirely successful. Indeed there is much to suggest that such 
discretion has been supervened by judicial oversight. As I have sought to suggest in 
this contextual prelude to my primary analysis of governmental discourse on judicial 
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impact, much remains to be understood about changes in how successive 
governments understood the constraint imposed by Chahal. It is by turning to 
interrogate the manner in which this constraint was constructed in political discourse, 
that I propose to uncover deeper insights into the impact Chahal exerted over time on 
the ideas governing deportation and asylum control. 
Analysis of Primary Sources 
Nature of sources 
Legislative change in response to Chahal occurred at the beginning of New Labour's 
term in government. This was a period during which many subsequently standardised 
processes of publicly documenting and consulting upon policy change were not yet 
implemented. Although it did document compliance as part of monitoring by the 
Council of Europe, the government had not yet made moves towards transparency 
that it would in subsequent years. As such, the balance of primary discursive sources 
considered for this case study has, in places, tended more towards political rhetoric 
than documents. Such rhetoric included parliamentary debates in which ministers 
sought to justify relevant legislative change, as well as government policy on 
deportation, national security and the UK's relationship with the ECtHR. Where 
governmental documentsindicative of the reasoning leading up to certain examples 
of policy change proved more scarce, my analysis has reliedin places upon tracing a 
series of material policy changesdeveloped in light of the constraint imposed by 
Chahal. In doing so, however, particular attention was given to these policies' 
wording, construction and justification,to consider how compliance with Chahalwas 
framed in relationship to the parallel realisation of other policy goals, such as 
effective immigration and asylum controls. Insight into the long -term impact of 
Chahal was also facilitated by analysis of how the government worded its failed 
attempt to convince the ECtHR to overturn its jurisprudence and by reference to 
subsequent documents and rhetoric indicating the government's priorities regarding 
future scrutiny by the Court. 
1. Domestication of constraints 
In Chahal, the ECtHR ruled on three points: the unlawfulness of deportation to a 
prospect of ill -treatment prohibited by ECHR Article 3; detention pending such 
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expulsion; and, notably, that existing mechanisms provided by British asylum policy 
for appeals against deportation in security cases were inadequate to ensure protection 
of ECHR rights. Although Mr. Chahal and several others in a similar legal position 
to him were quickly released from detention, and given leave to remain in the UK, it 
took a change of government in 1997 before measures were legislated to provide an 
ECHR compatible system of reviewing security deportations. Within only a year of 
entering government, New Labour produced legislation for creation of The Special 
Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC). This body provides hearings for 
individuals subject to deportation orders issued as conducive to the public good on 
the grounds of the Home Secretary's belief that their continued presence poses a 
potential threat to national security. Unlike the advisory function of the `panel of 
three wise men,' which previously reviewed security deportation decisions, SIAC is 
a superior court of record with authority to review both matters of law and facts of 
the case (UKCA 2000). In this respect, the creation of SIAC has involved a ceding of 
final discretion over deportation decisions from the Home Office to a quasi-judicial 
body, from which appeals may be made to the senior courts. SIAC therefore 
constitutes both a significant example of legislative and institutional change in 
response to Chahal, as well as an increase in judicial scrutiny over certain 
deportation decisions. 
The Chahal ruling had explicitly prohibited an executive balancing of concerns over 
national security against the protection of the individual from Article 3 ill- treatment. 
However, it must not be neglected that SIAC's function was carefully designed to 
facilitate consideration of executive concerns over security, albeit in a quasi-judicial 
forum which also attended to human rights protections. Of the three presiding 
members of a SIAC hearing, one must have experience of dealing with intelligence, 
whilst the other two comprise a High Court judge, and a judge with experience from 
the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (AIT). SIAC's role, as compared to the AIT, 
is specifically to review decisions which the Home Secretary has based on 
information which she wishes to keep secret for reasons of national security, 
diplomatic, or public interest. It is at the Home Secretary's discretion to withhold 
such information from the appellant, in which case, the information is reviewed in a 
closed session. In such cases, the appellant may not therefore be fully aware of the 
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case made against them as cause for deportation. Instead, a `special advocate' (a 
security vetted legal practitioner) privately represents their interests. Only this 
advocate is allowed to see the closed evidence, the appellant and their chosen legal 
representative are not (The Special Immigration Appeals Commission (Procedure) 
Rules 2003). 
Early debates on formulation of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Bill 
indicate uneasiness over the function of appeals and judicial review of the 
Commission's decisions. These revolved around two issues; protecting secret 
intelligence, and whether the Commission's ruling would be final. Only after 
extensive debate in the Lords, was a right of appeal provided - on points of law, not 
fact (HL Debate (02 Dec) 1997, c.1247 -50). This early intention of precluding 
appeals is particularly surprising given the Chahal ruling's requirement that there be 
adequate domestic remedies available to ensure compliance with the ECHR. 
However, it is suggestive of a desire to limit the extent to which authority is ceded 
from the executive to the courts over the substantive basis on which a foreign 
national is rendered liable to deportation. This is also reflected by ministerial concern 
to develop SIAC as a more "appropriate" alternative to the High Court, to ensure 
intelligence information be kept confidential (HC Debate (21 November) 2001, 
c.377). Alongside the innovation of closed material proceedings and special 
advocates, the framing of legislative change in terms of limiting the dispersal of 
power to the courts indicates that the Home Office was concerned to ensure that even 
if compliance with Chahal required that risk to the individual must be attended to, 
executive concerns over security would not be neglected. This comprised, at once, 
recognition of the constraint imposed by Chahal and yet an endeavour to comply 
with its constraint in a forum which is best suited to consideration of the Home 
Secretary's argument, with serious potential prejudice to equality of arms as a result 
of restrictions on appellants' access to the case made against them. 
SIAC as a microcosm of a broader 'bringing rights home' 
Implementation of Chahal notably coincided with the creation of the Human Rights 
Act1998(HRA) as a means of domesticating the ECHR by "bringing rights home" 
(Straw 1996). This legislation was significant, as the first implementation of the 
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ECHR directly in British law. It affirmed the importance of long- standing European 
law on human rights to British law, politics and society. However, this move is 
commonly accepted as motivated in large part by a desire to limit the number of 
embarrassing rulings from the European Court by allowing individuals to appeal to 
the British judiciary on human rights matters (e.g. Forsythe, 2006; Rask- Madsen, 
2004). The implementation of Chahal by means of SIAC can be approached as a 
microcosm of this broader trend towards domestication of international human rights 
law; creating a special institution designed explicitly to combine consideration of 
political concerns (here over security) with attention to constraints imposed by 
jurisprudence from the ECtHR. In this way, creation of SIAC may best be considered 
as evidence of an executive view of law as a mechanism for coordination of domestic 
political concerns in a context of intensified judicial scrutiny from the ECtHR. After 
Chahal, security deportations would likely be subject to litigation and hence, judicial 
scrutiny in any case. 
In its justification of compliance with Chahal to the Council of Europe, the 
government emphasised the incorporation of the ECHR into British law by the 
Human Rights Act 1998. The HRA was presented as guaranteeing compliance with 
Chahal on ECHR Articles 3 and 5, under a requirement that the ECtHR's 
jurisprudence be taken into account by government and the courts. The Council of 
Europe was also explicitly assured that the Home Secretary and SIAC would not 
pursue the type of balancing act prohibited in Chahal: 
...where a deportation case raises an issue under Article 3 of the Convention, 
the issue is considered on the basis of the risks of treatment contrary to 
Article 3 and without reference to other considerations such as national 
security. (Reported in Council of Europe, 2006, pp. 272-4) 
It is little surprise that the government would wish to convince the Council of Europe 
that it had complied with the ruling in no uncertain terms, in order to bring an end to 
monitoring of compliance. The rejection of a framing of deportation in terms of a 
balancing of individual rights against security is clear - especially in contrast to the 
previous government's view that "advice" on deportees' rights merely had to be 
"considered "(HC Report (21 February) 1996, c.429). However, this seeming 
affirmation of Article 3 as a `trump card,' which would preclude need for 
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consideration of concerns over national security, is at odds with the importance 
governmental statements attached to maintaining a security oriented review function 
in SIAC's operational procedures, as discussed above. SIAC was specifically 
designed to make reference to "considerations such as national security ". Dual 
consideration of the prospect that deportation would violate ECHR Article 3, 
alongside the merits of the Home Secretary's argument in favour of deportation in 
the interests of national security serves to emphasise that were it possible and 
justifiable, such aliens should be deported. Although SIAC is empowered to affirm 
or refute the Home Secretary's judgement, the centrality of this discretionary 
authority to certify deportation on grounds of national security is retained in the 
creation of SIAC. 
However, the creation of SIAC matters not only in itself as a mechanism for mixing 
the law and politics of security deportations, but also because its rulings can be 
appealed to the Court of Appeal. Subsequent review can therein consider where 
responsibilities lie in matters relating to deportation - with SIAC and the senior 
courts, or with the Home Secretary. The transformation of reviews of security driven 
deportation into a judicial matter has also spawned an increase in cases of judicial 
review concerning appeals against SIAC decisions before upper courts in the UK and 
ECtHR. As a consequence, governance of such deportations has become highly 
judicialized, involving extensive scrutiny of governmental reasoning for 
compatibility with the constraint imposed by Chahal. Senior courts have therefore 
been empowered to overturn aspects of SIAC rulings which deferred to the Home 
Secretary's judgement on the prospective safety of the deportee (e.g. UKCA 2013); 
policing both SIAC's function as well as that of the Home Secretary. 
The turn towards detention 
I have proposed that there was an uneasy tension between the governmental framing 
of SIAC's function and its provision of a fair hearing against deportation and 
detention, in compliance with Chahal. The importance given to security aspects in 
SIAC hearings may, however, be better understood in light of the Commission's 
developing role in overseeing the detention of foreign nationals suspected of 
terrorism. SIAC was set up to hear appeals against deportation decisions, and also the 
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detention endured pending expulsion. However, as the government's search for 
policy alternatives in lieu of deportation to a prospect of Article 3 ill- treatment 
shifted towards detention, so did the function of SIAC. Where compliance with 
Chahal precluded deportation, the Anti -terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 
(ATCSA), accompanied by a reservation to ECHR Article 5 on liberty (as part of a 
claim that international terrorism caused a state of national emergency) provided for 
indefinite detention pending a prospective future deportation, subject to the Home 
Secretary's `suspicion' that the individual may be a terrorist, or the `reasonable 
belief' that their presence is a risk to national security. ATCSA section 34 also 
provided for the exclusion of security deportees from the protection of the Refugee 
Convention, meaning that fear of persecution need not be balanced against exclusion 
(Blake & Husain, 2003, p. 339). Between 2001 and 2003, sixteen men were detained 
under the ATCSA (Privy Counsellor Review Committee, 2003, p. 51). The shift of 
governmental policy towards detention rather than deportation of unwelcome foreign 
nationals indicates both the constraining impact of Chahal and yet its failure to 
impact on a broader executive framing of foreign nationals' fundamental rights as 
subordinate concerns in an executive balancing of national security. 
Although SIAC had been created to ensure an effective domestic remedy to violation 
of ECHR rights by deportation, the fairness of SIAC procedures in detention and 
terrorism certification came under review (Constitutional Affairs Committee, 2005; 
later, by JCHR, 2007). In responding to parliamentary scrutiny of the role of special 
advocates and secret evidencein SIAC proceedings, Lord Goldsmith, the Attorney 
General, justified the regime in terms of protecting the public interest, whilst 
providing a forum for appeals representing the interests of the appellant (i.e. an 
effective domestic remedy). In turn, Lord Carlisle, reviewer of the government's 
counter -terrorism legislation, made explicit this otherwise tacit return to the logic of 
a balancing act. SIAC served to "maintain areasonable balance between fair 
proceedings and the reality of life -threatening risk to the public and to law 
enforcement agencies. The special advocate is a valuable lever in ensuring that 
balance. SIAC itself is the vigilant fulcrum" (Evidence to the Constitutional Affairs 
Committee, 2005, pp. 84, s.11). 
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To the extent that SIAC's consideration of the risk of ill- treatment in the proposed 
receiving country may have precluded deportation, where the security case was 
considered valid, this rendered the prospective deportee subject to an alternative 
restriction on their ECHR Article 5 right to liberty. A derogation to Article 5 
comprised a weaker link in the chain of rights protections than the absolute character 
of Article 3. The role of ECHR Article 8, on the right to private and family life, as a 
barrier to deportation and removal has more recently come under similar pressure - 
with government ministers arguing it should only apply in exceptional cases (HC 
Debate (19 June) 2012, c.761). Such attempts to circumnavigate rights constraints 
are suggestive of what critical scholars of security have considered an inherent 
tendency of security politics towards finding a caveat to "the weakest rule" in the 
broader regime (Bright, 2012). In this manner, the Home Secretary was able to 
perpetuate the governing logic behind deportation policy as a mechanism for control 
of immigration and asylum control as it intersects with national security - that of an 
executive balancing of rights versus discretionary matters such as the public good. 
Although such a balancing act had been constrained with regards to Article 3 by 
compliance with Chahal, the Home Office's desire to exercise authority over such a 
balancing act was actually enhanced by the grounding of SIAC in consideration of 
risks; serving as a mechanism to validate the effective imprisonment of those who 
could not be literally expelled from the country. The capacity of the government to 
pursue such detention through SIAC has been enhanced by its facility for closed 
material procedures and special advocates. Following the House of Lords' ruling that 
indefinite detention of foreign nationals was discriminatory and in violation of their 
human rights (UKHL 2004b), similar provisions for special advocates and closed 
material proceedings have been carried over into the government's subsequent 
regimes of Control Orders and Terrorism Prevention Investigation Measures (forms 
of de -facto house arrest) (Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2012, p. 59). 
Doubt has subsequently been cast on the extent to which compliance with Chahal by 
means of SIAC may have impinged upon not only the right to liberty, but also the 
common law right to a fair hearing, as appellants are unable to challenge undisclosed 
allegations against them (UKHL 2009; ECtHR 2009b; cf.ECtHR 2001: that ECHR 
Art. 6, the right to a fair trial, does not apply to immigration proceedings). A similar 
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question to that arising in Chahal - as to the scope for foreign nationals to effectively 
challenge restrictions on their ECHR rights - has persisted in the form of detention 
and then Control Orders, restricting the right to liberty. 
2. `Fine- tuning' in response to Chahal and Memoranda of Understanding 
Although the Chahal ruling was handed down by the ECtHR, a subsequent `saga' of 
policy alternatives pursued as alternatives to deportation came under scrutiny in the 
municipal courts. In these municipal cases, the vicarious `voice' of the ECtHR came 
into play through the HRA and the courts' application of the Chahal jurisprudence. I 
now turn to this `saga' of policy innovation and municipal review for indication of 
how the government negotiated,or `fine- tuned,' the impact of Chahal. 
A saga of policy change 
WhereasChahal constrained deportation, subsequent policy to deal with foreign 
nationals suspected of terrorism implemented mechanisms for their indefinite 
detention without trial (Anti - Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001: Part 4). This 
policy was, in turn, condemned by the judiciary (UKHL 2004b), resulting in the 
government rushing to legislate its best policy alternative - `Control Orders' 
designed to detain suspects at home, and to vest the state with powers to scrutinise 
and curtail most aspects of their everyday life - in a manner intended to work within 
the framework of the ECHR (Ewing & Tham, 2008). Significantly, legislation 
required any Control Order intended to deprive liberty in contravention of the ECHR 
to be authorised by the judiciary - a notable example of judicial constraint 
(Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005). A series of judicial rulings by the House of 
Lords have also resulted in modifications to the conditions for Control Orders' 
implementation (Ewing & Tham, 2008). It could be said that this iterative saga of 
policy innovation, judicial condemnation and further legislative reform is an apposite 
example of the process of judicialization at work: one case at a time, the nature of 
legal constraint upon deportation and subsequently, the detention of foreign 
nationals, has become differentiated and specified. However, it may be more 
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accurate to observe that the government was willing to pursue a series of modified 
policy tools intended to perpetuate a balancing of foreign nationals' rights against 
national security. This is a saga of legal risk taking - where the Home Office has 
creatively complied with each ruling, leaving the lawfulness of new policies for the 
courts to decide, should their scrutiny be activated by any future litigation. The 
policy tools have changed, but the governing logic behind them has persisted. The 
underlying premise has been consistent: that the Home Office should be empowered 
to limit foreign nationals' enjoyment of ECHR rights where the Home Secretary 
believes this to be in the national interest. 
Memoranda of Understanding 
Perhaps the most remarkable policy innovation in this context was the movement 
towards seeking to convince SIAC and the senior judiciary that Article 3 risk could 
be avoided by seeking `Memoranda of Understanding' (MoUs) from receiving 
countries, which promised there would be no torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment. Ostensibly, this move comprised an acknowledgement of the constraint 
imposed by Chahal. However, brief attention to the political framing of its use casts 
serious doubts on the extent to which the government felt bound to protect foreign 
nationals from risk on return. 
In 2003, in the wake of the UK's derogation from ECHR article 5 to facilitate 
provisions to detain foreign nationals suspected of terrorism, Tony Blair suggested 
that the government would "fundamentally" re- examine its obligation under the 
ECHR not to deport to a prospect of torture, if it could not otherwise reduce the 
number of asylum seekers arriving in the UK (Daily Telegraph, 2003).As Home 
Secretary, David Blunkett downplayed this suggestion, for fear that it make the UK 
an international pariah (The Independent, 2003). Blunkett had previously stated a 
preference for persuading the judiciary to ease barriers to deportation, of "dangerous 
individuals" rather than de- ratify the ECHR to register a reservation to Article 3. 
Directly responding to opposition criticisms of the "legislative problem" posed by 
Chahal, he stated that judicial cooperation in speeding up review of expulsions 
would be essential, "to ensure that democracy in all its guises can operate fairly and 
openly, rather than be held up to ridicule by those who should be upholding it. "(HC 
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Debate (15 October) 2001, c.926 -8). The policy decision was to derogate from 
Article 5 on liberty, opting for detention in- country rather than go up against Chahal. 
However, Blunkett's implication also seems to be that the courts were indulging 
vexatious litigation from aliens; frustrating, or at least delaying, the will of an elected 
government that such individuals should be deported. 
Following terrorist attacks on London in July 2005, pressure on government to 
execute security deportations rose yet further. Tony Blair instituted a twelve point 
plan expanding the grounds on which deportation orders could be made. In his "rules 
of the game are changing" press conference, Blair again threatened both to amend 
the Human Rights Act's interpretation of ECHR Article 3 if faced with "legal 
obstacles ", and to institute non -suspensive appeals for deportations (The Guardian, 
2005).This constituted a promise of deportation to a risk of torture, leaving the courts 
to decide if it was lawful only after the fact. Yet, in this press conference, Blair also 
emphasised the government's belief in the use of Memoranda of Understanding as a 
proposed safeguard against Article 3 ill -treatment by receiving countries (The 
Guardian, 2005),In contrast to circumventing judicial barriers to deportation, MoUs 
can be regarded as an effort more consistent with Blunkett's desire to persuade the 
judiciary to be more sympathetic to the lawfulness of deportation orders. 
Throughout the duration of the New Labour government (from 1997 to 2010), MoUs 
were arranged with states to which it sought to expel both failed asylum seekers and 
foreign nationals suspected of terrorism. Three such MoUs were concluded, with 
Jordan, Libya, and Lebanon, in addition to negotiations with other states in the 
Middle East and North Africa (JCHR, 2006d, p. 105). Concluded with heads of state, 
these agreements comprised a framework for subsequent diplomatic assurances 
specifying that a given deportee would be admitted to the state and not be treated 
inhumanely. Diplomatic assurances are not legally binding, and offer the individual 
no recourse against their breach, as they can only be enforced through diplomatic 
channels. Paradoxically, the very fact that the British government felt compelled to 
seek diplomatic assurances against ill- treatment is an acknowledgement that there is 
a "real risk" of ill- treatment in the state concerned. Indeed, the government openly 
acknowledged that without them, deportation to these countries would be contrary to 
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its international obligations, due to consistent patterns of human rights abuses in the 
states concerned (JCHR, 2006d, p. 98). The regime of MoUs is essentially an attempt 
to avoid direct responsibility for non -refoulement - leaving the protection of the 
deportee's rights entirely at the discretion of the receiving state. Beyond this, 
however, MoUs are also an attempt at persuading the judiciary that it is safe to 
deport, despite the appellant's fears about ill- treatment. They are a creative way of 
both recognising the constraint imposed by Chahal and yet also circumnavigating 
relevant concerns over the balance of risk involved in deportation. 
The sufficiency of diplomatic assurances has been considered by the courts on a case 
by case basis. For instance, the ECtHR (2012) agreed that such an assurance from 
Jordan allayed concern over the deportation of the radical preacher, Abu Qatada, 
after ten years of intermittent detention in the UK. As a means of influencing the 
judicial interpretation of risk, recourse to MoUs represented a compromise between 
legal procedure and manifest political frustration. Yet we may still question the 
extent to which these frustrations allowed for a genuine ceding of authority to legal 
and judicial safeguards, as required by Chahal and rule of law principles. In 
particular, judicial scrutiny of orders for deportation of suspected terrorists to Egypt 
brought to light Blair's confidential annotation of inter -departmental correspondence 
on diplomatic assurances: "why do we need all these things"; "get them back [out] "; 
"Speak to me "; and a reported willingness to accept very basic assurances as 
sufficient, ultimately failing to secure them (UKHC 2004). 
The government's engagement with MoUs suggests that although willing to comply 
with the literal constraint imposed by Chahal, the underlying desire to deport 
unwanted foreign nationals to a risk of torture persisted. The regime of MoUs 
comprised an executive endeavour to exercise authority over the management of this 
risk. However, the sufficiency of such endeavours was ultimately subject to judicial 
considerations of risk; the judiciary remained arbiter of the balancing act between 
national security and the risk to the deportee. 
Given the persistence of this underlying logic of an executive discretion over what 
constitutes safe expulsion, and purported openness to deportation even to a risk of 
Article 3 ill- treatment, it is perhaps unsurprising that the regime of MoUs was not the 
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government's only strategy. Beyond attempting to influence the judicial balancing 
act on a case by case basis, the government sought to reclaim authority over it, by 
intervening before the ECtHR. This challenge came directly "from the political 
centre of government" (Home Office Lawyer, quoted in T. Kelly, 2012, p. 104),to 
argue that the court should overturn the Chahal ruling's prohibition of an executive 
balancing of Article 3 risk against security. 
3. Litigation against Chahal 
Although Blair had clearly been frustrated over Chahal's constraint on deportation 
for some time, the July 2005 Bombings in London added further pressure on the 
government to demonstrably deal with foreign nationals suspected of terrorism by 
deporting them. At this time, Tony Blair voiced a particularly striking opinion of 
British exceptionalism with regards to the constraints imposed on government by the 
ECHR: "in view of changed conditions in Britain ", he hoped to secure a 
reinterpretation of international law (The Guardian, 2005). Alternatives to outright 
deportation of unwelcome foreign nationals had been frustrated by the saga of 
municipal judicial review noted above, and MoUs' efficacy proved contingent upon 
the acceptance of a judiciary prone to extensively delay deportations whilst it 
deliberated. As newly appointed Home Secretary in charge of revitalising the 
credibility of both the Home Office and immigration controls, John Reid openly 
criticised Chahal as "imbalanced ", a "gross misjudgement" (HC Debate (25 July) 
2006, c.743), "disproportionate" and simply "outrageous" (HC Debate (24 May) 
2007, c.1433). Whereas his predecessors as Home Secretary had often been reluctant 
or ambiguous about reform of international human rights law (Bonner, 2012, p. 77), 
Reid echoed Blair's previous threats to overturn legal obstacles, openly proposing to 
parliament that protection against deportation to a prospect of torture must be 
weighed against the public interest (HC Debate (24 May) 2006, c.1434). Advancing 
his predecessor's arguments to the European Parliament (C. Clarke, 2005), that 
application of the ECHR required individual human rights to be rebalanced against 
collective security, Reid lodged an intervention into cases pending before the ECtHR 
to argue for Chahal to be overturned. 
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After some delay, the UK's submission to the court was heard in 2007 and 2008, as 
an intervention into the case of Saadi v. Italy (ECtHR 2009a). In this case, Mr. Saadi 
appealed against the Italian government's claim that diplomatic assurances from the 
Tunisian government ensured compliance with its obligations under Article 3 not to 
return him to a prospect of ill -treatment. These assurances promised a fair trial and 
that Tunisian law on treatment of prisoners would be upheld. In its intervention, the 
UK argued that for suspected terrorists (such as Mr. Saadi), the constraint imposed 
by Chahal was too "rigid" and should be altered; the community interest in national 
security should be weighed against the risk to the individual in the receiving state. 
This would give a high degree of discretion to the state to balance the perceived 
"dangerousness" of an individual against an executive assessment of the risk faced 
on return, subject to diplomatic assurances. A high burden of proof would therefore 
be required of the individual that deportation would more likely than not lead to 
Article 3 ill -treatment. 
Although rejecting the sufficiency of diplomatic assurances against ill -treatment of 
Mr. Saadi, the court held that they may be sufficient in some cases. The court also 
recognised the challenges faced by states in protecting their national security. 
However, it sternly rejected the UK's argument, to affirm that Article 3 is an 
absolute right, even where prospective ill- treatment may be at the hands of another 
state; that the criterion for assessment is that of "real risk ", as opposed to being 
"more likely than not "; and that no reason whatsoever, including concerns over 
national security should be weighed against this risk (ECtHR 2009a: 138 -40). The 
court emphasised that national security and individuals' human rights are 
incommensurable, cannot and should not be balanced against each other.The UK's 
intervening argument clearly drew the ire of certain judges. Judge Zupancic stated 
his opinion that the only way one could agree with the UK's argument against 
protections pursuant to "the categorical imperative protecting the rights of the 
individual" would be "to maintain that such individuals do not deserve human 
rights... because they are less human." The judgement held the UK's argument to be 
"intellectually dishonest" and contrary to the spirit and intentions of the ECHR itself 
- to "protect the individual from the unbridled `interest' of the executive branch or 
sometimes even of the legislative branch of the State." The UK had attempted to do 
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away with protection of the individual in pursuit of the interests of the executive 
branch (ECtHR 2009a, 2) 
By turning to consider how the Home Office and government lawyers framed their 
intervening argument, we may move beyond the ire of the court to consider how 
government understood the impact of Chahal on its governance of asylum and 
deportation. 
The UK's argument in Saadi 
What is perhaps both unsurprising yet no less remarkable, is the particular care with 
which the UK's intervention was expressed in terms of a discourse of rights to 
defend its desired deportation policy. The wording of the British government's 
submission to the court (published in JCHR, 2006c Annex 2, ss. 3 -6) suggests a 
profound acceptance of the existence and legitimacy of a constraining framework of 
legal norms within which policy measures must be articulated. Whilst affirming the 
"absolute nature of the prohibition in Article 3" (s.3) as it impacts states' treatment of 
individuals, the government stated its position that: 
the context of removal involves assessments of risk of ill- treatment, and 
needs to afford proper weight to the fundamental rights of the citizens of 
Contracting States who are threatened by terrorism... [s.3] [And whilst] It is 
necessary to start by identifying the Convention rights and obligations that 
are in play in this situation. [s.4] The first set of rights comprises those of the 
citizens of the Contracting State. [s.5] 
Here, it was the "core values the Convention [ECHR] is designed to protect ", which 
were purported to be under threat by foreign nationals suspected to be involved in 
terrorism; specifically, citizens' "right to life" as "the necessary foundation for the 
enjoyment of any human rights" (s.5). 
This, the government's representation argued, resulted in a: 
corresponding obligation on Contracting States, and their democratically 
elected governments, to take the measures needed to protect the fundamental 
rights of everyone within their jurisdiction against terrorist acts, especially 
those threatening the right to life...' [s.6] 
174 
In other words, the government argued, by reference to normative principles of 
human rights law, that it was under a legal obligation to deport such individuals - 
fulfilment of whichwas hindered by the legal obligations which the government 
recognised as imposed upon it by jurisprudence of the ECtHR in Chahal. The 
government's use of such legal norms and discourse to frame an attempt to 
circumnavigate the law may seem perverse. The Court called it "intellectually 
dishonest" (ECtHR 2009a). Nevertheless, it illustrates a belief that it was in the best 
interest of policy makers to deploy such framing in order to justify policies to the 
judiciary. 
The government paid lip- service to the rulings of the court as requiring obedience, 
yet sought to have just such a ruling overturned. Indeed, the UK's submission to the 
Court made particular use of normative language of obligation. As such, although the 
government may not have agreed with the court as to the desirability of certain 
existing constraints on deportation, it nevertheless emphasised the legitimacy of legal 
and judicial norms as binding upon policy and government more generally. What is 
more, the manner in which this recognition was articulated demonstrated a 
willingness of the government to deploy legal norms and discourse as constitutive 
referents for the articulation and justification of immigration policy measures. This 
could arguably be taken to indicate the internalisation of the legitimacy of such rights 
discourse, such as has been hypothesised by theories of judicialization. Yet, the 
phenomenon may perhaps be better understood as a limited discursive tactic, bound 
to the particular context of a judicial audience. 
That the intervention couched an expression of highly communitarian values in 
references to the ECHR and a discourse of the state's duty to protect rights, indicates 
a peculiar vision of such rights and duties. The meaning of the Chahal jurisprudence 
wasre- framed in terms of "rights brought home" - as was the government's 
understanding of the incorporation of the ECHR into UK law (Straw, 1996). This 
was reflected in Blair's rhetoric of British exceptionalism; in the reservation to 
ECHR Article 5 to deny foreign nationals their liberty; and ultimately in the Saadi 
intervention's affirmation of executive discretion to protect the British national 
community as a higher order value than a foreign national's right to life and freedom 
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from torture. The Saadi intervention's appeal to the prioritisation of collective 
national security over individuals' human rights constituted an implicit claim for 
enhanced executive discretion,which I believe to be its most significant feature. The 
intervention appealed directly to the court to empower an executive balancing of 
rights against political exigencies, such as security. It appealed for the reinstatement 
of executive authority over the governance of deportation and asylum control; to do 
away with the need to convince the courts of their case in favour of expulsion. 
Success in this case would have significantly empowered the Home Secretary as 
arbiter over life and death for those considered undeserving of protection. 
Further reflections on Saadi 
The Saadi intervention was manifestly a backlash against judicial constraint of the 
governing logic of asylum control - that of executive discretion over balancing legal 
constraints against its execution of immigration and asylum controls. Yet, the 
discursive framing of the intervention clearly indicates the government's awareness 
of the extent to which a profound judicial constraint had been imposed on 
immigration controls. This was not simply a function of the Chahal ruling itself, but 
also of the municipal and Strasbourg courts' application of this jurisprudence and the 
ECHR principles which underpinned its reasoning. The saga of policy innovation 
and judicial constraint leading to the Saadi intervention undoubtedly comprised a 
journey of reflection by government on the nature and extent of this constraint. 
Unsurprisingly, the Court's ruling was not well received by the UK government. In a 
subsequent documentary on human rights, John Reid told the BBC that he regretted 
the UK's adoption of the ECHR entirely, as no individual should have "absolute 
rights." (BBC, 2012) These sentiments were openly grounded in a fear over a 
potential public backlash against government failures to deport suspected terrorists. 
The startling implication of Reid's reflections is that he would rather there be no 
incorporation of human rights in UK law at all, than allow a public failure to persist 
in the governance of the UK's immigration controls. 
The challenge against the constraint imposed by Chahal was clearly highly 
politically charged. Its failure left the government dependent upon the courts' 
acceptance of MoUs as sufficient to ensure deportations complied with the ECHR. 
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However, the simmering resentment of the constraint imposed by the courts did not 
dissipate. I now wish to turn briefly to the government's subsequent, broader 
attitudes towards judicial scrutiny which developed following the Saadi ruling, 
before moving on to consider the Chahal saga in terms of my analytical typologies of 
judicial impact. 
4. Backlash against the courts 
Whilst the ECtHR in Saadi emphatically affirmed that Article 3 was absolute, 
subsequent UK governments have since pursued a restrictive interpretation of Article 
8, on the right to private and family life as a potential barrier to deportation and 
removal. This has led to a battle over authoritative interpretation of the HRA and 
ECHR between government and the courts, on what weight should be given to 
concerns over the public interest in qualifying the right as a barrier to removal. Very 
clearly, this replicates the same concern over executive discretion over a balancing 
act in executing deportation, as was evidenced in the Saadi intervention. However, in 
Article 8(2), the government has sought to claim authority over the interpretation of a 
right which is not absolute, but open to governmental reservations in the interests of 
security, public safety and economic well -being of the country, among other criteria. 
As Home Secretary for the coalition government, Theresa May has argued that 
executive interpretation of national interests, and "parliament's public policy intent" 
should not be "negated" by the "view" of a judge (Secondary Legislation Scrutiny 
Committee, 2012; HC Debate (19 June) 2012, c760). The unwillingness of the courts 
to bend to the Home Secretary's interpretation of Article 8 has led to a battle against 
judges, whom May has held to be undemocratic and "subverting the law" by failing 
to implement the will of executive and parliament for deportation in all but 
"extraordinary" cases (The Guardian, 2013; The Immigration Act 2014). We may 
reasonably take such extraordinary cases to mean those involving a risk of death or 
torture. In this respect, Chahal appears to be an internalised constraint on 
deportation. However, there has been no deeper impact on the Home Secretary's 
articulation of deportation policy in accordance with spirit of the rulings in Chahal 
and Saadi that public policy and executive interests should not be balanced against 
the rights of the individual. Indeed, May has promised to innovate further 
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policymeasures if the courts should "test" existing rules (The Guardian, 2012b). The 
communitarian exception she has sought to apply in this instance, indicates that 
having a British family, or established family life in the UK does not make one a 
member of the national community, nor the community of rights which its members 
enjoy. 
These more recent developments with regards to the balance between human rights 
and deportation and removal, have unfolded in a context of growing political 
animosity towards the ECtHR. This was driven forward in part by cross -party 
opposition to implementation of its rulings on the right of prisoners to vote in 
elections (HC Debate (11 Feb) 2011, c.497). However, the ECtHR attracted 
particular "disappointment ", if not resentment, for preventing the deportation of the 
radical preacher Abu Qatada to Jordan, as well as requiring that the government 
financially compensate him for the deprivation of liberty he endured (Home 
Secretary Jacqui Smith in The Guardian, 2009; ECtHR 2009b; 2012). Whilst tabloid 
newspapers railed against the European Court's judges as "unelected dictators" (The 
Sun, 2011), heated yet indirect exchanges took place between government ministers 
and the British senior judiciary through public lectures and comments to the media 
on the relationship between the executive, parliament, and the British courts in 
matters of compliance with the ECtHR (Lord Neuberger, 2011; e.g. Justice Minister, 
Ken Clarke on the Today Programme, 2011). 
Whilst consulting on a revision of the incorporation of human rights in UK law 
(Coalition Programme for Government, 2010, p. 11), Prime Minister David Cameron 
diverged from the tactics of his predecessor, Tony Blair, in proposing not radical 
reform of the interpretation of the ECHR, but revisions to its relationship with 
Member States' judiciaries. At the Council of Europe's Izmir conference on the 
future of the ECtHR, Justice Minister Ken Clarke promised to use the UK's 
impending chairmanship of the Council of Europe to reform the Court. After a 
preamble affirming the British people's "unshakeable belief in individual liberty, 
freedom, fairness and a sense of what is right ", Clarke suggested the only way the 
court could be effective and secure legitimacy with the public is if guarantees "due 
respect for the decisions of national courts and of democratic national parliaments." 
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(K. Clarke, 2011) Clarke's statement to the Izmir Conference suggests that whilst the 
UK recognises the principles embodied by the ECHR, it has serious problems 
accepting the scrutiny of the court. The UK is not alone in Europe in having such 
concerns; indeed, the conference declaration explicitly emphasised that the ECtHR is 
not intended as a court of appeal for immigration (Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe, 2011, s.A.3). 
Upon the UK's commencement of the rotating chairmanship of the Council of 
Europe, Cameron addressed the ECtHR directly, accusing it of having become "a 
small claims court"(Cameron, 2012a). He argued that the Court should focus its 
limited resources on states and cases involving the "most serious violations of human 
rights." Otherwise, "the national decision" should stand, provided it "has been 
subjected to proper, reasoned democratic debate" and scrutiny by the national courts 
(Cameron, 2012a). In an early draft of the Brighton Declaration on the future of the 
ECtHR, the government initially proposed to restrict admissibility criteria, to limit 
access to the Court (published in The Guardian, 2012a). Once again, such framing of 
the Court as unduly interfering with the UK's sovereign prerogatives is reminiscent 
of a British exceptionalism; that the ECHR was Churchill's gift to post -war Europe, 
and that where it has deviated from this vision, such rights should be brought home. 
The emphasis placed upon national processes as `reasonable' indicates Cameron's 
view that the ECtHR serves, by contrast, as an unreasonable and unnecessary 
imposition on British democracy. 
By way of a final comment on this protracted period of growing political 
recrimination towards the courts, particularly the ECtHR, it could be said that such 
governmental rhetoric may serve to deflect attention from its policy failures where 
faced with an adverse judicial decision. Deportation is now but one area of public 
policy for which the government faces unwelcome judicial scrutiny - albeit a 
particularly enduring and prominent one. Governmental framing of judicial scrutiny 
as anti -democratic, unnecessary, and at times unreasonable, has served to shift 
political attention away from policy failures onto symbolic questions of 
constitutional authority - namely, who should have the final say, government or the 
courts. In this respect, recent debates over the judgement and responsibilities of the 
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British and European judiciary indicate that little has changed since the government's 
initial argument in Chahal: a will to political discretion over human rights' role in 
constraining public policy, manifest in the government's desire to reclaim political 
discretion from the courts. 
Classification and discussion of judicial impact 
Beyond narrating the saga of iterative policy innovations following judicial review, I 
have endeavoured to uncover more nuanced insights into how the government 
understood the impact of these judicial decisions, and how it justified its policy 
responses. Having considered key insights from critical framing analysis of primary 
discursive sources, I now wish to further develop my analysis of judicial impact in 
this case according to the analytical typologies of response and impact. In doing so, I 
also consider the possible significance of politicisation and the source of the ruling in 
shaping judicial impact. I begin by specifying the manner in which the government 
responded according to my typology of how compliance may be reconciled with 
policy objectives; further reflecting on the significance of changes in the 
government's understanding of the Chahal jurisprudence as a constraint on 
deportation. I then turn to consider the level of ideas governing asylum control at 
which judicial impact can be established in this case. Finally, I suggest that these 
classifications of judicial impact canhelp account for a marked divergence between 
intransigent political rhetoric and a significant judicialization of deportation in 
practice. 
Judicial impact in terms of the governments' response 
Each episode in this `saga' demonstrated a profound framing of deportation in terms 
of substantive ECHR rights. This framing arose in a variety of contradictory 
manners; the ECHR as an expression of British rights, to be exercised according to 
their interpretation by the authorities of the British state; the ECHR as an illegitimate 
impediment to effective governance of security and immigration; and these very 
rights as the vehicle according to which the government sought to justify the 
imperative need for political discretion to protect the national community against 
dangerous foreign nationals, denying them protection of their rights in the process. 
Such discursive framing of human rights as constraints on government often implied 
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that they did not extend beyond a British community of rights, from which the 
government sought to expel the deportee. Indeed this framing is consistent with the 
highly suggestive title of the policy paper which brought forward the incorporation 
of the ECHR into UK law; "bringing rights home" (Straw, 1996). The implication 
was very much that the Home Secretary's certification of a deportation order 
comprised not merely an intention to expel the foreign national in question from the 
borders of the community, but from the associated community of rights. 
The government initially responded to Chahal by seeking to justify thoroughly 
compliant policy change. SIAC was legislated for in parallel to incorporation of the 
HRA. As analogues in the domestication of prospective future judicial scrutiny, these 
significant legislative reforms may have been understood as posing little risk. In its 
peculiar formulation as a quasi-judicial body, SIAC ensured that a security and 
intelligence presence was maintained in the arbitration of appeals against removal of 
security suspects. Were this the extent to which the impact of the ruling was 
considered, such reforms may appear suggestive of a conversion in government to 
the legal attitude espoused by the ECtHR. However, the pursuant series of policy 
tools devised as an alternative to outright deportation, to deal with security suspects 
though detention and other curtailment of their liberties, such as Control Orders 
suggests otherwise. 
Although the principled prohibition on expulsion to Article 3 ill- treatment was 
respected, the effect of these policy innovations was to depreciate the significance of 
Chahal as a constraint on the governance of national security where a perceived 
threat was posed by foreign nationals. Above all of the other pursuant policy 
innovations, the use of Memoranda of Understanding indicates that immigration and 
asylum control were regarded by the government as central concerns. Their use and 
justification demonstrate that the government was determined not to allow judicial 
application of the constraint imposed by Chahal to prevent an expanded programme 
of deportation as a means of controlling immigration and national security. 
The saga of policy innovations through which the impact of Chahal was `fine -tuned' 
over time, is highly suggestive of legal risk taking by the Home Office. A succession 
of policy tools, all of which shared a common objective of empowering the Home 
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Secretary to balance foreign nationals' rights against national security, came under 
judicial scrutiny. Such an attitude to lawfulness may have precedent in the Home 
Office (Daintith & Page, 1999, p. 337)as part of an organisational culture of 
`muddling through' a series of punishing judicial decisions (Pollard, 2005, p. 258; 
Simon, 1957). However, legal risk taking may also have comprised an effective 
strategy for containing the impact of the courts on the underlying objectives which 
motivated a particular measure. In each instance, despite necessary legislative 
declarations of compatibility with the HRA, fuller consideration of the lawfulness of 
highly restrictive policies was left to the courts, as and when they turned to 
retrospectively determine whether individuals' human rights had indeed been 
violated. 
Nevertheless, sustained judicial scrutiny of not only deportation orders, but the 
policies devised to deal with those who could not be deported, led to rising 
resentment of the constraints imposed by Chahal. Such resentment even extended 
towards the legal regime of rights and their judicial oversight, which had been 
enhanced by HRA and grown partly as a consequence of onward appeals from SIAC 
to the senior courts. In this manner, the government's response to the impact of 
Chahal moved towards `amplification' of its coercive effect upon the governance of 
national security and immigration control. This changed understanding of Chahal's 
implications is, of course, best reflected by the Saadi intervention, as an attempt to 
reinstate governmental discretion over the balancing of ECHR Article 3 as a barrier 
to deportation. However, it is also reflected in subsequent comments in which the 
government called for the municipal courts and ECtHR to defer to certain 
governmental policies on deportation and removal. This discourse of a coercive 
supranational judiciary has carried over into more recent debates on the future of the 
ECtHR, extending beyond the matter of deportation in its concern over more 
profound matters of national sovereignty and judicial oversight of executive abuse of 
power. 
Level of Impact 
The policy toolof deportation at all costs was constrained at first and then, again, 
when the government latterly fought to have it rendered lawful. The saga of legal risk 
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taking, which I have described above, reflects an unwillingness to adjust the 
underlying goals of each policy: to facilitate the balancing of foreign nationals' rights 
against executive priorities. Gradually, the underlying programmatic logic of a 
balancing act, allowing executive discretion to prioritise security concerns over 
migrant rights, has been greatly constrained by repeated judicial review. One of the 
most pervasive features of this saga is the extent to which the lawfulness and 
implementation of deportation and counter -terrorism policies targeted at foreign 
nationals have been rendered subject to judicial oversight and review. 
Ultimately, as the ECtHR rejected the government's bid to reverse Chahal, the 
underlying philosophy of asylum control has been constrained in practice - but only 
for those cases where Article 3 issues are raised. Other ECHR rights have proven 
more amenable to successful imposition of reservations on their applicability to 
foreign nationals. However, such restrictions have been challenged in a highly 
symbolic and pervasive fashion by judicial review. The rising confidence of 
municipal courts in judicial review under the Human Rights Act has been significant 
in this regard. Sustained municipal review of policies devised in the wake of Chahal 
has affirmed the authority of the British judiciary as an institution, as well as 
providing a forum for the passive voice of the ECtHR to be heard, in consistently 
applying the court's jurisprudence as a constraint on government. The consequence 
of this rising tide of judicial scrutiny has been that the government often does not 
maintain final discretion over individual cases of inclusion and exclusion from the 
state. It may often have the last word, with a tendency towards recriminatory 
rhetoric, but a significant diminution of its authority over deportation and 
immigration control is evident in the limits placed on its ability to balance migrant 
rights against political priorities in practice. 
This has posed a significant challenge to the government's ability to demonstrably 
realise the governing public philosophy of asylum control: to claim authoritative 
executive control over inclusion and exclusion. This challenge is reflected in the 
intensity of political rhetoric which has continued, despite significant judicialization 
of deportation, to affirm governmental will and capacity to not only effect, but 
expand, use of deportation as a tool for both national security and immigration 
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control. Such rhetoric has made particular recourse to symbolic constitutional matters 
relating to the balance of powers between the executive, judiciary and ECtHR. In so 
far as these issues have, and continue, to grab media headlines and dominate political 
debate, they may well have detracted attention from the substantive diminution of 
executive control over deportation as a consequence of sustained judicial oversight. 
The role of politicisation and source of ruling in policy impact 
Significance of politicisation 
Although initially straightforward, long -term compliance with Chahal proved to be 
highly politicised. By turning to consider successive governments' discursive 
construction of the problem posed by compliance, judicial impact in this case can be 
betterunderstood as a problem of executive discretion and authority in the face of the 
courts. The problem faced was not simply one of realising a desire to expel foreign 
nationals suspected of posing a threat to national security. Indeed, as the Law Lords 
pointed out, there were British born security suspects who could not conceivably be 
deported (UKHL 2004b). A definitive aspect of the government's problematisation 
of continued compliance with Chahal was its concern over gradually ceding 
authority over deportation to judicial arbitration. As it appeared that the Home Office 
was losing final say over when ECHR rights should be legitimately considered a 
barrier to deportation, political rhetoric increasingly sought to at least have the final 
word. 
Politicisation of compliance appears to have been a function of the level at which 
Chahal impacted the ideas governing asylum control. Compliance with Chahal 
challenged the government's control over not only the implementation of deportation 
orders, but its discretionary authority to control inclusion and exclusion. Moreover, 
this challenge involved a public failure to exercise control over immigration in a 
context of concerns over national security (the desire to deport foreign terrorists). 
Engaging with the judicial impact of Chahal on these fundamental ideas governing 
asylum control - the logic and philosophy of its function - allows deeper 
appreciation of the process leading towards politicisation of compliance. Political 
rhetoric questioning the legitimacy of the ECtHR and ECHR as constraints on 
domestic policy concerns has affirmed the executive will to effectivecontrol. The 
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significant gap between this rhetoric and less ambitious substantive interventions as 
to the future function of the court is ultimately indicative of the extent to which the 
government has, in practice, reluctantly accepted the oversight of the ECtHR. As in 
my consideration of the case of the Afghan Hijackers, however, this constraint is not 
reflected in political rhetoric, which has sought to legitimate governance of security, 
immigration and asylum. 
Significance of the source of the ruling 
That the ECtHR ended up scrutinising the Chahal case had much to do with the 
reluctance of the British municipal courts to engage in review of matters relating to 
national security. However, in assessing whether governmental interpretations of 
Chahal were influenced by its being handed down by the ECtHR, as opposed to the 
municipal courts, the prevalence of a discourse of national exceptionalism cannot be 
ignored. This ranged from the notion of rights brought home through Blair's appeal 
to exceptional circumstances, including a reservation to ECHR Article 5; 
discriminatory efforts to detain, control and restrict fair trial rights of foreign 
nationals, which were not applicable to British subjects (UKHL 2004b);and 
ultimately, an appeal to the integrity of a national community of rights as endangered 
by the effect of Chahal in impeding the government in its duty to protect all from 
foreign nationals who it believed a threat to national security. These appeals to the 
supremacy of the national community, alongside more recent emphasis on reform of 
the balance of power between the executive, British courts and ECtHR, may suggest 
a belief on the part of government that the municipal judiciary are more sympathetic, 
or at least easier to deal with. In turn, this suggests that the ECtHR was a problem. 
However, it was the municipal courts' sustained scrutiny of alternatives to 
deportation which drove the government to seek the overturning of Chahal. It is 
undoubtedly significant that the ECtHR upheld its previous jurisprudence. However, 
the municipal courts and Asylum Tribunal had also been upholding Chahal as a 
constraint on deportation and removal orders for over a decade. Moreover, in the 
case of further governmental restrictions to foreign nationals' ECHR rights beyond 
Article 3, such as their right to liberty and family life, it has been the UK courts 
which have been the primary interlocutor with government on the legitimate 
185 
boundaries of executive discretion to balance foreign nationals' human rights against 
their expulsion. 
Ultimately, successive governments have, since the Saadi intervention, been willing 
to pass the buck for failed deportation - blaming the ECtHR. As already noted, 
deliberate targeting of the Court's legitimacy, particularly in political rhetoric, may 
have more to do with the government's desire to deflect attention from the true 
extent to which deportation and removal have been constrained. This constraint is not 
only an effect of the Chahal ruling, but of extensive, pervasive, and iterative scrutiny 
of immigration and asylum control by the municipal judiciary. It could be said, 
however, that attacks on the European Court of Human Rights have sought to cut off 
the prospect of similar such problem rulings as Chahal at the root, rather than 




At first glance, the impact of Chahal on immigration and asylum control appears 
profound. Its implementation has led to extensive judicial oversight of executive 
measures not only in deportation and immigration control, but in their related use as 
tools of national security policy. One may reasonably talk of a judicialization of 
deportation and asylum control. However, such an impactful bearing upon 
government has not been straight forward. The relationship between executive 
discretion to balance the human rights of foreign nationals against objectives such as 
asylum control and national security is still fluid, and subject to ongoing deliberation 
in court on a case by case basis. Nonetheless, it is highly significant that these 
boundaries of political discretion are being challenged in court. That is a truly 
significant move away from the free standing authority over deportation once 
enjoyed by the Home Office before Chahal. In the Saadi intervention, the 
government all but confessed to being incapacitated with regards to its policy 
objective of deporting unwanted foreign nationals. 
This challenge to governmental authority over deportation has not been without 
significant consequences for foreign nationals subject to deportation and removal 
orders. The court in Saadi may have implied that the UK failed to consider foreign 
nationals suspected of terrorism to be human. However, they and many other foreign 
nationals subject to deportation and removal orders, share the prior feature of simply 
being unwelcome aliens whom the British government cannot expel. Although they 
cannot be deported to a risk of torture, cruel and degrading treatment, their 
nationality has, in effect, become a basis for depriving the benefits and protections of 
human rights, such as liberty, family life and a fair trial - rights intended to be 
enjoyed simply by virtue of one's humanity. 
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7. Vilvarajah & Medical Justice 
Introduction 
This chapter considers the impact of judicial decisions from two episodes in the 
history of British immigration and asylum control; from the early 1990s, and twenty 
years later, circa 2011. In this period, the UK transitioned from there being no right 
of appeal prior to asylum removals, to heated engagement in the courts over the 
government's failure to protect a constitutional right of access to justice for foreign 
nationals, which had since developed in English common law. This chapter looks 
further back in time, beyond the events described in the previous chapter, to consider 
how the government responded to Vilvarajah v. UK (EComHR 1990; ECtHR 1991). 
It also turns to consider the recent Medical Justice case (UKHC 2010a; UKCA 
2011a). These cases share a common concern for long standing debates over a 
fundamental right of access to justice for migrants which renders them amenable to 
consideration within one chapter. In essence, this concern for judicial safeguards 
against unlawful removal is definitive of all my case studies. Even where it is not the 
direct matter of law addressed by the courts, it is of course the concern which drives 
litigation. In this respect, Vilvarajah and the Medical Justice case provide historically 
meaningful bookends to my analysis of judicial impact on asylum and removal 
policy. 
However, these judicial decisions have been chosen not for their similarity to one 
another, but rather as a counterpoint to the Chahal and Hijackers case studies. The 
governmental responses to Medical Justice and Vilvarajah were largely absent of the 
politicisation of compliance which was so characteristic of my prior case studies. 
Also, as the Vilvarajah case concerns governmental responses to a ruling from the 
ECtHR, whereas the Medical Justice case was handed down by the British senior 
courts, these cases may facilitate interesting comparison, not only according to the 
presence or absence of politicisation, but also according to the source of ruling 
(whether domestic or ECtHR). As in preceding case studies, critical framing analysis 
of governmental documents and political rhetoric has been conducted, so as to elicit 
data on implicit problem definitions which indicate how government understood and 
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responded to the judicial decision as well as its broader impact on existing policy 
priorities. 
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Vilvarajah y U.K. 
In this section, I consider the impact of Vilvarajah v. UK on asylum control, 
including the creation of an in- country right of appeal for asylum seekers. This 
significant change took place against a backdrop of two significant, but potentially 
conflicting pressures for asylum reform: on the one hand, rising judicial scrutiny of 
asylum determination, including governmental anticipation of an adverse ruling from 
the ECtHR on failure to provide asylum seekers with adequate rights of appeal; on 
the other hand, the beginning of a highly charged political concern over numbers of 
asylum seekers, as part of broader immigration control. 
Facts of Case 
In 1989, the independent immigration adjudicator overturned a Home Office decision 
to remove five Sri -Lankan asylum seekers. The men had already been returned to 
Sri- Lanka. As a result, the government was charged with the embarrassment and 
expense of bringing the men back to the UK "with the minimum delay" (Carvel, 
1989). In response to parliamentary questions following the ruling, Lord Renton 
asserted that the government had no plans to review asylum policy and stated his 
intention to appeal against the adjudicator's ruling (HC Answer (6`h June)1989,c.43). 
Subsequently, the municipal judiciary ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the facts 
of asylum determination, and that review was not required as to the `reasonableness' 
of the Home Secretary's decision to remove the men. In 1990, the European 
Commission of Human Rights ruled against the UK on the matter, forwarding the 
case for consideration by the ECtHR. This was on the basis that the UK was in 
breach of ECHR Article 13, as judicial review did not provide an "effective remedy" 
against perceived violations of ECHR rights - particularly ECHR Article 3 
prohibiting expulsion to a prospect of proscribed ill- treatment (EComHR 1990). 
Due to a failure to incorporate the ECHR into domestic law, the UK was at a serious 
disadvantage to prove that ECHR rights could be considered by any means other than 
judicial review (Jackson, 1997, pp. 98 -9). Given that there was no in- country 
mechanism to consider the facts of an asylum case before removal, a central concern 
in Vilvarajah was consideration of British judicial review's limitation to determining 
whether a `reasonable' Home Secretary would have considered the necessary facts of 
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the case. This is related to questions surrounding British judicial review under 
administrative law being much more limited than constitutional judicial review in 
many continental European jurisdictions, where courts may be empowered to 
consider facts, amend and annul policies and administrative actions. At stake for the 
British government in Vilvarajah,was therefore the potential political fall -out of a 
supranational challenge to the institutional legitimacy of British judicial review for 
enforcement of the ECHR. The British government took action before the ECtHR 
could consider the case. Preparation of the Asylum Bill 1991 has been regarded as a 
"damage limitation exercise" by the Home Office, in anticipation of "substantial 
likelihood" of defeat(Randall, 1994, p. 221),Ironically, the ECtHR subsequently 
found no breach of the Convention (ECtHR 1991). 
In considering the impact of the Commission and ECtHR on reforms to UK asylum 
control in this case, I draw primarily upon governmental sources pertaining to the 
Asylum Bill 1991 and its later legislative enactment as the Asylum and Immigration 
Appeals Act 1993. However, before turning to consider primary sources, I firstly 
wish to make reference to the particular context in which this legislative change took 
place; in particular, the significance of rising judicial pressure on asylum control, and 
parallel political pressure to reduce numbers of 
Governmental priorities regarding asylum control and judicial 
scrutiny 
In my introduction to the thesis, I said much about the context of growing restrictions 
on asylum as it was conflated with immigration control. In addition to this, I also 
noted the parallel rise of judicial scrutiny of asylum control as part of a general 
emboldening of the courts under administrative law. I will not therefore replicate that 
discussion at great length here. However, it must be noted that the impact of 
Vilvarajah on asylum control unfolded at a crucial point in this early development of 
tensions between political restrictions on asylum and its legal liberalisation in 
response to rising judicial pressure. 
Control over asylum as part of immigration flows 
Asylum control had not been politically important prior to the late 1980s. 
Restrictions on asylum as part of broader immigration controls had gone relatively 
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unopposed (Steiner 2000, 103). For example, in 1985, Sri -Lanka (to which the 
government sought to return Mr. Chahal) was among the first countries on which 
visa requirements were imposed as a means of reducing asylum applications. 
However, a seemingly exponential growth in numbers of applications for refuge 
throughout this period led to the politics of asylum control being driven by a desire to 
demonstrate control, leading to conflation of asylum with broader immigration. In 
this regard, the government claimed no duty of care for "economic refugees "arriving 
"simply to better themselves "(Conservative Party, 1989, 1991). 
This discursive shift has been considered as both a means to legitimate more 
restrictive asylum controls and as a product of Home Office influence upon the 
media to legitimate its role in immigration control, including proposed policy 
reforms (Kaye, 1994, p. 150). Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, tabloid 
newspapers reported on a series of expulsions of "lying" refugees and crackdowns on 
"would -be immigrants" (Kaye, 1994, p. 150). Subsequent passage of The Asylum and 
Immigration Appeals Actl993through parliament in July 1993, was shrouded in a 
moral panic by tabloid reports on "bogus refugees" (Dunstan, 1995, p. 609). 
Although the government regarded the high rate of refusals of asylum as a sign of its 
`abuse', this also led to pressure for the judiciary to find jurisdiction over asylum. 
The inability of existing institutional arrangements for administration of asylum to 
deal with rising applications led to an increased use of detention (Dunstan, 1995, p. 
609) and a decline in the procedural efficiency, consistency and perceived fairness of 
initial decisions on whether to grant asylum or order the applicant's deportation 
(Thomas, 2003). In the absence of a dedicated appeals mechanism to scrutinise the 
accuracy and fairness of initial administrative decisions on the award of asylum, the 
result was an exponential rise in applicants seeking judicial review to rectify 
perceived procedural injustices in these asylum determinations and precipitant 
removal orders. Although the ECtHR's consideration of Vilvarajah reflected a 
refusal of the municipal judiciary to engage with the factual basis of refugee claims, 
the rise of judicial review of the administration of asylum in this period may be 
regarded as a significant pressure on government. 
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Growth in judicial review and a politics of rights 
Litigation in Vilvarajah took place during an early period of increasing involvement 
of the British judiciary and ECtHR in oversight of procedural justice (i.e. fairness), 
and to a lesser extent, protection of human rights in asylum determinations. 
Alongside the increasingly apparent problems in the administration of asylum, this 
rise in judicial power and confidence led the judiciary to shake off its prior "self - 
abnegation" and assert jurisdiction over asylum (Thomas, 2003, p. 482). From the 
late 1980s to the mid- 1990s, the British judiciary transitioned from a markedly 
hands -off attitude towards asylum policy into an extensive and prolific supervisory 
role (UKHC 1985, 1988; UKCA 1989; UKHL 1987, 1994). The emboldened attitude 
of the courts is perhaps most clearly indicated by the handling of a failure to stay 
removal pending judicial review in M v. Home Office (UKHL 1994): the judicial 
House of Lords affirmed the courts' jurisdiction to grand mandatory interim 
injunctions in judicial review, and that a minister exercising Crown powers may be 
held in contempt of court for breaching an injunction. 
This rise in juridification' of asylum and public law more generally took place 
alongside broader political developments in support of empowering the municipal 
courts to review the compatibility of government acts with the ECHR. Between 1989 
and October 1991, Liberty re- branded itself as one of a growing number of human 
rights organisations. It began to have significant impact on the opposition political 
agenda (IPPR, 1990), entering into "discussions behind the scenes" with the Labour 
party about incorporation of the ECHR into British law (Rask- Madsen, 2004, p. 83). 
Constitutional reform was increasingly regarded as a platform for opposition to 
Thatcherism (Erdos, 2009, p. 805; Rask- Madsen, 2004, p. 82). Labour thereby broke 
with previous cross -party consensus that a bill of rights would risk "government by 
judges" beyond parliamentary control (Rask- Madsen, 2004, p. 82 at 73). The 
development of a politics of rights directly coincided with the commencement of 
parliamentary debates on the Asylum Bill, in November 1991.Such an opposition 
politics of human rights may suggest potential for robust compliance with the 
Vilvarajah ruling. However, there is little to indicate governmental concern for 
human rights guarantees. At the time of the Vilvarajah case, the UK was the most 
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frequent litigant before the ECtHR, and had accrued more rulings against it than any 
other Member State (Jackson, 1997, p. 17; Rask- Madsen, 2004, pp. 80 -81). 
Tensions between restrictions and rising judicial power 
Existing academic studies of the politics of asylum control in this period tend to 
voice dismay at the government's opposition to a more liberal, humanitarian duty 
towards refugees (Bloch, 2000; R. Cohen, 1994; Dunstan, 1995; Kaye, 1994; 
Randall, 1994). In his comparative study of judicial restriction of illiberal 
immigration controls, Joppke (1998c, 1999) dismissed such a role for the British 
judiciary. Yet jurists have noted the significance of rising judicial scrutiny during this 
period in provokinggovernmental reflection on both administration of asylum and 
associated policies(Jackson, 1997; Thomas, 2003). Indeed, the rise in judicial power 
to impose unwelcome duties to asylum seekers may have encouraged illiberal 
restrictions on entry (Gibney & Hansen, 2003). By attending to the government's 
discursive construction of the problem posed by judicial impact on asylum control, it 
is possible to actually engage with this hypothesis. Moreover, it is possible to 
determine the manner and extent to which the ruling in the Vilvarajah case (as an 
important example of the juridification of asylum) impacted upon asylum control and 
its political framing. 
Analysis of primary sources 
Nature of Sources 
Due to my focus on legislative change in response to the Vilvarajah case, primary 
sources for this case included a significant amount of political rhetoric in 
parliamentary debates. During the early 1990s, government did not pursue the more 
extensive degree of documented consultation and assessment of policy proposals 
which provided material for my more recent case studies. For example, consultation 
on the introduction of asylum appeals consisted of circulating the already drafted 
policy, with a purported willingness to receive comments (Lord Chancellor's 
Department, 1992). Further documentary sources comprised of political manifestos 
and treatment of the case in subsequent parliamentary research papers. 
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Policy change in response to judicial pressure 
Prior to the Vilvarajah case coming under scrutiny in Strasbourg, the Home Office 
had sternly sustained its refusal to subject asylum to a constraining legal framework. 
This initial intransigence was predicated on the explicit fear that in- country asylum 
appeal mechanisms would "risk... encouraging abusive asylum applications" (HC 
Answers (1 Nov) 1989, c.184w)and lead to "unmeritorious appeals in order to delay 
removal." (IND, 1984). The government's initially intransigent opposition to asylum 
reforms suggests that escalating judicial involvement in the Vilvarajah case may be 
factor leading to subsequent reforms. One of the most surprising aspects of the 
government's response to the Vilvarajah case is the development of legislation 
intended to pre -empt an adverse ECtHR ruling: the Asylum Bill 1991, which 
eventually led to the creation of an in- country right of appeal in asylum cases under 
the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993. These reforms were intended to meet 
obligations under ECHR Article 13 - to provide an "effective remedy" prior to 
removal - in anticipation of an adverse ruling by the ECtHR (Thorp & Young, 
2003). 
Parliamentary debates indicate that at the time of the European Commission of 
Human Rights' ruling on Vilvarajah, there was a growing political awareness of the 
pressure exerted by the municipal judiciary's "anxious scrutiny" (UKHL 1987, 952) 
of the administration of asylum. Home Secretary Kenneth Baker met with calls for 
his resignation and for the abandonment of the 1991 Asylum Bill, over his removal of 
an asylum seeker to Zaire in defiance of an injunction from the Court of Appeal 
(UKHL 1994; HC Deb (02 December) 1991, c.33). Baker's assertions of rectitude in 
disregarding judicial authority and legal principles are suggestive a vision of law 
proffered by in -house legal advice, within the Home Office, rather than that 
suggested by the courts. Some significance may, however, be attached to the 
escalation of judicial scrutiny to the ECtHR, as opposed to municipal review. Pre- 
emptive compliance mitigated the fallout of an adverse ruling of the ECtHR, which 
could have fuelled political debate on domestic incorporation of the ECHR and 
extensive publicity given to ECHR cases by the British media at that time (Lester, 
2004, p. 10). Such regard is also indicated by contemporaneous questions in 
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parliament, seeking statistics on supra- national, judicial dictation of policy (e.g. HC 
(18 Mar) 1993, c.353; HC (17 Dec) 1993, c.960). 
Whilst the Home Office under Baker may have been unhappy about judicial scrutiny 
of asylum control, greater significance may be attached to the manner with which 
Home Secretary Ken Clarke justified legislative reforms as a tool which "cuts 
through" perceived judicial pressure on the administration of asylum: 
We cannot continue with the complexity of the procedures that we operate. 
The courts have intervened on the ground of lack of appeal rights in many 
cases. Their decisions have added yet more increasingly ornate procedural 
requirements to our decision making. This Bill cuts through all that. The new 
appeal rights will be the key to procedural simplicity and decision- making 
finality. Strict time limits, together with a streamlined channel for clearly 
groundless cases, will prevent abuse. (HC Deb (2 Nov) 1992, c. 31 -32) 
Although offering appeal rights, early formulations of the Bill sought to withdraw all 
access to legal aid for asylum appeals (e.g. HC Deb (13 November) 1991, c.1131). 
This may appear to be a punitive response to rising litigation on asylum. However, 
parliamentary debates on the Bill indicate that whilst judicial pressure was a factor, 
policy change was primarily intended to deter asylum applicants from targeting the 
UK. Whilst at times driven by concern as to whether such restrictions were racist, 
debates were largely characterised by two issues; conflation of asylum and broader 
immigration control; and development of a distinction between real refugees and 
bogus asylum seekers. It is to these debates that I now turn, in order to understand 
how the extension of appeal rights for asylum seekers was located within a broader 
political context of restrictions upon asylum as a variety of immigration, rather than 
humanitarian protection. 
Reform subsumed by restrictions 
Whereas the problematisation of asylum as a matter of legal obligation was limited 
within government, its presentation as a point of weakness in the broader regime of 
border control was extensive. The Foreign Secretary called for fast action to close 
"weak" European borders, or else Britain would be "swamped" (Hurd, 1991). The 
Home Secretary suggested "rapid rejection" and enforcing "early departure" as 
strategies for "deterring further abuse of the [asylum] process." (HC Deb (2 July) 
1991, c.167). From the vantage of hindsight, these very strategies led to increases in 
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judicial scrutiny. However, as noted above, the Asylum Bill arose at a peak in 
significant increases in asylum applicants. Parliamentary rhetoric justified the Bill as 
a means of dealing with increased pressure on administration of asylum by deterring 
further applicants from coming to the UK. This was facilitated by parliamentary 
support for measures empowering the Home Secretary to more rapidly remove those 
present in the UK. A rhetoric of disbelief in the humanitarian motives of asylum 
seekers met with cross -party political consensus, oriented around the perceived 
problem of large numbers of "bogus" applicants. Justification for what ultimately 
became the 1993 Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act was claimed in terms of 
preventing abuse of the immigration system. This tougher approach to asylum 
control was predicated upon a new, dualistic reconfiguration of the figure of the 
asylum seeker with dubious motives, as opposed to the refuge seeking humanitarian 
protection. Opposition concerns were limited to the risk that new legislation may 
adversely affect "genuine" asylum seekers (HC Deb (2 Nov) 1992, c.36), but did not 
regard it has having a deleterious effect on access to asylum or an effective remedy 
in cases of removal. 
Although the 1993 Act introduced an in- country right of appeal for asylum seekers, it 
also instituted a procedure to "fast- track" removal of applicants whose case the 
Home Secretary considered to be "manifestly unfounded." This mitigated delays 
imposed on many removals by the "ornate procedural requirements" of judicial 
review, which the Home Secretary had decried in parliament. Included within this 
system, were those deemed to have transited through a "safe third country" en route 
to the UK. These applicants were to be returned to such transit countries without 
consideration of their claim, on the assumption that asylum should be sought there. 
In this regard, the UK applied a broader scope than was proposed by the European 
Community's Dublin Convention, which had not yet been applied, and which limited 
such expedited removals to countries within the EC (Home Office, 1992). In the UK, 
such asylum seekers were given only two days prior to removal in which to lodge an 
appeal to an adjudicator. In such cases, the adjudicator was restricted to 
consideration of the return to the safe third country, and excluded from considering 
the merits of the underlying asylum claim (schedule 2). Whereas the Home Secretary 
was allowed a further right of appeal against the Special Adjudicator's decision in 
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such cases, applicants were required to appeal from outside the UK- in other words, 
after they had been removed to a another country, with no assurance that their 
asylum claim would be considered there. The discursive distinction between genuine 
and abusive asylum seekers thus became a statutory distinction between those with 
full rights of appeal, and those whose removal could be expedited. 
As a consequence, refusals almost doubled between 1993 and 1994, from 46% to 
79% (see figure one in appendix one). Detentions also doubled (Joppke, 1999, p. 
133). However, asylum applications continued to rise in 1994 and 1995 as did the 
proportional contribution of immigration and asylum to the case load of the High 
Court (figures one and three in appendix one). The 1993 Act's specification of 
asylum according to the Refugee Convention also led to a profound reduction in the 
award of alternative forms of humanitarian protection from risks other than 
persecution, such as wars and disaster. Such "exceptional leave" had, until then, been 
by far the predominant form of asylum in the UK (ECtHR 1991, 97). In practice, the 
scope of asylum was thus paradoxically delimited and reduced as a consequence of 
the incorporation of a statutory right of appeal grounded in the Geneva Convention's 
definition of the refugee. 
Ironically, these attempts to steer asylum seekers clear of the superior courts on a 
rapid road out of the country were to backfire, as the courts found them "so unfair as 
to be unlawful" (UKCA 1994). The measures were nevertheless consolidated by The 
Asylum and Immigration Act 1996, which also instituted a presumption against 
asylum seekers arriving from a "white list" of countries, considered by the Home 
Office to pose "no seriousriskofpersecution." (s.1(2)) Both the regime of expedited 
and circumscribed appeals, and its subsequent extension in 1996,indicate that judicial 
concerns relating to the appeal rights of asylum seekers had little impact on 
governmental attitudes guiding the policy and administration of asylum control. With 
the ECtHR. ultimately finding in favour of the UK in Vilvarajah, profoundly 
restrictive legislation in 1996 may have constituted a resolute step back from the 
development of a limited system of appeals for asylum seekers, which had initially 
sprouted under the shadow of judicial scrutiny at home and in Strasbourg. Indeed, 
political rhetoric increasingly came to supplant the figure of the refugee with that of 
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the bogus asylum seeker, or simply, "illegal immigrants" (HC Deb (20 Nov) 1995, 
c.338). Contrary to concerns voiced by the judiciary over the fairness and efficiency 
of initial asylum determinations, the high rate of initial refusals of asylum continued 
to be heralded by government ministers as a clear indication that most asylum 
seekers were indeed economic migrants (HC Deb (11 Jan) 1996, c.331). 
Preliminary conclusions on Vilvarajah 
I will reserve full analysis of the government's response in this case until after I have 
presented my primary data on the Medical Justice case, below. However, the central 
observation which I wish to emphasise is that although asylum control was 
liberalised by creation of an in- country right of appeal, executive discretion over 
asylum seekers' access to this appeal mechanism was greatly enhanced, with 
dramatic consequences for the success rate of applicants. The significance of this 
legislative restriction is made apparent by recourse to its discursive construction in 
governmental sources: it responded to judicial pressure which had impeded the 
government in its desire to expediently remove asylum seekers as a means to deter 
applicants by demonstrating vigorous control. In this respect, the ostensible impact of 
Vilvarajah on liberalisation of asylum control in the UK is highly questionable. 
Indeed, access to justice for many asylum seekers was significantly impeded in the 
wake of the ruling. 
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Medical Justice 
In this section, I leap some twenty years forward in time, to consider the impact of a 
string of judicial decisions involving foreign nationals' access to judicial safeguards 
against unlawful detention and removal. My central focus is on the government's 
response to the Medical Justice case (UKHC 2010a; UKCA 2011a), which is taken 
as particularly indicative of governmental attitudes towards judicial scrutiny of 
removal decisions. After presenting the facts of the case, I seek to locate it within the 
context of not only contemporary governmental priorities on asylum control and 
judicial oversight, but also a significant prior build -up of related jurisprudence. 
Primary sources on the problematisation of compliance with the Medical Justice are 
then analysed. In doing so, I consider whether the case comprised a denouement in 
engagement between government and judiciary, with discernible impact on policy 
and attitudes in government on access to judicial safeguards against unlawful 
removal. 
Facts of Case 
Policy exceptions on notice prior to removal 
In 1999, the Home Office agreed a `concordat' with the High Court that it would 
wait a minimum of seventy -two hours between delivery and enforcement of removal 
directions (Home Office, 2002a). This was intended to allow foreign nationals 
ineligible for Leave to Remain in the UK a brief window of opportunity to seek legal 
advice, and potentially to apply for judicial review of the lawfulness of their removal. 
If judicial review proceedings were confirmed, then removal would be suspended 
pending a ruling from the court. In March 2007, the Home Office unilaterally applied 
exceptions to this concordat, excluding certain categories of individuals from 
provision of seventy -two hours' notice prior to removal. This regime of exceptions 
was justified as necessary to the best interests of the `removee:' for their medical 
needs, or child welfare (IND, 2007). In January 2010, it was extended to include 
three further categories: those seen as posing a threat to others, those considered 
seriously disruptive, or who consented to expedited removal (UKBA, 2010a, Ch.60, 
ss.3.1.1 - 3.1.5). 
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The policy on exceptions was clearly written with an awareness of their legal 
sensitivity. Their use required that UKBA's Litigation Management Unit be 
informed (UKHC 2010a: 27). UKBA's director also explicitly recognised that 
"[w]hen applying exceptions we are acutely aware that we are making the task of 
legal representatives more difficult." (UKBA, 2009) Despite prior UKBA promises 
of transparency, this was initially a "secret" policy, which was neither publicised nor 
announced to partner organisations (ILPA, 2012, p. 5; UKHC 2009). This is 
suggestive of UKBA exercising caution by means of secrecy, rather than procedural 
safeguards and of prioritising the defensibility of removal actions in terms of success 
rather than justice. Such was the judicial dismay when the secret policy came to light 
that the judge concluded the only plausible account, on the evidence, was that 
"litigation is now often necessary to enable even the government to discover what its 
immigration policies are." (UKHC 2009, p.8) 
The Medical Justice case 
The legality of the policy of exceptions as a means to facilitate accelerated removals 
came under review in the Medical Justice case (UKHC 2010a; UKCA 2011a). 
Medical Justice, the advocacy group supporting the litigants branded the policy 
"deportation without warning of suicidal people and unaccompanied minors." 
(Medical Justice, 2010)In 2011, the Court of Appeal upheld the High Court's ruling 
that the UKBA policy of accelerating certain removals was unlawful. The courts held 
the policy to have risked preventing access to a lawyer, abrogating a constitutional 
right of access to court, which had developed in municipal jurisprudence prior to 
incorporation of the HRA. The policy was therefore found unlawful due to "a very 
high risk if not an inevitability that the right of access to justice is being and will be 
infringed." (UKHC 2010a: 171 -2) The regime of exceptions was held to be 
fundamentally unjust and contrary to rights which are "inherent and fundamental to a 
democratic society." (UKHC 2010a: 44) 
In arriving at its ruling, the High Court highlighted prior comments of both the Home 
Secretary (in a 2007 policy document) and Chief Executive of UKBA (in a letter of 
2007), recognising the applicability of such rights to those subject to enforced 
removals: "to balance the need to ensure proper access to court with the public 
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interest in establishing a robust removal process" (quoted in UKHC 2010a: 45, 
63).As in my previous case studies, we may observe the discourse of a balancing act 
here; an uneasy metaphor, characteristic of prior governmental attempts exercise 
discretion over the application of fundamental rights as constraints on government 
policy. 
Also at stake in the Medical Justicecase was consideration of whether it was justified 
at all for the judiciary to rule on the policy of exceptions. The court claimed 
jurisdiction on the basis of recent judicial claims of authority "to obviate in advance 
a proven risk of injustice which... inheres in the system itself." (UKHC 2010a: 33) 
The alternative would have been for the court to await individual challenges from 
those persons adversely affected by the policy -a position rejected by the courts, due 
to the case's definitive concern over problems accessing judicial review (UKHC 
2010a: 173). In light of consideration in this case of what is effectively a matter of 
public interest, it is worth noting that the Home Secretary had attempted to overturn 
liability for costs incurred by Medical Justice in obtaining legal representation for the 
Home Secretary's appeal against the initial ruling of the High Court (UKCA 2011b). 
Whilst the court rejected this attempt to impose a barrier to defence, it is consistent 
with contemporaneous governmental acquiescence in the closure of the two largest 
providers of legal advice to migrants - due to delays in provision of state funds and 
changes to the system of legal aid (BBC News Online, 2010; Bowcott, 2011). One 
may even read the Home Office position in Medical Justice to be that such 
organisations should not be allowed to challenge government policy before the 
courts. Indeed, the government's argument to the Court of Appeal against a general 
duty to ensure access to legal advice in removals cases, sounds rather like a threat; 
suggesting that such a responsibility, "would have significant implications for the 
provision of legal services in this country and for the availability of public funding 
for legal advice." (UKCA 2011a, 7) These words are reminiscent of previous policy 
propositions to deny legal aid to migrants, such as those in the Asylum Bill 1991, 
considered above. Unsurprisingly,The Law Society(2011) linked the Medical Justice 
case to concerns over the impact of cuts to legal aid; effectively limiting migrants' 
access to judicial oversight without need for a regime of exceptions limiting notice of 
removal. 
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Governmental priorities regarding asylum control and judicial 
scrutiny 
Concerns over expediency and welfare in removals 
By the late- 2000s, lingering scandals plagued the immigration and asylum agenda. 
Pressure for reform was so great as to lead the Home Secretary to signal a 
willingness to effect change by labelling the Home Office and Border Agency "unfit 
for purpose." (Reid in BBC News Online, 2006e) Regular and highly publicised 
scrutiny by the Home Affairs Select Committee and Independent Chief Inspector of 
the UKBA put particular pressure on the Border Agency to demonstrate it was in 
control of the removal of foreign nationals without leave to remain.The scale of 
UKBA's perceived inability to manage asylum and removals at this time, was 
symbolised by a backlog of over 450,000 unresolved "legacy" asylum cases, 
accumulated over many years (Home Affairs Committee, 2011). Perhaps more than 
at any other point in the history of immigration and asylum control in the UK, 
governments were exposed to extremely high expectations on effective asylum 
control and removals. This pressure was further exacerbated by a particularly 
vitriolic demonization by the print media of not only asylum seekers and immigrants, 
but also of their opportunity to make recourse to the courts to protect their procedural 
and human rights (JCWI, 2012). 
Despite asylum applications being at a record low, particular emphasis was placed 
upon both rhetoric and practice of enhanced expulsion capacity(Gibney et al., 2011, 
p. 550). Governmental concerns over demonstrating control were reflected by 
rhetorical promises under the Labour government to "remove more [immigration 
offenders], and remove them faster" (Byrne, quoted in The Daily Mail, 2008), as 
well as the newly elected Conservative -led coalition government's highly symbolic 
pledge to reduce net -migration from hundreds of thousands per year, to tens of 
thousands (Conservative Party, 2010, p. 21). 
Although controversial among lawyers and asylum support groups (e.g. ILPA, 2006, 
2012), `no- notice' removals did not attract particular political controversy. This is 
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despite previous public expression of concerns by the judiciary (BBC News Online, 
2005)and occasional concern among MPs and in the media over the legality and even 
morality of certain removals (BBC News Online, 2009). The ruling in Medical 
Justice was ostensibly concerned with the minutiae or procedural arcana of removals 
policies - questions of how, rather than why, to expel a foreign national. It may be 
fair to assume that, in general, public, the media, and politicians support the necessity 
of removals policies as part of a fair and effective asylum system. However, experts 
and activists in asylum law were acutely concerned by a long track record of 
inefficient and unjust UKBA decisions, which were only remedied by judicial 
oversight - indicated by the large proportion of initial decisions overturned on appeal 
(ILPA, 2006, 2012; Medical Justice, 2010). Such concerns over the welfare of 
vulnerable individuals speak directly to UKBA's attempt to justify the exceptions in 
terms of the best interests of the individual subject to forcible removal. The case put 
by government to the Court of Appeal in Medical Justice, outlined above, is a clear 
indication that the coalition government inherited New Labour doubts as to the 
existence of a right of access to justice to review the legality of removal decisions. 
Rising judicial pressure on foreign nationals' access to justice 
As under the previous government, judicial scrutiny of removal and deportation were 
particularly unwelcome among the Conservative -led cabinet. Whilst Blair had 
decried the courts as a barrier to "common sense" expulsions (Blair, 2006b), 
Conservative Home Secretary Theresa May characterised them as "anathema to good 
administration" (HC Debate 23.10.12: Col. 189) and called for the Human Rights Act 
to be "scrapped" due to its role in preventing deportation (in Hennessy, 2011). 
Similarly, the coalition government increased restrictions on legal aid in immigration 
cases (Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act2012) which the prior 
Labour government had employed to limit access to legal advice after failing to 
`oust' the courts from reviewing certain aspects of immigration control (Woolas in 
Barkham, 2008; Rawlings, 2005; Blair in Wintour, 2003). 
Leading up to the Medical Justice case, a string of judicial rulings affirmed the 
importance of foreign nationals' access to justice for redress against unlawful 
government actions, general failures to follow policies on detentionand removal, and 
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an inherent unfairness of the system of asylum decision making (systemic questions, 
in UKCA 2004, 2009; detention in UKHL 2003b, at 26; ECtHR 2008; on removals, 
UKHC 2009, 2010b; UKCA 2010a, 201lb). The High Court ruled there was "no 
conceivable justification for same day removals" (UKHC 2010b, 5) and that 
exemptions to the provision of seventy -two hours' notice were unlawful, as were 
Home Office attempts to mislead lawyers representing individuals subject to removal 
orders (UKHC 2009). As can be discerned from the facts of Medical Justice, no- 
notice removals continued despite this judicial condemnation. In implementing this 
string of judicial decisions, the Home Office dealt with the redetermination of 
individual administrative decisions and paid damages and costs as required. Yet, it 
failed to adopt a more robust attitude towards legal safeguards, persisting in what 
came to be regarded by immigration law practitioners as an "institutionally unlawful" 
culture of regular failures by UKBA to follow its own rules and guidance (Free 
Movement, 2009). 
These cases took place against a backdrop of attempts by the Home Office to limit 
access to judicial review as an explicit tactic for, "minimising the number of bogus 
judicial review applications we get against deportation" as a means "to deter, detect, 
detain and remove illegal migrants" (Home Office, 2006b).The reasoning linking 
access to judicial review and migration control is made clear by a consultation on 
discontinuing the practice of suspending removal when an application for judicial 
review is lodged with the High Court. This stated the Immigration and Nationality 
Directorate's view "that judicial review is often used purely as a tactic to disrupt the 
removal process when the underlying claim has no merit." (IND, 2006b) 
Consummate with this view was the tendency of the IND to refer to bids for judicial 
review as a "threat" (ILPA, 2006). 
These statements and the government's minimal response to this body of prior 
jurisprudence suggest that at an organisational level, immigration officials were 
highly sceptical about the legitimacy and necessity of judicial oversight of not only 
some, but the majority, of removal actions. They also suggest the IND's confidence 
in its own capacity to determine and arbitrate such legal questions as may constitute 
a barrier to removal, without deference to outside legal or judicial authority. At best, 
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we may discern the existence of an organisational culture which considers legal 
questions best addressed by government officials, in- house. At worst, we may 
consider the prospect of an organisational disregard for the applicability and 
legitimacy of legal and judicial constraints on removal.The judiciary for its part, 
voiced, "despair at the manner in which the system [of asylum control] operates..." 
(UKCA 2009, 2); elsewhere observing that despite "outrageous and arbitrary 
exercise of executive power ", "it is difficult to foresee how such arbitrary conduct 
can be deterred in the future..." (UKCA 2010a, 84, 77). 
Even prior to the direct challenge to the lawfulness of the policy of exceptions in the 
Medical Justice case, judicial pressure had been mounting on the issue of access to 
court, and the importance of judicial safeguards against unlawful detention, 
deportation and removal. Prior `containment' of these rulings by government may 
suggest that the Medical Justice case would have little impact on governance of 
asylum. However, in contrast to these prior rulings, Medical Justice comprised a 
direct challenge to the legality of government policy. Given the great degree of 
pressure and scrutiny of the government's record in fulfilling promises to quickly 
expel increasing numbers of foreign nationals, as well as the apparent culture of 
disbelief in foreign nationals' requirement of legal advice, extensive compliance with 
the Medical Justice ruling may appear unlikely. By turning now to consider how the 
government problematized judicial impact in this case, it is however, possible to 
identify a particularly nuanced response which is neither a straightforward example 
of constraint, nor suggestive of a particularly profound impact on the more 
fundamental agenda of expedient removals at executive discretion. 
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Analysis of primary sources 
Nature of Sources 
The predominance of internal government documents among my primary sources 
reflects the lack of political controversy over compliance in this case. 
Implementation of the Medical Justice ruling did not require changes to primary 
statute, so was handled within the executive, without recourse to parliament. 
Justification of policy change was primarily directed towards internal executive 
procedures and legal advocacy groups. This included equality impact assessments of 
policy change and letters to "corporate partners," drafted by the Ministry of Justice 
and Home Office Immigration and Border Policy Directorate. Attention was also 
paid to political rhetoric - both directly in response to the Medical Justice ruling, and 
on the broader, related topic of expedited removals. 
Initial response 
In response to judicial scrutiny in the Medical Justice case, UKBA readily suspended 
operation of the policy of exceptions. Announcing itsintention to appeal the High 
Court ruling, the Home Office simply expressed itself to be, "disappointed with the 
court's judgement ", against, "an important element" of its management of removals. 
It also emphasised an enduring commitment, "to removing individuals with no right 
to be in the UK as quickly as possible." (quoted in The Daily Mail, 2010) When 
questioned about the ruling's impact on "fast track deportation," The Prime 
Minister's Spokesman echoed the Home Office statement, before dismissing 
suggestions that the ruling threatened the Immigration Minister's assertion that the 
UK should not be seen as "a soft touch" (Prime Minister's Office, 2010). Although a 
public statement of "disappointment" may seem strong language, it is typical of 
governmental responses to several rulings on removal actions and human rights 
around this time (e.g. Davies, 2012; Prime Ministers Questions (16 Feb) 2011), and a 
regular feature of parliamentary discourse on immigration control (Home Affairs 
Committee, 2010, Ev.28). When compared to hard rhetoric attacking the courts in 
my previous case studies, notably the Hijackers case, the government's official 
response to Medical Justice is suggestive of reluctant acceptance. Reference to 
disappointment is ironically reminiscent of the more historic meaning of the word, in 
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terms of which the Home Office had been dispossessed of its position of authority 
over the regime of exceptions. 
In its official statement, the Home Office made a direct claim to be managing the 
situation. Its implication was that efficient management requires removals to be 
executed "as quickly as possible ", and by extension, that in the absence of perceived 
legal barriers to removal, intervention by the courts is an unfortunate inconvenience. 
In light of concerns over the UK being seen to be a "soft touch" on migrants, it is 
worth noting that before the constraint on removal directions had been considered at 
appeal, an early day motion was afoot in parliament expressing a desire for 
government to expel foreign nationals, regardless of constraints imposed by human 
rights law (EDM 1226 - Field, 2010). Medical Justice concerned a constitutional 
right in common law as a safeguard of procedural justice. However, the Home 
Secretary's willingness soon after the ruling to question the legitimacy of human 
rights protections as a barrier to deportations may be taken to indicate a low regard 
for the role of the courts in overseeing their legality (May in Hennessy, 2011). 
Implementation 
Governmental reservations about the role of the courts in overseeing removal actions 
are indicated by the nuanced manner in which the Home Office sought to implement 
the Medical Justice ruling. Following the High Court ruling (UKHC 2010a), the 
exceptions to seventy -two hours' notice were removed from UKBA enforcement 
instructions and guidance, even although the Home Secretary subsequently appealed 
against the ruling (UKBA, 2010b). Whilst such a compliant response is arguably 
routine in cases of judicial review where the court issues an injunction, it is by no 
means always the case that government agencies comply. It is reputedly not 
uncommon for policies to continue to be applied until (and occasionally even after) 
the appeals process has concluded.2 The revised policy rendered compliance with 
Medical Justicedependent upon the discretion of case owners responsible for 
deciding whether to delay removal pending a prospect of judicial review (UKBA, 
2010b, s.41, 50). Confidence in such administrative compliance is not encouraged by 
2Personal correspondence by e -mail with Alison Harvey, Legal Director of ILPA. 
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the track record of litigation discussed above, nor by Parliamentary investigation at 
the time into whistle -blower accounts of a pervasive "culture of disbelief and 
discrimination" in UKBA's processing centres(Vaz in Taylor & Muir, 2010). Such 
concerns were echoed by the UKBA Independent Chief Inspector's investigation of 
the agency's decision making, indicating a culture of unfair and potentially unlawful 
handling of cases (2011). 
Above all, a will to minimise the impact of Medical Justice on the core policy goal of 
expediting removals was evidenced in a Home Office consultation letter proposing to 
waive the requirement of seventy -two hours' notice prior to removal, where this is 
"consented" to by the migrant (Home Office, 2012). In October 2012, the Home 
Office was still, "considering how we take policy forward in this area." It was, 
however, "keen" to resume expedited removals.3 This consultation indicates the 
continued unwillingness of UKBA to seek informed consent via the legal 
representative of the individual subject to removal. The document employed a 
language of safeguards which directly invokes the Court of Appeal's ruling in 
Medical Justice (UKCA 2011a, at 30, 34). Its recourse to discussion of safeguards 
attempts to justify governmental authority over removals in terms of fairness in the 
administration of asylum, which had been cast into doubt. The consultation has, 
however, been attacked by UKBA's partner organisations as but one of no less than 
eighty -five practices which have habitually sought to exclude the migrant's legal 
advisor from official proceedings, potentially expediting removal by encouraging 
withdrawal of existing legal challenges (Law Society, 2012). The very title of the 
letter, "Illegal migrants who wish to leave the United Kingdom, waiving their legal 
rights beforehand ", is indicative of the Home Office view on whether those 
consenting have a lawful basis to remain(ILPA, 2012, p. 2). The Home Office 
manifestly continues to believe that those subject to removal have no need of 
recourse to the courts, since they have no right to be in the UK. Whilst the 
consultation explicitly recognises the binding constraint imposed in Medical Justice, 
its implicit goal is to empower the Home Office to remove as many unwanted 
3 Personal correspondence by e -mail with an Enforcement Policy officer in the Home Office, 
Immigration and Border Policy Directorate. 
209 
foreign nationals as possible, as quickly as possible. Crucially, it proposes to do so 
lawfully - albeit by proposing changes to secondary legislation so as to redefine such 
removals as within the bounds of the law. This is a clear bid to legitimate the 
subordination of questions of legality to administrative discretion, rather than to a 
prescribed deference to legal and judicial procedures. 
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Classification and discussion of judicial impact 
Having considered key findings from critical framing analysis of primary discursive 
sources, I now wish to further develop my analysis of judicial impact in both cases 
according to the analytical typologies of response and depth of impact. Beyond the 
material changes to policies governing access to justice prior to removal, I have 
endeavoured to elicit more substantial insights into the government's deeper 
understanding of the significance of the Medical Justice and Vilvarajah to its broader 
objectives in asylum control and removal. In this section, I specify the government's 
responsein each case according to my typology of how compliance may be 
reconciled with policy objectives. I then turn to consider the level of ideas governing 
asylum control at which judicial impact can be established in each case, before 
considering whether significance may be attached to the source of the ruling, or lack 
of politicisation of compliance in these cases. 
Judicial impact in terms of the government's response 
Although nearly twenty years passed between the events surrounding Vilvarajahand 
Medical Justice, certain common themes are apparent. The government's response in 
both cases was ostensibly suggestive of regard for the institutional legitimacy of the 
judiciary. The substantive content of each ruling was implemented (or for Vilvarajah, 
anticipated) by means of compliant policy change. Yet, further attention to primary 
discursive sources through which the government responded indicates that in both 
cases, the overarching response was to diminish the disruptive effect of compliance 
on pre- existing policy goals. In both cases, governmental framing of immigration and 
asylum demonstrated a persistent will to delimit the parameters of foreign nationals' 
access to judicial review. 
Vilvarajah 
In the case of Vilvarajah, in particular, judicial impact initially seems to have been 
significant. The government responded by pre -empting the ECtHR's ruling to 
provide the first true differentiation of asylum from immigration control, in the 
legislation of a legal mechanism for in- country asylum appeals. Ministers briefly 
reflected upon sustained judicial scrutiny as a nuisance, requiring structural reforms 
to the architecture of asylum controls. However, legislative change was 
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predominantly justified by a discourse problematizing deserving / undeserving 
migrants. This led to the creation of new powers for the Home Office to class certain 
asylum applications as manifestly unfounded, abrogating appeals - leading to a two 
tier asylum system; one for those whom the executive decided should be fast tracked 
out of the country without access to the new appeals mechanism, and another for 
those whom it felt should benefit from access to it. 
Providing for an appeals mechanism sought to reduce the volume of judicial review 
of administrative decisions. However this liberalisation of asylum was subsumed 
within an illiberal framing of asylum seekers as either deserving or undeserving 
migrants. This framing prevented the Vilvarajah ruling from having any broader 
constraining impact on asylum control. In these respects, the government responded 
by `depreciating the significance' of the ruling, which was subordinated within 
broader efforts to realise restrictive immigration controls. 
Medical Justice 
As in Vilvarajah, the government's response to the Medical Justice case provides a 
clear illustration of the distinction between compliance and judicial impact. Direct 
compliance with the ruling was full and rapid, even though the initial judicial 
decision was appealed. However, the long term impact of the ruling, even on the 
question of exceptions to provision of a minimum period of notice prior to removals, 
is not clear cut. Whilst the specific exceptions ruled on by the courts were suspended, 
the Home Office continued to explore possibilities for re- enacting a caveated version 
of the policy. Moreover, the ruling on the importance of foreign nationals' access to 
justice was subsumed by rhetoric which not only positioned rights and review in 
tension with high priorities of executive expediency, but even questioned the future 
of migrants' human rights. The Medical Justice ruling, and preceding jurisprudence 
on access to legal advice and judicial oversight of detention and removal, have had 
no broader impact on cognate operational policies and practices which serve to 
restrict foreign nationals' access to legal advice prior to removal. Neither policies nor 
governmental attitudes on expedient removal and the role of judicial scrutiny have 
changed in response to Medical Justice. The minimalist reforms implemented in 
response to these cases can be considered a definitive case of containing impact: 
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implementation of the courts' direction to reconsider individual administrative 
decisions and revise particular operational protocols, without broader changes to the 
underlying policy programme. This response is also reflected by the government's 
argument to the Court of Appeal in Medical Justice, that the jurisdiction of the court 
should be limited to the legality of individual administrative decisions, rather than 
the over -arching policy regime. 
Level of Impact 
Vilvarajah 
Perhaps most remarkable about Vilvarajah and the Asylum and Immigration Appeals 
Act 1993ís their indication of the politics and law of asylum control having moved in 
opposite directions: an increasingly elaborate and specified appeals system, oriented 
around the primacy of the Geneva Convention; yet increasingly operating through 
legislative constraints which excluded large proportions of applicants from full 
access to this system. Vilvarajah impacted upon the administration of asylum by 
constraining the policy tool of automatic removal of failed applicants as a means of 
effective border control. However, the underlying programmatic logic was 
maintained; according to which asylum was governed through an executive 
balancing of asylum seekers' rights against restrictive immigration controls. 
Although challenged by the requirement to subject administration of asylum to 
oversight by a tribunal, executive discretion was ultimately enhanced, in so far as the 
Home Office was empowered to shape access to legal review of its decisions by 
deciding which claims were `unfounded.' The result was a substantial increase in the 
number of applications rejected. The public philosophy of restrictive asylum control 
was thereby sustained despite its juridification' in the form of enhanced jurisdiction 
for the tribunal and courts. The maintenance of governmental authority over 
inclusion and exclusion within the state was particularly emphasised by a discursive 
framing of asylum as requiring state intervention to prevent the undeserving from 
delaying their expedient removal in court, and by the right to expel those considered 
as lodging manifestly unfounded claims. 
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Medical Justice 
With the suspension of the regime of exceptions to provision of seventy -two hours' 
notice prior to removal, the government's policy tool was in this case constrained. 
However, the underlying logicgoverning the programme of removal clearly was not. 
The Home Office emphatically affirmed belief in its role as arbiter of a balancing act 
between expedient removal and its constraint by legal principles. Executive 
discretion over removal has not been affected, even if one of the tools through which 
it was pursued has been constrained. This discretion was further emphasised by the 
Home Office consultation on possible further exceptions to the required notice before 
removal. This sought to affirm the authority and capacity of UKBA to determine 
where and when access to legal arbitration is necessary, and posits UKBA as final 
judge of the role of justiciable rights in governing inclusion /exclusion. This is clearly 
part of an on -going programme of ensuring expedient removal; an attempt to uphold 
the philosophy of restrictive asylum control, despite judicial constraints. 
The role of politicisation and source of ruling in policy impact 
Significance of the source of the ruling 
Pre -emptive policy change in the shadow of an anticipated adverse ruling by the 
ECtHR suggests that the government regarded the supranational provenance of the 
Vilvarajah ruling to be of some significance. This may reflect concern to prevent the 
ruling from fuelling opposition politics which were newly oriented towards domestic 
incorporation of the ECHR. However, I have also sought to emphasise that 
governmental discourse framing compliant policy change indicated more explicit 
regard for rising pressure from a newly activist municipal judiciary, which had found 
jurisdiction over asylum under common law. Such self -activation of jurisdictional 
competence, and the development of constitutional rights through litigation in the 
British senior courts, was also the basis of the adverse ruling in Medical Justice. 
These cases suggest that governmental framings of immigration control which 
sought to diminish the legitimacy of legal constraints on executive discretion are 
motivated not by ostensible concerns over the role of the HRA or ECHR, but rather 
the entire system of judicial review of government actions and policies. In this 
respect, it is the intensive and consistent scrutiny of the municipal courts which 
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exerts more pressure on government than does the ECtHR. Nevertheless, it has been 
shown in this chapter that the significance of both to asylum control can be subject to 
significant discretionary framing of judicial impact in terms conducive to enhancing 
governmental discretion. 
Significance of politicisation 
Governmental responses to Vilvarajah and Medical Justice involved no notable 
politicisation of compliance. As such, they will be considered as a kind of litmus -test 
in the next chapter, in which I compare the role of politicisation and source across all 
four of my cases to consider whether they condition judicial impact on policy 
change. 
Conclusion 
In both Vilvarajah and Medical Justice, foreign nationals' right to access judicial 
safeguards against unlawful actions of the state were considered by the courts. Both 
the policy measures leading to judicial scrutiny, and the diminutive governmental 
responses with which the rulings met, suggest an intransigent unwillingness on the 
part of successive governments to accept an expansive right of access to court for 
foreign nationals in cases of removal. For the cases considered within this chapter, 
this may plausibly be considered indicative of a qualification to the universal 
applicability of constitutional and European Human rights on the grounds of 
nationality. The municipal judiciary and ECtHR have not failed to intervene on the 
legality of those governmental actions which have extended governmental claims to 
discretionary power over asylum control and removals to the point of unlawful 
behaviour. However, the administrative and political record presented in this chapter 
suggests an alarming capacity of governments to effectively contain the dissenting 
voice of the courts beneath a blanket of legislative caveats, which seek to subsume 
the content and even authority of this judicial message. Against this backdrop, a style 
of compliance with the courts has developed in which the direct letter of the law in 
judicial decisions has been largely heeded. Yet, there has been little, if any, 
discernible judicial impact on an underlying illiberal attitude towards the rights of 
foreign nationals, and a willingness to take legal risks in implementation of asylum 
determinations and removals. 
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There is certainly a paradoxical tension between increased legal- procedural 
requirements imposed on asylum control in response to the courts and parallel 
restrictions on barriers to expedient removal by government. Yet, it would be overly 
ambitious to say of the cases considered in this chapter that governance of asylum 
and removal had been constrained by the courts. As predicted by Gibney, restrictive 
policies appear to have been paradoxically driven forward by judicial affirmation of 
liberal principles. We may, however, do well to note that this illiberal spread has 




8. Comparative discussion of 
judicial impact 
Introduction 
In the preceding three empirical chapters, I have argued that judicial impact on 
policy change is best understood according to how the problem of compliance and 
broader policy change were framed within government. I sought to identify and 
understand factors which shaped governmental attitudes towards compliance with the 
courts in asylum control. Particular emphasis was placed on the importance of how 
key governmental actors perceived the ideas governing asylum control to be 
impacted by compliance; whether challenging or constraining the viability of a 
policy instrument, or more fundamentally, the governing logic or underlying public 
philosophy of asylum control. In this chapter, I further consider the role of these 
governing ideas alongside other factors which I identified in chapters two and three 
as potentially significant to understanding judicial impact on policy change and its 
governmental framing. By comparing the role of politicisation of compliance, source 
of ruling, depth of impact and response across each of the four cases, I endeavour to 
elicit a deeper understanding of how and why judicial decisions impact upon changes 
to asylum control policy. I then consider trends and themes in the nature and process 
of judicial impact on policy and its framing which have emerged across the body of 
my case studies. In doing so, I return to the puzzling tension between oppositional 
rhetoric and compliant policy change which first motivated this research, to reflect 
on the distinctive roles of political rhetoric and bureaucratic responses in negotiating 
judicial impact on policy change. 
Comparative analysis of depth of impact 
For each of the judicial decisions which I have considered, the courts engaged with 
different primary legal issues. Vilvarajah and Medical Justice concerned access to 
justice. Chahal was the only case directly concerning the boundaries of ECHR 
Article 3 as a constraint on expulsion (although Article 3 was a background factor in 
each case, due to my focus on deportation and removal). Finally, the Hijackers case 
concerned the boundaries of executive power under parliament. Although the legal 
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principles varied, there are consistencies between these cases, even simply by virtue 
of the constitutional function of judicial review of executive acts. Firstly, all of the 
cases are expressive of the right of access to justice for foreign nationals, even where 
this was not the substance of litigation. Secondly, they all concern the boundaries of 
executive discretion - whether over policy foimulation, or its implementation. In the 
governance of asylum, these principles inescapably operate in tension with each 
other. Executive discretion over expedient asylum control has often been pursued by 
imposing impediments upon foreign nationals' access to and enjoyment of certain 
rights, including access to justice. In each case I have considered, judicial impact has 
related to such a balancing of the rights of unwanted migrants and asylum seekers 
against a policy commitment to expedient expulsion or restricted presence within the 
state. However, the level of impact on such controls has varied, as indicated by the 
critical framing analysis presented in Table 2, below. 
This variation is potentially highly instructive as to how and why governments 
respond to the courts in a given manner. In particular, we may distinguish between 
responses which amplify the coercive effect of rulings, and responses which 
depreciate or contain rulings' significance for the broader governance of asylum 
controls. Having posited that understanding judicial impact depends upon 
interrogating the discursive construction of the `problem' of compliance, I now wish 
to draw comparative explanatory insights from my analysis of how this was framed 
in each case. I focus on the perceived affect these rulings had upon the governing 
philosophy and programmatic logic of asylum control; the government's capacity to 
demonstrably exercise symbolic control over the inclusion and exclusion of 
unwanted foreign nationals; balancing their human rights and access to justice 
against the execution of policy commitments. 
As the jurisprudential and political facts of each of my chosen cases have already 
been presented in the preceding empirical chapters, I will not repeat them at length 
here. Table 2 collates the key findings about judicial impact in my analytical chapters 
according to politicisation of compliance, the source of the ruling, the response from 
government, and the perceived depth of impact. Due to its particular significance in 
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the forthcoming comparison of my findings, I will, however, briefly restate my 
formulation of 'depth of impact' as a significant explanatory factor. 
Levels of impact 
These levels provide for concise articulation of how governmental discourse is 
expressive of the underlying political understandings about policy in flux. As such, 
they provide a useful conceptual vocabulary through which to discuss judicial impact 
from the perspective of government. 
Public philosophy: Restrictive asylum controls. 
The state seeks to exercise coercive controls necessary to restrict inclusion (and 
therefore enforce the exclusion) of foreign nationals, including asylum seekers. This 
is pursued in opposition to a more expansive humanitarian philosophy of asylum 
control. 
Programmatic Logic: Executive discretion. 
Demonstration of authoritative governance of inclusion and exclusion requires 
discretion to execute asylum controls. This is reflected in a governing logic of 
balancing political expediency against potential liberal constraints. The executive 
therefore seeks discretion over a balancing of inclusion /exclusion, individual /state, 
liberty /security, expediency /review. 
Policy: Deportation, removal and restrictions on rights in- country. 
These are the means through which the public philosophy and programme of asylum 
control are implemented: expulsion and other forms of coercive control of unwanted 
foreign nationals, such as placing limitations on their human rights within the 
country. Policies may also seek to limit barriers to expedient and authoritative 
governance of asylum, notably by restricting access to judicial oversight. 
Table 2: Cases according to factors of interest 
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Variation in the nature of sources 
Before proceeding to compare the outcome of judicial impact across cases, it is first 
worth noting that variation in the nature of sources available for each case is itself a 
potentially significant finding. More internal government documents were produced 
in `politicised' cases. This suggests an enhanced role for government bureaucracies 
in stabilising problem definitions through document production under contested 
political conditions. Unsurprisingly, there was also more political rhetoric in 
response to judicial decisions in such cases. 
There has also been a significant development in the nature and volume of internal 
governmental sources across the period covered by my case studies. Vilvarajah and 
Chahal were decided by the courts prior to the emphasis placed by the New Labour 
government on governmental transparency, particularly associated with the Freedom 
of Information Act 2000 which came into force in 2005. In the early 1990s, before 
this opening up of government, `consultation' ahead of proposed policy change 
consisted of circulating the already drafted policy, with a purported willingness to 
receive comments (e.g. Lord Chancellor's Department, 1992). This differs greatly 
from the extensive consultation of `stakeholders' which is now typically undertaken; 
for example, in the wake of the Medical Justice ruling. These developments reflect a 
trend towards increased justification of governmental actions both within 
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government and parliament, as well as to the public. Scrutiny by the media and 
requirements to report to the Council of Europe and JCHR on compliance have also 
increased over time, enhancing the role of documentary sources in justifying 
governmental responses to the courts. 
The nature of governmental discursive sources produced following judicial decisions 
can also be understood as a function of the perceived depth of impact upon 
governing policy ideas. Variation in the nature of discursive material produced, 
including the extent of political rhetoric, speaks to the nature of judicial impact. The 
Chahal jurisprudence produced a far greater and more extensively documented 
response in government than was the case for Vilvarajah, not simply because of 
different historical conditions of transparency in government, but also due to 
interpretation of Chahal as a profound constraint on deportation and removal policy. 
The predominance of brief, private letters from the Home Office and Ministry of 
Justice as a means of justifying the governmental response to Medical Justice speaks 
to the absence of any politicisation of implementation of the court's decision. This 
contrasts sharply with the extensive role played by detailed departmental reports 
prepared in the wake of the highly politicised Hijackers ruling. The role of 
documents in orienting and justifying governmental responses to the courts also 
depends upon the nature of the material policy changes required for compliance. For 
example, whether modification of the Immigration Rules (as in Medical Justice) or 
legislative change (as in the Hijackers case). However, the willingness of the 
executive to initiate legislative change is itself a product of the perceived impact that 
compliance with the ruling was seen to have on realisation of the governing ideas of 
asylum control. 
In a similar fashion, the function of political rhetoric is also intrinsically linked to the 
matter of politicisation, and related to not only an inferred electoral salience of policy 
issues, but the political framing of their importance. This includes the perceived 
importance of performing political authority via the media (Hajer, 2009). The rising 
importance of such a politics of spectacle is reflected by the shift in political rhetoric 
over my case studies: from the dominance of justificatory comments within 
parliament in the early 1990s as to the inconvenience of judicial scrutiny, through 
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recriminatory public statements in the mid- 2000s, and more recently, pledges to 
revise the constitutional balance of powers between parliament, the municipal 
judiciary and the ECtHR in Strasbourg. Rhetoric in response to the courts has not 
only become more resentful over time, but has turned responses to particular judicial 
decisions into a matter of policy pledges on the role of judicial scrutiny itself. 
Governmental actors have thereby not simply justified judicial impact on specific 
policy measures, but sought to justify political authority under a judicial shadow. 
Procedural versus principled rulings and politicisation 
Having considered the occasional tendency of political rhetoric to oppose judicial 
oversight of government, it could be argued that the cases I have drawn upon in this 
thesis suggest increased oversight of asylum control has been most extensive where 
judicial norms are already accepted as legitimate constraints on government: at the 
level of procedural fairness in implementation of policy. Vilvarajah and Medical 
Justice did not specify general rules for whom or under what conditions a foreign 
national could or could not be expelled. Rather, they imposed procedural 
requirements for review. In doing so, they affirmed judicial authority to scrutinise 
matters otherwise subject to executive discretion. However, despite the fixation of 
political rhetoric on the role of rights as constraints on deportation, the Hijackers 
case also concerned a procedural matter - that the executive had overstepped its 
authority in developing and applying restrictions on Leave to Remain. Moreover, 
Medical Justice also affirmed the development of a common law constitutional right 
of access to justice for foreign nationals -a potentially powerful barrier to executive 
constraints on fundamental rights and freedoms which the government's legal 
representatives sought to refute. 
Similarly, rhetorical opposition to judicial oversight (or politicisation of compliance) 
in the case of the Hijackers and Chahal saga may appear to be a product of the 
courts' invocation of constitutional law and ECHR rights at the level of the 
lawfulness of policies (as opposed to procedural requirements). These cases related 
to not merely how, but who could be expelled and when rights could be restricted - 
resulting in significant legislative change. Governmental opposition to compliance 
may reflect the comparatively recent and politically unwelcome role of the judiciary 
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as arbiter of human rights as constraints on government, and indeed its willingness to 
find significant standing for aliens in the constitution. 
However, I do not believe that the most meaningful determinant of political 
opposition to compliance with the courts is whether a decision requires procedural 
reforms or legislative change; nor whether human rights principles were invoked. 
Indeed, Vilvarajah required procedural and legislative reforms and invoked ECHR 
rights, yet did not lead to politicisation. Whilst the rulings in Vilvarajah and Medical 
Justice resulted in policies being constrained and the institution of asylum control 
being liberalised, their impact was not understood within government as a challenge 
to the governing logic or public philosophy of asylum control. It is by recourse to 
such perceived depth of impact on the ideas governing asylum control that I believe 
we may more adequately explain varying governmental responses. 
The role of governing ideas in responses for non -politicised cases 
Medical Justice 
Compliance with the Medical Justice ruling did not impinge upon a broader regime 
of executive discretion over when and how foreign nationals should be allowed 
access to legal advice prior to removal. A constitutional right of access to justice was 
affirmed by the courts, which not only precluded the policy tool of no- notice 
removals, but could be considered a potential barrier to expedient removals by 
empowering foreign nationals to seek judicial review. However, the jurisprudence 
did not constrain a broader regime of several dozens of UKBA practices which The 
Law Society regarded as indicative of a general will to impede access to timely legal 
advice. Nor has compliance with the Medical Justice ruling prevented Home Office 
consultations on potential caveats to its constraint on no- notice removals. The 
absence of a 'deeper' impact on the idea of executive discretion in governing asylum 
control is perhaps a product of the ruling being about procedural requirements of 
removal, rather than the broader discretion to initiate expulsions. However, the Home 
Office's confidence in its role as arbitrator of legitimate need for legal advice in the 
latter stages of removal proceedings indicates that even on the level of discretion 
over the procedural legitimacy of removal proceedings, there has been no great 
constraint of the governance of asylum removals. Governmental justifications of 
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changes to the Immigration Rules emphasised the authority and capacity of the 
Home Office to make decisions about the balance between expedient removal and 
access to justice. 
Vilvarajah 
On one level, the impact of Vilvarajah was to insert an enhanced judicial role in 
balancing removal against protection of the individual, through the asylum tribunal. 
However, as in the response to Medical Justice, the liberalising effects of Vilvarajah 
upon asylum control were absorbed within a broader empowerment of executive 
discretion to restrict access to appeals prior to expulsion. This was justified in terms 
of necessary discretion to differentiate between deserving and undeserving (so called, 
manifestly unfounded) applicants. Impact was effectively absorbed by the 
government's ability to discursively frame the problem of compliance in terms which 
enhanced its discretion over asylum control. For Vilvarajah, discursive justification 
of policy change emphasised the public philosophy of more restrictive outcomes in 
asylum control, empowering Home Office discretion over its expedient realisation. 
Summary 
Observation of material changes to procedural rules governing appeals and removal 
in response to these rulings might suggest judicial impact as causing increased 
concern in government over procedural legitimacy and a consequent liberalisation of 
asylum control. Yet, attention to the discursive framing of change indicates an 
intransigent affirmation of the public philosophy and governing logic of asylum 
control: the primacy of exclusion (as opposed to inclusion) and executive discretion 
to balance rights and review against its expedient execution. The policy tools - of 
automatic removal and exceptions to notice prior to removal - were constrained. 
However, the more fundamental governing ideas were not. This explains the lack of 
politicisation of compliance in these cases, and the response with which they met. It 
was possible to depreciate the significance of Vilvarajah and the institution of in- 
country appeals to effective asylum control because even although the institution of 
asylum had been further subjected to legal constraints, executive discretion was 
enhanced. It was possible to contain the impact of the Medical Justice ruling to the 
matter under review - the exceptions to notice - because the ruling was not 
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understood in government as imposing upon the broader regime of policy measures 
which could be considered attempts to prevent last -minute 'vexatious' litigation as a 
barrier to expedient removal. 
The role of governing ideas in responses for politicised cases 
In contrast, compliance with the courts in the Afghan Hijackers case, and most 
notably, Chahal was indeed framed as challenging the continued and demonstrable 
exercise of these governing ideas. In particular, the authority of the Home Office to 
balance the rights of unwanted migrants against asylum control was directly 
challenged. 
Chahal 
The tool of deportation at all costs' was immediately constrained in compliance with 
Chahal. Gradually, the underlying programmatic logic of a balancing act, according 
to which the executive prioritised security concerns and demonstrable deportation 
capacity over migrant rights, was greatly constrained by repeated judicial review 
which applied the Chahal jurisprudence, broader ECHR principles, and British 
common law principles to the implementation of policies which sought to coercively 
restrict the freedoms of foreign nationals who could not be expelled. Realisation that 
the public philosophy of asylum control was challenged by such symbolic failures 
may explain the move from acceptance to amplification. Ultimately, as the ECtHR 
rejected the government's bid in Saadi to overturn Chahal, the underlying 
philosophy of asylum control as control over inclusion and exclusion was 
constrained in cases where ECHR Article 3 issues are raised. The government often 
no longer has the practical discretion it would like over inclusion/exclusion and the 
role of certain rights as potential policy constraints. Moreover, judicial constraint of 
coercive alternatives to deportation presented a serious challenge to the executive in 
its desire for an effective and authoritative response to the policy problem of 
unwanted foreign national security suspects. 
This challenge to governmental capacity extends beyond the nexus of migration and 
security. Vilvarajah had led to a role for the adjudicator as an arbiter of whether safe 
return was allowed under domestic interpretation of international refugee law. This 
imposed a balancing act which involved comparatively minimal consideration of the 
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ECHR until its function was dramatically impacted by the requirement to consider 
and implement the Chahal jurisprudence. The constraint imposed upon asylum 
control by the tribunal had been partially diminished by restrictions on the domestic 
implementation of refugee law: a regime of 'safe countries of origin' and safe third 
countries of transit as a means of restricting access to appeals against removal from 
within the UK. For cases invoking a risk of ECHR Article 3 ill- treatment on return, 
Chahal supervened such restrictions, facilitating rights -based adjudication as a delay 
or barrier to removal. Considering Chahal alongside Vilvarajah highlights its impact 
not just in terms of judicial oversight over expulsion of security suspects, but also as 
an affirmation of the ECHR as a necessary consideration in determining the 
legitimacy of removal. By providing an extra layer of protection within the state (at 
least where there is a real risk of article 3 ill- treatment), Chahal effectively brings 
international protection back into the gap left by minimalist legislative application of 
the Refugee Convention. The role of the tribunal was shifted beyond simply 
determining whether expulsion would be lawful, to consideration of the need for 
alternative humanitarian protection within the host state, regardless of whether an 
applicant qualified under the narrow terms of the domestic incorporation of the 
Refugee Convention. 
In this respect, it is not simply in high profile cases involving failures to deport 
security suspects, but the adjudication of rights as a barrier to removal in general, 
that effective realisation of the public philosophy of asylum control has been greatly 
challenged by the impact of Chahal. Political rhetoric has not, however, reflected this 
practical restraint. Rather, in amplifying constraint, rhetoric has sought to claim the 
necessity of enhanced executive control, free from legal constraints, in order to 
exercise governmental capacity to realise the public philosophy of asylum control. 
This rhetoric has also sought to legitimate claims to executive authority by displacing 
attention from policy outputs (failures to expel unwanted foreigners) onto symbolic 
debates about constitutional balance of powers between executive, judiciary and 
ECtHR. 
Given the politicisation of long -term compliance with Chahal and associated 
amplification of its coercive effect on effective asylum control, we may perhaps infer 
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a governmental desire for a return to the more circumscribed and discretionary 
function of asylum in the past. The persistence of a governing logic of executive 
control over expedient removal is certainly demonstrated by the programme of 
exceptions to legal advice (and therefore judicial scrutiny) which has largely 
survived the Medical Justice ruling. 
Afghan Hijackers 
Beyond the direct constraint the Chahal ruling has imposed in cases involving 
prospective removal to a real risk of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
(under ECHR Art.3), the inability of the government to expel such high profile 
personae non -gratae as the Afghan Hijackers dealt a significant blow to its symbolic 
authority over asylum control in general. Compounding the constraint imposed on 
deportation by Chahal with further requirements relating to the provision of status 
and associated rights to non -deportable migrants, the Hijackers ruling seriously 
challenged the integrity of the underlying philosophy guiding asylum control. In that 
the government had pursued a de -facto excision of the Hijackers from state and 
society by denying their legal presence, the ad -hoc policy ruled ultra -vires in the 
Hijackers cases is perhaps the purest expression of the restrictive philosophy 
governing asylum. The judicial decision's inclusion of the men in the UK (both as 
legal agents despite their lack of political agency, and as deserving of recognition by 
the Home Office with precipitant economic access to welfare and employment), not 
only challenged the ad -hoc special immigration status as unlawful, but also the 
underlying programme of abrogating migrants' rights and foundational worldview 
that the Home Secretary should regulate inclusion and exclusion. 
Hard rhetoric affirming governmental will to discretion and control sought to fill this 
breach, to sustain an image of political authority required to satisfy the demands of 
the restrictive public philosophy of asylum. This goes some way to accounting for 
the emphasis in political rhetoric on deportation capacity, even where this was not a 
substantive legal fact addressed by the judicial decision. Indeed, governmental focus 
on the question of deportation capacity may have served to distract attention from the 
very direct and substantive judicial constraint of executive powers under 
constitutional principles from common law (ultra vires), rather than the HRA or 
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ECHR, which had become scapegoats for a string of government failures. To the 
extent that certain classes of deportation and removal invoking ECHR Article 3 
concerns have been constrained in practice, hard political rhetoric assuring a policy 
commitment to remove more migrants, faster, has sought to shore up claims as to the 
legitimacy, if not the integrity, of asylum controls. The constraint of executive 
discretion to innovate restrictive policies in the Hijackers rulings also goes some way 
to explaining politicisation of compliance, which may potentially even have served 
as a means of distracting public and political attention from executive abuse of 
power. The government's ad hominem response vilified the judiciary as overstepping 
its authority under parliament in just the manner which the courts had found the 
Home Office to have done. Politicisation here speaks not to the inconvenience of 
legislating for executive authority to restrict rights associated with immigration 
status, but to the unwelcome judicial challenge to executive authority and discretion. 
Politicisation of compliance as subordinate to depth of impact 
By engaging with the governing ideas impacted by judicial decisions in this manner, 
we can more adequately appreciate that their articulation in governmental 
interpretations of judicial impact is an integral factor accounting for politicisation of 
compliance. This is reflected in my analysis by discursive responses to rulings which 
sought to `amplify' the coercive effect of Chahal and the Hijackers jurisprudence as 
unwarranted constraints on the effective governance of asylum and immigration. 
Compliance in these cases could not be `contained' or diminished, due to the highly 
publicised deficit between the practical scope for asylum control, subject to judicial 
scrutiny, and political commitments to deportation, removal and control. As such, the 
coercive effect of the rulings was amplified. In doing so, the underlying commitment 
of the government to removal was therefore restated, regardless of the deficiency of 
policy outputs. 
To the extent that such hard rhetoric persists in publicly opposing judicial constraints 
on balancing foreign nationals' rights against political commitments to deportation 
and removal, it can be said that whilst the guiding public philosophy may have been 
challenged in practice, it has certainly not been constrained in political rhetoric. This 
is particularly significant in the context of the performative character of the politics 
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of asylum. In this context, the rhetorical image of control may matter more to 
political legitimacy than substantive policy outputs. Indeed, such rhetoric may serve 
to excuse or distract from sustained public, media and political attention to 
deficiencies in practice, avoiding the need to more fully justify the consistency of 
substantive asylum controls with the ideas which govern it - legitimation by means 
of a "de- coupling" of rhetoric and practice (Brunsson, 2002). Politicisation is not 
therefore a factor which can explain judicial impact, but is rather a significant facet 
of its manifestation within the negotiation and justification of policy change and 
governmental control. 
Indeed, politicisation appears to be a means through which governments have sought 
to reconcile unwelcome constraints with the continued viability of policy goals - at 
least at the level of rhetorical promises. Politicisation of compliance also appears to 
be an expression of frustration over the judicial constraint of executive discretion 
which has historically been central to the exercise of this control in practice. In 
particular, the courts have impinged upon the executive's authority over the 
legitimate balance between the individual's rights and the execution of deportation 
and removal policies as well as similarly coercive restrictions within the state. 
Ostensibly, politicisation has comprised an affirmation of executive leadership in the 
formation and execution of asylum policy, by opposing judicial interference. 
However, it also indicates that legitimation of such control has been displaced from 
practical implementation into rhetorical assertions of a will to discretion, authority 
and capacity. Recriminatory comments implying constitutional illegitimacy of 
judicial interventions have served as a rhetorical shield intended to prevent debate. 
This has constituted a reconfiguration of discursive categories in order to legitimise 
asylum controls which have ultimately proven not to be lawful. Although this is the 
political ontology proposed by theories of securitisation of migration control (Buzan 
et al., 1998, pp. 24-5), such bids for discretionary power are clearly not limited to 
security concerns. 
Source of rulings (UK and ECtHR) as subordinate to depth of impact 
It is similarly apparent that the source of the judicial decisions I have considered in 
this thesis does not appear to have any direct significance for judicial impact on 
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policy framings. Rather, the source appears significant only as it intersects with the 
depth of impact each ruling had on the ideas governing asylum control. 
Governmental discourses on compliance with the Hijackers ruling revolved around 
the perceived excessive constraints on asylum control imposed by the ECtHR in 
Chahal, despite the fact that the legal substance of the Hijackers case concerned 
common law principles on the boundaries of the executive's discretionary powers. 
The substance of the case is, however, consistent with the response in their shared 
concern over executive discretion to balance foreign nationals' rights against 
executive prerogatives. The constraint imposed by the Chahal ruling percolated into 
political understanding over a period in excess of a decade, as successive 
governments realised the extent to which practical discretion over deportation and 
alternative restrictions in- country were constrained by the British courts. In both 
cases, it was the sustained scrutiny of the municipal courts which resulted in judicial 
impact on the logic and philosophy governing asylum. This confounds any simple 
assertion that the ECtHR is uniquely significant to judicial impact. 
The impact of both Vilvarajah and Chahal involved compliance with the ECtHR by 
means of increasing the complexity and jurisdiction of domestic judicial supervision. 
In both cases, it may be argued that the government perceived this increasing 
juridification of asylum as a means of shielding asylum control from further 
unwelcome interference from the ECtHR. This suggests a profound impact of the 
ECtHR on asylum control. Yet, the counter -balancing of compliance with enhanced 
executive discretion over access to appeals following Vilvarajah cannot be neglected 
for its role in diluting any liberalisation as a consequence of the ECtHR's scrutiny of 
asylum procedures. Following Chahal, later governments' will to discretion over 
balancing foreign nationals' rights was clearly unperturbed, leading to the Saadi 
intervention as well as to substantive restrictions on a range of ECHR rights for 
certain foreign nationals. The government's rhetorical invocation of the importance 
of the integrity of domestic authority, in particular, speaks to the programmatic logic 
of asylum control. This was also reflected by the UK's intervention in the Izmir 
declaration of the Council of Europe, denouncing any role for the ECtHR as a last 
court of appeal for migrants. The government's willingness to intervene in these fora 
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suggests that it does not regard ECtHR jurisprudence as the final word on the 
lawfulness of asylum controls, and does not intend to allow the Court such authority 
in future. This is also indicated by an acceleration of political rhetoric denouncing 
the political legitimacy of supranational adjudication by the court. 
One may further question whether the supranational basis of the ECtHR leads to it 
being perceived as more significant than municipal courts by political actors. A 
defining feature of the long term impact of Chahal, was its initiation of a saga of 
legal risk taking, where restrictive policies in lieu of expulsion were trialled and 
adjusted in response to municipal judicial scrutiny. The continued exercise of an 
executive balancing of rights suggests ambivalence at best towards the legal 
principles and authority of the ECtHR expressed in Chahal. Nevertheless, sustained 
domestic judicial scrutiny in the Hijackers cases and throughout the Chahal `saga' 
was precipitated by governments' compliance with the prior constraint which Chahal 
imposed on expulsion. However, in affirming both Chahal and the ECHR's 
constraint on executive actions, it was domestic rulings which both emphasised and 
extended the ECtHR's constraint of executive discretion over asylum control. 
The ECtHR has had a significant effect on reconfigurations of asylum control in the 
UK. However, this appears to be a function of governments' desire to contain 
discretion over asylum control within the nation state by complying with the ECtHR 
through significant institutional reforms which empowered domestic scrutiny of 
controls. It has been argued that the UK's reforms to the institutional structure of 
review sought to bring about "a distinct national vision in response to the imposition 
of supranational instruments." (A. King, 2010) This may include the pre -emptive 
development of the asylum tribunal ahead of the ECtHR's ruling in Vilvarajah and 
legislation of SIAC after Chahal. Both are significant manifestations of judicial 
impact on policy change. However, these developments can also be interpreted as 
attempts to contain the impact of rising domestic judicial review by redirecting 
litigants through tribunals. Scrutiny by the ECtHR may comprise a critical juncture, 
spurring on policy change. However, it may well be the case that it is simply the 
critical mass of judicial scrutiny at the domestic level required to activate 
supranational jurisdiction as a further layer of appeal that explains such pressure for 
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reform. Significance should not be attached to political regard for constraints 
originating from the ECtHR without also attending to the importance of the 
associated empowerment of municipal review, upon which application of the 
majority of European jurisprudence depends. 
The British senior courts have exerted their own significant effect on asylum 
controls, independent of human rights principles and jurisprudence of the ECtHR. 
Whilst the impact of the Medical Justice case was largely contained within the world 
of the Border Agency and immigration law practitioners, it is significant that judicial 
constraint derived not from the ECHR or jurisprudence of the European Court, but 
from the British judiciary's finding of a constitutional right of access to courts for 
foreign nationals in common law. The capacity of the domestic courts to upset 
governmental policy objectives is clearly indicated by the Hijackers case, which also 
drew authority over the lawfulness of executive actions from common law. The 
ruling directly challenged Home Office authority over foreign nationals' status 
within the UK. However, it was the constraint imposed on deportation by Chahal, 
that political rhetoric engaged with following the ruling. 
Despite political debate which is anxious of the ECtHR, sustained domestic judicial 
scrutiny appears to be highly significant. In this respect, I agree with Christian 
Joppke (2001) that municipal review can be particularly significant in accounting for 
`constraint' of illiberal immigration and asylum controls. Yet, in providing an 
updated account of its function in the UK context, I disagree with Joppke's claim that 
the British municipal courts have had little impact on asylum control (1998c, 1999). 
This is particularly due to the British judiciary's proven ability to challenge the 
governing logic of executive discretion over asylum control. However, the power of 
much domestic review has also resided in its sustained application of European 
human rights principles (Jacobson, 1997), challenging the government's ability to 
contain the impact of rulings by building sustained pressure for policy change - as 
demonstrated over the course of the Chahal saga. This stands in distinct contrast to 
the handling of the Medical Justice ruling, which did not invoke European Rights 
and was effectively `contained' despite pressure for reform from a significant body 
of jurisprudence. Nevertheless, primary significance should not be attached to the 
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rise of human rights principles, but instead to the rise of the municipal judiciary as a 
sustained interlocutor with the government's asylum controls - both in terms of 
constitutional principles and human rights law. 
Why and when amplification vs containment? 
I began my comparative consideration of cases by suggesting that it is necessary to 
consider why political actors may wilfully amplify the coercive effect of some 
rulings yet seek to diminish or contain the impact of others. This is to ask when and 
why government seeks to keep judicial impact quiet and when it makes a fuss about 
it. In my foregoing discussion, I suggested that divergent responses can be 
understood according to the level of generality of governing ideas which are 
interpreted within government as at stake in compliance with a ruling. On this basis, 
more may be said about the tension between containment and amplification as 
characteristic of the political negotiation of judicial impact. 
As a strategy for managing the disruptive effect of judicial impact on policy 
governance, containment is characterised by a quiet probing of the parameters of 
constraint, primarily by administrative actors responsible for the justification of 
minor, incremental policy change by means of documents, such as reports to 
parliamentary committees and letters to stakeholders. Depreciation of significance is 
similar, but endeavours to justify more substantive changes to policy. In contrast, 
amplification typically involves rhetorical denunciation of constraint; it expresses a 
vision of judicial impact as a dialectic process, where the clash between pre- existing 
policy ideas and the interpretation of judicial decisions is productive of policy 
change. In proceeding, I will pay particular attention to containment and 
amplification, as contrasting responses. 
By drawing insights from the Chahal saga of sustained review of policy alternatives 
to outright deportation, we may infer that amplification of the constraint imposed by 
Chahal in the Saadi intervention came to pass where containment of domestic 
judicial constraints on policy alternatives was no longer considered viable. The saga 
was comprised by government taking a series of legal risks: a series of policy 
innovations which restricted the rights and freedoms of foreign nationals were 
legislated under the shadow of highly probable judicial scrutiny of their lawfulness. 
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It appears highly likely that where opportunities for containment or legal risk taking 
are exhausted, unavailable, or undesirable as a means of sustaining the viability of 
asylum controls in the face of judicial pressure for reform, justification of the 
coherence of such policy goals will be sought by amplification of the coercive 
constraint imposed upon them by the courts. In the cases reviewed in this thesis, such 
amplification has occurred where the courts have succeeded in challenging the 
lawfulness of not only policy tools such as deportation, detention, or restrictions on 
rights and freedoms, but the more fundamental executive discretion over 
determination and restriction of such rights as constraints on asylum control. 
Amplification as discursive dissonance in action 
In these cases, opposition politics and media attention tended to focus on the lack of 
governmental control or authority. However, governments also willingly amplified 
the coercive impact of rulings as a strategy for dealing with policy incoherence 
caused by judicial decisions. Governmental actors cannot disavow the constitutional 
and procedural constraints imposed by the rule of law, including regard for judicial 
review. However, the substantive articulation of law and judicial authority in certain 
rulings produces some degree of discomfort in government. Such responses (ranging 
from `disappointment' to recrimination) are not necessarily intended to question the 
legitimacy of the judiciary or of legal principles, such as human rights, per se, but 
rather the particular manner in which judicial scrutiny and its interpretation of rights 
are expressed as constraints on the executive or its policies. In this regard, 
amplification of the coercive effect of rulings seeks to both recognise that judicial 
decisions are lamentably binding, yet emphatically restate continued commitment to 
prior policy goals. As such, amplification exemplifies dissonance in action: an 
attempt to justify coherence between adherence to the rule of law and refusal to 
accept this as requiring modification of beliefs or actions. From this dissonance 
perspective, rhetoric serves not merely as a policy instrument, intended to reframe 
the continued viability of existing policy programmes. It also serves as an assertion 
of the political authority and legitimacy of the governmental actors responsible for 
the policy programme. 
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Theoretical contribution of the dissonance approach to judicial impact 
The tension between judicial and political ideas as to the legitimate governance of 
asylum has been one of the central concerns of this thesis. Indeed, I believe that 
attention to this dynamic is fundamental to explaining how government responds to 
the courts to not only mediate judicial impact on policy change but also to legitimate 
political authority in the face of legal challenges. Engagement with governmental 
responses to the courts as a manifestation of discursive dissonance informed the basis 
of my analytical typologies, by recourse to which I have sought to account for 
varying governmental responses to the courts. As such, I held that it is the particular 
manner in which governmental actors interpreted judicial decisions as constraints on 
policy ideas that explains governmental responses. Governmental actors are not 
intrinsically opposed to judicial scrutiny, the rule of law or human rights, just its 
occasional inconvenience to the realisation of highly symbolic political 
commitments. Yet these dual concerns - over particular policy objectives as well as 
the rule of law - are not always compatible when faced with an adverse judicial 
decision. Unease is caused by dissonance, which is manifest in discursive processes 
of interpretation and justification of judicial impact and policy change intended to 
reconcile compliance with pre- existing ideas about the governance of asylum. 
Adoption of this approach has allowed for investigation of the process and reasoning 
behind the otherwise paradoxical tension between parallel legal -liberalisation of 
asylum procedures, yet increasingly restrictive and coercive policies for asylum 
control (Gibney & Hansen, 2003). Dominant theories of the impact of law on politics 
have missed this correlative politicisation of legal constraint. Processes through 
which political actors reconcile unwelcome judicial power within policy governance 
should be a necessary consideration when considering the possibilities of a 
judicialization of politics (Hirschl, 2008b; Stone Sweet, 2000). My attention to 
judicial impact as a function of political interpretation and reconciliation of 
dissonance in policy discourses shows that judicialization of asylum control and 
politicisation of both asylum and judicial scrutiny are not inconsistent or 
incompatible. They are two sides of the same coin. Tensions between these outcomes 
have been shown to be the subject of governmental efforts to either amplify or 
contain the effects of judicial decisions on governing ideas. 
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Correspondence between amplification and containment 
Although containment and amplification are both manifestations of this process of 
judicial impact in terms of governmental efforts to reconcile dissonance, 
amplification has proven to be particularly dominant in political rhetoric. Moreover, 
my analysis indicates that the amplification of constraint in such public statements 
often fails to reflect substantive legal -procedural constraints imposed on the policies 
and practices of asylum control. 
Although a radically different strategy for reconciling the disruptive effects of 
judicial impact on policy, containment of compliance is the natural administrative 
product and parallel of this rhetorical politics. It is an exercise of the discretion which 
such rhetorical politics has sought to affirm and legitimate. It allows for management 
of pressure for change, and limits the need to send disruptive legal signals further up 
the political ladder for consideration of compliance by the cabinet or in parliament. 
At root, this comprises a rejection of new interpretive frames from outside the 
administration of asylum control (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Containment and 
amplification therefore comprise complementary strategies for sustaining the 
resilience of policy goals in the face of judicial pressure. 
By engaging with containment and amplification as dissonance strategies, it is 
possible to understand how depth of impact can account for variation in judicial 
impact. The more fundamental the ideas governing asylum control that are 
challenged by compliance with a judicial decision, the more extensive will be the 
role of discursive dissonance in governmental efforts to reconcile the coherence of 
policy goals and authority of political actors responsible for them. Conflicting 
judicial and governmental accounts of asylum control must be reconciled to prevent 
dissonance - the appearance of inconsistency between beliefs and actions. In this 
respect, whilst I initially posited politicisation of compliance as a potential 
intervening factor in determining the impact of court rulings on legitimation of 
policy change, it can also be understood as an indicator of judicial impact upon these 
more fundamental governing ideas. It is expressive of the discursive strategy of 
amplification of impact pursued in seeking to reconcile dissonance. In such cases, 
policy incoherence is blamed on the courts. Ran Hirschl (2008a) has hypothesised 
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that political actors are increasingly willing to blame courts for making unwelcome 
decisions, so as to avoid the electoral consequences of accepting governmental 
responsibility for unpopular policy choices. Yet, the phenomenon I am describing 
here is markedly different. Amplification of the courts' coercive effect upon the 
governance of asylum comprises a bid for more political authority and discretion to 
make policy choices, not less. 
The administration of asylum control policies has been `juridified' (Blichner & 
Molander, 2008) in so much as greater legal constraints have been imposed on their 
function. This is particularly manifest in material policy changes which recognised 
and enhanced judicial scrutiny in Vilvarajah, Chahal, and Medical Justice. It is also 
apparent at the level of governmental discourse which recognised judicial 
constraints, even if indicating they were unwelcome. However, this has not conferred 
an associated judicalization' of justificatory political discourse in terms of referents 
borrowed from the courts, in the sense that Alec Stone Sweet (2000) has suggested 
may serve strategic political goals of legitimating policies under conditions of 
extensive judicial scrutiny. Whilst judicial power has been recognised, there has been 
a political contestation over the ceding of final authority to the courts. Where faced 
with a judicial decision which challenged a particular policy or administrative action, 
politicians and bureaucrats have behaved as we might expect - seeking to justify 
their authority and capacity to govern effectively. In the cases I have considered, this 
has comprised a discourse of fundamental political discretion and authority, even 
where ideas concerning rights based constraints and judicial power were invoked (for 
example, in Saadi). As such, to the extent that judicial and legal norms and discourse 
have been co -opted in government discourse and the courts have been successful in 
`reining in' certain illiberal aspects of the governance of asylum, this cannot be 
regarded as a judicialization of politics. 
The distinctive role of rhetoric in performing asylum control 
Having outlined the tensions between and coherence of amplification and 
containment as complementary governmental strategies for dealing with judicial 
impact, I now wish to give further consideration to the striking divergence between 
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internal governmental discourse and political rhetoric which has been indicated in 
my case studies. 
Whereas there appears to have long been an acceptance within government 
bureaucracies that judicial review must be internalised as a consideration in policy 
making (Treasury Solicitors, 2006), political rhetoric has been markedly intransigent 
in rejecting judicial decisions as unwelcome and even invalid sources for government 
policy. This rhetoric has sought to sustain the integrity of the ideas governing asylum 
control in the face of judicial challenges. In this respect, legitimation of the 
government's capacity to implement restrictive controls in line with the governing 
philosophy of asylum control has often been displaced from practical implementation 
into the area of political rhetoric. 
Judicial oversight has dispersed authority for the administration of asylum and 
removal decisions from what was once a near exclusive preserve of the Home 
Secretary's discretion. The result has been a hollowing out of executive discretion 
over deportations and removals, as well as constraint of the freestanding authority of 
administrative actions, policy instructions, and even legislative provisions, in the face 
of judicial scrutiny of their consistency with the requirements of procedural justice 
and human rights principles. The vacuum left at the core of executive power to 
control asylum and migration through expulsion, is perhaps being filled by hard 
rhetoric. Such rhetoric is performative in the sense that discourse is constitutive of 
problems, interventions and intervening actors, but also in the sense that the very 
rhetorical act itself performs a function - it bids for authority in an attempt to 
convince its audience of the competence and capacity of the speaker. Such rhetoric 
may therefore be understood as seeking to fill the authority gap left by the enduring 
inability of successive governments to confidently ensure realisation of the intended 
outcome of executive orders and even policies on deportation and removal, in the 
face of their scrutiny by the judiciary. 
The apparent sincerity of consistent pledges to control asylum and expulsions is of at 
least as much significance as manifest failures to follow through in practice. For 
example, Blair's "tipping point target" (Blair, 2004) of removing a few tens of 
thousands of failed applicants for asylum was of great symbolic significance. On one 
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level, this comprised a genuine effort to improve `outputs' in the governance of 
asylum, arguably making it an exceptional moment in the politics of immigration and 
asylum in the UK (Boswell, 2014). However, this measure was also clearly intended 
to legitimate political authority over asylum in the face of enduring scandals over its 
inefficient administration giving rise to several hundreds of thousands of cases in 
which the Border Agency had failed to execute removal proceedings (Home Affairs 
Committee, 2011). Political rhetoric has served the ends of symbolic politics. It has 
been largely detached from other actions taken in response to the courts, in serving 
an "ever present underlying objective" of life in government: "to reassure the 
populace and reassert control... to market its competence; to manage the appearance 
of rule." (Rhodes, 2011, p. 276) However, for asylum control, this has not comprised 
a willingness to negotiate policies with stakeholders outside of the executive 
government (cf. Rhodes, 1997). In particular, the input of the judiciary has been 
minimised. Rather, rhetoric has served as an attempt to perform the authority of the 
state. 
Consideration of the government's response to the courts in this thesis suggests that 
the politics of asylum control have been displaced into politics as performance of the 
authoritative governance of asylum (Hajer, 2009). Governmental rhetoric has sought 
to displace attention from capacity to realise substantive policy outputs into a 
rhetorical image, or spectacle, of political will to control. This rhetorical performance 
seeks to manage public and political expectations about future policy trajectories. It 
is fundamentally a bid for acceptance of the sincerity of governmental actors in order 
to legitimate enhancement of their discretion. As such, it emphasises emotions, 
beliefs and intentions. This is not a matter of political performance in terms of 
service delivery or efficient realisation of policy outcomes. It is a politics of 
performance in terms of appearances; the objective is to appear in control. In this 
function of government, it is more important to appear credible and trustworthy than 
to claim legal legitimacy or efficacy. In this regard, asylum and immigration are not 
truly `valence' issues, as has been claimed of British politics in the late 2000s (H. D. 
Clarke, Sanders, Stewart, & Whiteley, 2009). No government has realistically been 
able to legitimate itself in terms of actual policy outputs. Even the increase in 
removals in response to Blair's target setting exercise did little to convince the public 
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that the government was in control of asylum (Spencer, 2007, p. 360) or to address 
seemingly insurmountable backlogs. It was by rhetorical gestures of sincerity that 
public confidence in political capacity was solicited, rather than by demonstrating 
actual competence. 
Government ministers and the Home Office have sought to legitimate discretionary 
power over asylum according to a public philosophy of restrictive controls, which 
persists, even if it is irrational or implausible in light of manifest failures of political 
control in practice, over not only recent years, but decades (Boswell, 2007a, pp. 603- 
4; Brunsson, 1985). Such rhetoric is an expression of the identity of the polity, in 
terms of what it values (Yanow, 1996, p. 22), validating beliefs about the importance 
of asylum control, and therefore the status attached to government in this role. Whilst 
a network of documents within government have guided and constituted stable 
conceptual categories of meaning and political order as part of processes of policy 
change, political rhetoric has served symbolic politics, managing the threat posed to 
the stability, coherence and acceptance of government by events such as judicial 
review. In many cases, governmental documents may be read as retrospective 
exercises in justification of the substantive trajectories of policies implied by such a 
politics of spectacle. 
In cases of amplification of judicial impact, leadership has been positioned by 
opposition to a judicial `enemy' as justification for enhanced political authority 
(Edelman, 1988, p. 88). Just as the myth of rationality is central to viable 
organisational function (Putnam & Mumby, 1993), the mythology of control is 
central to the legitimacy of the state as arbiter of asylum. This rhetorical legitimation 
seeks to cope with judicial scrutiny by seeking to maintain and coordinate an 
appearance of rule by opposition. It does not strategically plan rational policy 
responses to social and political problems. Arguably, as a public reification of the 
symbolic identity of the state, this phenomenon may serve as a mask which obscures 
scrutiny of underlying political practices (Abrams, 2006, pp. 125 -6; Brunsson, 2002) 
which have failed to control asylum. In particular, we may note rising political 
rhetoric on the legitimate role of the judiciary and supranational human rights has 
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displaced substantive concerns over lawful and efficacious government into a 
symbolic constitutional question which is open ended. 
Performance of authority may account for stasis of ideas governing asylum 
Political rhetoric on asylum control has been remarkably consistent over a period of 
twenty -five to thirty years. Similarly, policies have consistently been developed in 
order to sustain the underlying public philosophy and programmatic logic of asylum 
control. Governments have been uniformly restrictive in their interpretation of 
asylum, and consistently declared a vision to enact firm controls. Speaking of similar 
tendencies in law and order, Loic Wacquant has characterised performance of 
authoritative governance as a pornographic spectacle which tends towards 
predictable re- enactment: 
rampant gesticulation over law and order is conceived and carried out not so 
much for its own sake as for the express purpose of being exhibited and seen, 
scrutinised, ogled: the absolute priority is to put on a spectacle, in the literal 
sense of the term. For this, words and deeds proclaiming to fight... disorders 
must be methodically orchestrated, exaggerated, dramatized, even ritualized. 
This explains why, much like the staged carnal entanglements that fill 
pornographic movies, they are extraordinarily repetitive, mechanical, 
uniform, and therefore eminently predictable. (Wacquant, 2009, pp. xi -xii, 
emphasis in original) 
Although I have not set out to study it as such, it is plausible to conceive of the 
political rhetoric of asylum control in the manner Wacquant describes: a repetitive 
and ritualised performance of the spectacle of authoritative governance; its 
predictable words and deeds proclaim the will to fight; they exaggerate and fetishize 
asylum as the object of necessary governmental intervention to enforce its just 
administration. Such ritual performance of governmental authority may explain why 
so little has changed in the fundamental trajectory of restrictive asylum controls and 
its illiberal political framing, despite the incorporation of a significant, conflicting 
judicial perspective within its governance. 
On the possible limits of this symbolic politics 
The scope for political actors to pursue symbolic politics may be limited to policy 
domains where governments are less likely to be held to account in terms of visible 
indicators or observable failures to deliver on promises (Boswell, 2012). Yet, the 
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examples of judicial impact considered in this thesis have indicated that even in the 
case of manifest failures by successive governments to demonstrate control over 
asylum control and removals, the role of political legitimation through symbolic 
rhetoric has been enhanced, not diminished. Nevertheless, the divergence of the 
rhetoric and practice of asylum presents a serious problem for government, and its 
reconciliation may not be possible. 
Governments have tended to pursue adjustments to existing policies by taking legal 
risks which seek to minimise judicial impact (containing compliance). I have 
suggested that this strategy for maintaining maximal executive discretion is a 
complement to political rhetoric which promises state capacity. Yet, in practice, this 
capacity and authority have become increasingly hollowed out. Indeed symbolic 
rhetoric may explain why asylum has become so politicised. In turn, legal risk taking 
may explain why the UK government is subject to such frequent and extensive 
judicial scrutiny of the lawfulness of its administration and policies in asylum 
control. In practice, some significant governing activity has been dispersed to the 
municipal and supranational courts. 
A similar dispersal of political power has been observed as a consequence of 
migration of decision making powers due to Europeanisation. This has been 
considered more disruptive to `simple' polities such as the UK, which are used to a 
tradition of highly concentrated centralised authority. We may note that a similar 
such tradition in asylum control has been challenged by the courts. The observation 
of Europeanists here may be insightful. Vivien Schmidt (2006) has argued that states 
have faced `problems' with dispersal of power not simply where governing practices 
have changed, but where governing ideas and discourse have not - in other words, 
where the ideas and discourse governing a policy regime have diverged from the 
reality of its governance. Centralised political discretion under a crown prerogative 
over asylum control has certainly been challenged by the rise of human rights and 
judicial oversight as constraints on its execution. Yet, despite the capacity of the 
UK's strong central government to communicate an altered vision of the ideas which 
increasingly govern asylum as a function of rights and constitutional principles of 
procedural justice under judicial scrutiny, successive regimes have chosen not to. 
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The practical administration of asylum has changed over the past thirty years into an 
institution which is subject to a uniquely high degree of judicial oversight. Yet 
governmental discourse communicating policies for asylum to the public has not 
changed to reflect this. This rhetoric reflects a retrograde desire to hold onto the 
relics of a traditional political discretion and crown prerogative which are 
increasingly being eroded in the courts. This rhetoric does not seem sustainable, due 
to its increasing divergence from the practice of asylum control under judicial 
scrutiny. Arguably, the recriminatory tone of rhetoric on the role of the courts 
reflects this tension. 
Conclusion 
Attention to the processes of interpretation and justification through which judicial 
impact is exercised within governance of asylum policy provides valuable insights 
into policy making as a process which is contingent, recursive, and a hybrid of law 
and politics. Judicial rulings clearly require political implementation, and policy 
making clearly includes input from the courts. This realisation engenders two 
significant advances to our understanding of not only asylum control measures, but 
also the constitutional relationship between judicial and political branches of 
government in this area: firstly, that judicial power has a constitutive influence over 
and within asylum policy and its associated politics; secondly, that despite frequent 
academic assumptions that the politics of asylum is characterised by increasing 
exercise of extra -legal discretion to diminish its protections for refugees (as noted in 
my introduction), I have identified evidence of extensive political articulation and 
justification of asylum controls within and according to a constraining legal 
framework. 
Nevertheless, whilst it is indeed the case that governance of asylum in the UK has 
laboured under a judicial shadow (cf. Joppke, 1999), this has not precluded legal risk 
taking in asylum control and efforts to `contain' the impact of individual rulings 
(Conant, 2002). The empirical detail of judicial impact on policy change uncovered 
in my case studies suggests that the stability and legitimacy of government in this 
area are highly tenuous and often contingent upon minor, incremental shifts in policy 
structure. Also notable, is the apparent disjuncture between the rhetoric and practice 
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of asylum control and deportation. Despite significant and variegated jurisprudence 
imposing constraints on deportation and removal, in line with constitutional 
principles of procedural justice and provisions derived from the European 
Convention on Human Rights, this constraint is not reflected in political rhetoric 
promising authoritative control over asylum, deportation and removal. This can be 
explained by recourse to my typological analyses. Where it has not been possible to 
contain judicial impact on the governing logic and philosophy of asylum control, 
occasionally emotive and recriminatory political rhetoric has sought to shore up the 
plausibility of not only political commitments to asylum control, but also political 
authority over them. Authoritative governance of asylum has increasingly come to be 
perfouued by means of political rhetoric which seeks to uphold credible intentions to 
control, as opposed to substantive control over asylum and deportation in practice. 
This explains the apparent empirical paradox which first motivated this research: that 
of hard rhetoric against judicial decisions, yet compliance in practice. Rhetoric has 
served both to make up for an apparent lack of governmental capacity due to 
growing constraints, and also to legitimate greater discretion to exercise authoritative 
controls. 
By identifying the role of governing ideas at stake' in governmental framings of 
judicial impact, I have argued that it is possible to account for varying political 
responses to the courts, including politicisation of compliance. Where impact is 
framed as more general, politicisation of compliance follows. In contrast, the source 
of the ruling appears to have no independent significance to responses, although the 
domestic courts have had a particularly important role in sustaining judicial scrutiny 
of asylum control. As such, judicial impact on the governing ideas of a policy 
domain is presented as a vital consideration for future research. 
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9. Conclusion 
This thesis has argued that judicial impact on policy change is best understood 
according to how the problem of compliance and reform are framed within 
government. I sought to identify and understand factors which shape governmental 
attitudes towards compliance with the courts in asylum control. Particular emphasis 
was placed on the importance of how key governmental actors perceive the ideas 
governing asylum control to be impacted by judicial decisions; whether challenging 
or constraining the viability of a policy instrument, or more fundamentally, the 
governing logic or underlying public philosophy of asylum control. In this manner, I 
have argued that judicial impact on asylum control policy has been discernible in the 
UK over the past twenty -five years. The courts have imposed significant procedural 
and rights based requirements upon government in this area. However, I have also 
shown that governments have exercised significant discretion in their interpretation 
and implementation of judicial rulings, resulting in variation in policy change and its 
framing. An adequate understanding of the impact of judicial decisions therefore 
requires attention to how legal requirements are reconciled with broader policy 
objectives and how this relationship develops over time. Judicial impact is not a 
definitive phenomenon, but a fluid political construct which may change over time, 
subject to developments in the politics and administration of asylum control. 
My research analysed a period of British political history which involved particular 
controversy over the role of the judiciary in reviewing immigration, asylum and 
national security controls. I have challenged assumptions that the politics of asylum 
control during this period were primarily motivated by concerns over national 
security. Rather, underlying symbolic concerns over sovereign capacity to control 
inclusion and exclusion of foreign nationals and associated governing ideas explain 
much about the UK's recent and historic asylum control policies and their political 
framing. Although political debate in the UK is still concerned with questions of 
rights, judicial review and expulsion, there has been a marked shift in recent years 
away from asylum control towards broader concerns over net migration. The politics 
of judicial review have also shifted - following not only governmental priorities in 
immigration control, but also sustained controversy over the future of domestic and 
245 
European human rights in British public life. In particular, the role of rights as 
guarantors of fair and just treatment of not only foreign nationals, but as general 
constraints on government, appears very much in question. With these concerns in 
mind, this concluding chapter builds upon my previous consideration of judicial 
impact on asylum control policy to offer some brief reflections on what my research 
offers to future analysis of judicial impact on politics and policy change. Firstly, I 
discuss implications for understanding of judicial impact in the UK. I then tentatively 
offer limited normative reflections based on the findings of my research. Finally, I 
draw out broader implications for future research. 
Judicial impact in the UK 
My focus on the single case of the UK was informed by the need for contextually 
specific approaches to the study of policy change (as discussed in chapters 2 - 4). 
This necessarily limits the generalizability of my conclusions. Bounded insights may, 
however, be drawn from this research. I have endeavoured to elicit comparative 
tensions and consistencies which characterised the politics and administration of 
asylum control in the context of rising judicial scrutiny since its inception as a 
distinct institution of government in the early 1990s. This has allowed for insights to 
be drawn into governance of this politically controversial policy domain which move 
beyond a reductive dichotomy between exceptional political discretion on the one 
hand, and its constraint under a judicial shadow, on the other. I hope that this will 
facilitate a less partisan approach to analysis of judicial impact, which is less inclined 
to cast either the executive or judiciary as to blame for retrograde politics. This 
tendency is unfortunately somewhat characteristic of some debates over the 
normative desirability of judicial power - or political constitutionalism versus legal 
constitutionalism (Bellamy, 2007). 
My central argument has been that judicial impact is fundamentally political. Even in 
cases which demonstrate a strong judicial assertion of authority over the legitimacy 
of policies and their implementation, subsequent political interpretation and 
enactment have imposed variation in the outcomes of judicial impact. In my 
comparative analysis, I have demonstrated that such judicial impact can be nuanced, 
variable and unstable over time. More than this, certain key themes have emerged 
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from my analysis. In particular, tensions between governmental responses which 
contain the impact of unwelcome rulings and those which amplify the coercive effect 
of rulings. 
The current politics of judicial review 
Governmental responses which amplify the perceived coercive effect of judicial 
decisions are certainly not unique to the governance of asylum control. Indeed, they 
are a highly visible attribute of a rising brand of visceral and emotive `gesture 
politics,' which has been highly prominent in government discourse on human rights 
and judicial scrutiny in the UK in recent years. The current Prime Minister has 
variously declared himself to be "uneasy ", "appalled" and "physically sick" in 
response to recent unwelcome rulings of the British judiciary (in BBC News Online, 
2011; HC Deb (16 Feb) 2011, c.955; Kirkup, 2011). The Conservative -led coalition's 
plans, since 2012, to implement significant cuts to both the scope of judicial review 
and opportunities to access it are also highly significant. In my introduction to the 
thesis, I contested the accuracy of much recent commentary on the seemingly low 
success rate and significance of applications for judicial review. Yet this does not 
detract from governmental claims that the majority of a growing volume of 
applications for review are "ill- conceived ", "have no chances of success" and impose 
unnecessary costs and delays upon government (PM and Justice Secretary, in 
Bowcott, 2012). In his argument for "cutting back on judicial reviews ", David 
Cameron invoked the rhetorical image of a "revolution" in government during World 
War Two (Cameron, 2012b). His so called "war" on judicial review was 
subsequently reviled by legal practitioners (Jowell, 2012; Wagner, 2012). Yet, under 
parliamentary sovereignty, there is nothing unlawful about the government seeking 
approval from the legislature to curb judicial supervision by "clipping the courts' 
wings" (Elliot, 2012). 
In light of this development of an increasingly oppositional governmental attitude 
towards procedural and human rights and their application by the judiciary, I will 
now tentatively offer some important normative reflections arising from the findings 
of this thesis. I will then return to the matter of how my research may inform future 
research. 
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Normative reflections on the politics of judicial impact and asylum 
control 
It would perhaps be irresponsible of me to have argued at length in this thesis that 
judicial decisions' meaning and impact on government are open to interpretation 
without offering some suggestions as to the normative implications of this for 
governance of asylum and the rule of law. I have endeavoured to have regard for the 
right of the executive in the constitution, and of the state in international law, to 
control borders and determine whom should be granted asylum, international 
protection, or Leave to Remain. As noted, the executive has the right to seek 
parliamentary approval for restrictions on the effect of not only particular judicial 
decisions, but even the jurisdiction of the courts. However, it cannot be ignored that a 
startling extent of the administrative actions and policy measures reviewed by the 
courts and considered in this thesis were not only unlawful, but involved gross abuse 
of power by the Home Office. This is not just my judgement, but that of the courts. 
Reflections on the governance of asylum in the UK 
Asylum control stands as a powerful example of how successive governments have 
treated the most disadvantaged individuals under their jurisdiction. Over the past 
thirty years, British governments have subordinated the welfare, human rights, and 
even prospects of survival, of many such foreign nationals. Moreover, analysis of the 
reasoning and justifications for such policies and actions suggests that they were 
pursued for reasons of political expediency and often motivated more by concerns 
over electoral or organisational legitimacy than legitimate or lawful asylum control. 
My findings on the practice and governing ideas of asylum control also suggest the 
importance of a reconfiguration of powers in its governance. The Home Office, 
UKBA and its predecessors have shown themselves to be enduringly inefficient, 
ineffective and unfair in their administration of asylum controls. This is reflected 
statistically, in the high proportion of initial decisions overturned; in the content of 
particular judicial decisions; and by the government's response to many judicial 
decisions. An apparent lack of control over asylum has characterised successive 
governments' efforts spanning at least thirty years: a lack of control, both in terms of 
failures to realise stated objectives on expediting removals, and in terms of 
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procedural fairness and lawful administration. During this time, asylum and 
immigration more broadly have developed into a highly symbolic issue of state 
authority and capacity to govern. This has been to the detriment of both effective 
asylum control, and the welfare of a great number of refugees. In my analysis of 
judicial impact on asylum control, I have argued that governmental desires to 
demonstrate control have often motivated more restrictive policies and minimalist 
application of legal principles. It may seem extreme to suggest that governments 
appear to have been driven by an apparent fear of losing control of powers over 
foreign nationals entirely. Yet, in recent years, more extensive lack of effective 
control over the processing and treatment of asylum seekers in Greece led to a loss of 
international confidence in state capacity and to the government conceding authority 
over reforms to the policy regime to academics, NGOs and the UNHCR (UNHCR, 
2009). It may be said that it is just such a transfer of authority over governance of 
asylum to the courts, which successive governments have wrestled against in the UK 
over the past twenty -five years. 
Fundamentally, asylum control should be a matter of humanitarian protection, and 
therefore inclusive refugee policies. Restrictions on the rights of asylum seekers 
should be a last resort, and should not detract from respect for the principle of 
humanitarianism (Gibney, 2004, p. 254). Removal of Home Office responsibility for 
asylum control may bring an end to the unfortunate structural conflation between 
immigration and asylum, and may facilitate changes to its discursive associations in 
the political, public and media imagination. To this end, administration of asylum 
may be better managed by an agency independent of government, which represents 
not only governmental interests, but also views of the UNHCR, Refugee Council, 
and judiciary. 
Reflections on the role of constitutional review 
A striking feature of my case studies is the importance of sustained judicial scrutiny 
to reversing egregiously unlawful decisions and effecting (albeit limited) policy 
change. In contrast, governmental responses to reports of the JCHR on compliance 
with human rights principles and judicial decisions appear to float between dismissal 
and lip -service. On the basis of my research into the construction and justification of 
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asylum control policies, the importance of enhanced constitutional review of the 
lawfulness of government policies must be emphasised. This would be best served by 
means of constitutional preview. Otherwise, retroactive scrutiny of government 
actions' lawfulness risks remedying bad policy or maladministration only after 
irreversible harm has been done to individuals. To the extent that profound political 
opposition exists to enhancing the role of the courts in this regard, pre -legislative 
abstract constitutional preview could be enacted within parliament, as in Sweden and 
Finland, for example (Bull, 2011; Husa, 2011). This would, however, require strong 
powers beyond those currently held by the JCHR, to either quash policy measures or 
to require a parliamentary vote on their continued effect. 
Future directions for research 
As indicated above, the importance of further study of the courts' impact on 
government is only overshadowed by the greater need for investigation of the 
politicisation of law and judicial scrutiny which has arisen in response. Whilst the 
generalizability of my findings is necessarily limited, they suggest the need for 
further research which compares the causes of divergent responses to the courts in 
government along the axis of containment and amplification. To this end, I believe 
that my approach based in interpretive policy analysis of the practice of discursive 
problematisation in government offers much potential as a method. 
Methodological contributions 
Governmental actors are often unwilling or indeed not permitted to talk about the 
role of legal interpretation and advice in their deliberations on policy change. 
Moreover, I have argued that political responses to the courts may be fundamentally 
subject to a form of rhetorical dissonance, which suggests that we cannot ignore the 
role of interpretation in government in a vain hope to ascertain an empirical truth 
about judicial impact. As such, my deconstructive approach to the subjective 
construction and justification of policy meaning in government offers much potential 
as both a feasible and instructive means of engaging with this problem. In the case of 
research on less politically controversial policy areas for which governmental 
bureaucracies are more open to academic collaboration, a greater diversity of 
documentary sources may be obtainable as indicators of the drivers of policy change 
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and compliance with courts. In such cases, my approach to documents and rhetoric 
may also be enhanced by interview accounts. These would be no less amenable to 
analysis of discursive problematisation. Where such enhanced access to 
governmental sources is possible, it may be desirable to pursue a stronger 
comparative assessment of the role and significance of differing sources than was 
possible in this thesis. 
I have also endeavoured to show the importance of going beyond mere recording of 
material changes to the structure of policies (such as legislation and operational 
guidelines) to interrogate how these have been articulated, and ascribed significance 
by discursive sources in government. Attention to the framing of policy change in 
this manner offers much potential for contribution to broader literature on the role of 
interpretation in government and of ideas in policy change. I present this approach as 
a plausible means of accounting for varying responses to the courts. In particular, my 
use of a modified version of Vivien Schmidt's (2008) typology of governing ideas 
which underpin a policy regime may comprise an effective means of interrogating 
and explaining variation in judicial impact on government. The contextual specificity 
of such a tool as an expression of a particular policy domain does, however, limit its 
practical use to qualitatively detailed studies such as employed in this thesis. 
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Further empirical investigation 
Interpretive analysis of policy and politics 
In chapter 8, I offered reflections on how my research has advanced theoretical 
analysis of judicial impact. Here, I would like to offer some reflections on how my 
research may inform further empirical investigations. By attending to judicial impact 
as the product of political interpretations of meaning in action, my research 
contributes to existing debates in interpretive policy analysis, particularly on policy 
change as a discursive problem (Baachi, 2009; Hajer & Laws, 2008; Schmidt, 2008; 
D. Stone, 2002; Verloo & Lombardo, 2007; Verloo, 2005; Wagenaar, 2011; Zittoun, 
2009). This has been made possible by use of critical framing analysis to look at 
policy change as a process which constructs problems by defining them as objects for 
political intervention. 
In particular, I agree with Maarten Hajer (2009) on the importance of political 
analysis which attends to government as an exercise in legitimation through 
performance of symbolic authority. This requires that we move beyond attempts to 
measure the substantive outputs of policy as a criterion for evaluation of the 
character or efficacy of policy processes and governmental behaviour. Symbolic 
politics may be at least as important as material actions to policy processes and their 
communication and coordination by government. The scope for political actors to 
pursue symbolic politics may be limited to policy domains where governments are 
less likely to be held to account in terms of visible indicators or observable failures to 
deliver on promises (Boswell, 2012). Yet, my research on judicial impact has 
indicated that even in the case of manifest failures by successive governments to 
demonstrate control over asylum control and removals, the role of political 
legitimation through symbolic rhetoric has been enhanced, not diminished. This 
phenomenon deserves further investigation, preferably in a comparative context 
which may facilitate analysis of potentially varying political interpretations and 
justifications of factors motivating symbolic politics as opposed to outcome oriented 
government. My observation of tensions between amplification and containment of 
judicial impact is one example of such analysis. 
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Migration studies on judicial impact 
By way of contribution to debates in migration studies on whether courts constrain 
illiberal policies, I have offered a detailed account of how and why governments 
respond to judicial decisions which may be regarded as constraints. I have argued for 
the necessity of such an account of how and why governments implement judicial 
decisions as part of immigration and asylum control. Attending to political context 
and policy processes is certainly a promising avenue for explaining otherwise 
paradoxical tendencies in government: for instance, the gap between promised 
controls and implementation; or the tension between liberal judicial principles and 
illiberal asylum controls. Whilst my investigation of the UK case study suggests the 
need to update previous assessments of the extent of judicial impact on immigration 
and asylum control - if for no other reason than their age - this task would not be 
simple if it were to be applied to multiple jurisdictions. This is due to the importance 
of contextually specific sensitivity to the historical, political and organisational 
imperatives which govern policy processes and their political framing. Nevertheless, 
I have suggested that further research should attend more to such variations within 
government, than to variation in the constitutional powers of differing polities as a 
predictor of judicial impact on immigration control. 
Conclusion 
It is by no means possible to declare that there has been a straightforward judicial 
constraint of illiberal asylum controls in the UK. Nor would it be accurate to suggest 
that governments have succeeded in freeing themselves from the constraint of legal 
principles derived from judicial review. Yet, there is clear evidence of a complex and 
significant judicial impact on changes to asylum control policy and its governmental 
framing. Even though brokered by government, much of this impact has been 
politically unwelcome. My overview of governmental responses to judicial scrutiny 
of asylum controls suggests that despite consistent political attempts to decrease the 
courts' jurisdiction and influence, it is likely to continue to grow. Meanwhile, 
inflammatory tensions between governmental discretion and judicial scrutiny have 
become a matter of public interest. I began this thesis by observing concerns that 
such conflict may comprise "a potentially fatal fault line in the constitution" 
(Cavendish, 2006, p. 21). Growing political animosity towards the judiciary in the 
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UK and in Strasbourg, and their application of not only human rights principles, but 
UK common law, suggests an impending critical juncture in the role of law in 
government. One of the central messages of this thesis is that the causes of this 
constitutional conflict can be attributed not only to the role of rights and specific 
policy issues, such as asylum control, but to the fundamental challenge to 
authoritative governance which the courts represent. This symbolic performance of 
government under a judicial shadow and its politicisation of law are therefore 
pressing concerns for further enquiry. 
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Appendix 1: Tables of statistics on 
asylum, deportation and judicial 
review 
Figure 1: Applications and decisions on international protection for the 




















1984 2,905 .. 1,431 347 24% 42% 175 
1985 4,389 .. 2,635 502 19% 27% 201 
1986 4,266 .. 2,983 533 18% 14% 164 
1987 4,256 .. 2,432 635 26% 15% 200 
1988 3,998 .. 2,702 496 18% 28% 281 
1989 11,640 .. 6,955 890 13% 36% 350 
1990 26,205 .. 4,025 705 18% 28% 370 
1991 44,840 .. 6,075 3,380 56% 19% 745 
1992 24,605 .. 34,900 18,465 53% 7% 1,540 
1993 22,370 .. 23,405 10,690 46% 13% 1,925 
1994 32,831 .. 20,988 16,501 79% 18% 2,391 
1995 43,963 .. 27,006 21,301 79% 23% 2,564 
1996 29,642 .. 38,962 31,669 81% 31% 2,926 
1997 32,502 .. 36,044 28,944 80% 56% 2,065 
1998 46,014 .. 31,571 22,316 71% 58% 1,469 
1999 71,158 .. 33,722 11,024 33% 76% 732 
2000 80,315 .. 109,206 75,679 69% 47% 1,721 
2001 71,027 65% 120,949 89,308 74% 36% 2,399 
2002 84,132 68% 83,540 55,132 66% 29% 1,492 
2003 49,407 72% 64,941 53,867 83% 35% 1,837 
2004 33,960 78% 46,021 40,463 88% 28% 2,204 
2005 25,712 84% 27,393 22,654 83% 41% 2,546 
2006 23,608 85% 20,930 16,458 79% 48% 1,779 
2007 23,431 84% 21,775 16,032 74% 62% 1,230 
2008 25,932 90% 19,398 13,505 70% 63% 2,742 
2009 24,487 92% 24,287 17,545 72% 62% 3,345 
2010 17,916 90% 20,261 15,066 74% 67% 2,891 
2011 19,865 88% 17,380 11,731 67% 76% 2,419 
2012 21,843 88% 16,774 10,715 64% 85% 2,142 
2013 23,507 88% 17,647 11,105 63% 88% 2,411 
.. Not available 
* Protection under the Refugee Convention, as opposed to other statuses. 
Source: Home Office Immigration Statistics (2014). 
255 





























42,667 14,913 11,743 3,170 35% 30% 9,68; 
2005 25,200 15,685 11,381 4,304 62% 54% 9,42" 
2006 18,237 18,280 10,881 7,399 100% 100% 8,49 
2007 17,262 13,705 8,047 5,658 79% 69% 9,72: 
2008 16,247 12,874 7,169 5,705 79% 68% 10,07 
2009 20,890 11,636 6,432 5,204 56% 41% 8,82( 
2010 17,957 10,394 6,174 4,220 58% 45% 8 68 
2011 14,150 10,077 5,774 4,303 71 % 59% 9,28 
2012 12,857 9,031 5,068 3,963 70% 57% 9,57E 
2013 13,516 8,660 4,671 3,989 64% 49% $ 38( 
*Total refusals plus total withdrawals (see figure 1). 
** Based on potential removals (asylum) minus voluntary departures (asylum). 

















1987 1529 697 46% 
1988 1229 359 29% 
1989 1580 419 27% 
1990 2129 569 27% 
1991 2089 506 24% 
1992 2439 544 22% 
1993 2886 668 23% 
1994 3208 935 29% 
1995 3604 1220 34% 
1996 3901 1748 45% 
1997 3848 1929 50% 
1998 4539 2518 55% 
1999 4959 2769 56% 
2000 4247 2120 50% 
2001 4752 2421 51% 
2002 5377 3286 61% 
2003 5949 3848 65% 
2004 4208 2221 53% 
2005 5382 3149 59% 
2006 6485 4084 63% 
2007 6690 4344 65% 
2008 7169 4643 65% 
2009 9097 6660 73% 
2010 10548 8122 77% 
2011 11200 8649 77% 
Source: (Hood & Dixon, 2012b) 
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Figure 4: Success rate of judicial review applications to the High Court 
Area Year 
Apps 
Apps Apps Apps dropped 
received granted refused conceded 
% Apps 
% Apps % Apps Dropped 





or settled Settled by court 
Allowed* 
Immigration / 2006 4,084 278 1,743 2,063 7% 43% 51% 38 14% 
Asylum 
Total 2006 6,458 752 2,638 3,068 12% 41% 48% 131 17% 
Immigration / 2007 4,344 310 2,306 1,728 ' . 4 S' . 20 6% 
Asylum 
Total 2007 6,690 847 3,269 2,574 ' . ' . :' 162 19% 
Immigration / 
Asylum 
2008 4,643 353 2,677 1,613 :' . :' . ' . 46 13% 
Total 2008 7,169 914 3,886 2,369 ' , ' . ' . 199 22% 
Immigration / 2009 6,660 344 2,501 3,815 5% 38% 57% 52 15% 
Asylum 
Total 2009 9,097 862 3,610 4,625 9% 40% 51% 192 22% 
Immigration / 2010 8,122 613 3,967 3,542 8% 49% 44% 61 10% 
Asylum 
Total 2010 10,548 1,100 5,185 4,263 10% 49% 40% 194 18% 
Immigration / 2011 8,649 607 4,604 3,438 7% 53% 40% 54 9% 
Asylum 
Total 2011 11,200 1,220 6,391 3,589 11% 57% 32% 174 14% 
* Of those cases granted permission for review. 
(Based on Hood & Dixon, 2012b) 
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1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 
I mmigration All Other Areas 
Source: (Hood & Dixon, 2012a) 
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Appendix 2: "Super -text Template" 
for Critical Frame Analysis 
The context of each document and example of political rhetoric was recorded, in terms 
of its relationship with other documents, rhetoric, processes of review by the courts and 
parliamentary committees, and policy making in government. The following specific 
questions were then asked of each example of a governmental document or political 
rhetoric, to elicit how it contributed to a definition and response to the problem of 
judicial impact on asylum policy. 
I. Problem Diagnosis 
What is represented as the problem? 
Why is it seen as a problem? 
What is seen as the cause and effect? 
What categories, mechanisms, norms or symbols are invoked? 
2. Diagnosis of Roles 
Who is seen to have caused the problem? 
Who's responsibility is the problem? 
Normative groupings - is there a problem group? 
Active /passive roles (perpetrators /victims) 
Legitimation of non -problems 
3. Prognosis 
What to do? 
Hierarchy, /priority of goals 
How to achieve goals (strategy /means /instruments) 
What categories, mechanisms, norms or symbols are invoked? 
4. Prognosis & Roles 
Who should /should not do what? 
Who has a voice in suggesting possible actions? 
Who is acted upon? 
Legitimation of non -action. 
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5. Normativity 
What is seen as good/bad? 
How /where do norms function in the text (diagnosis /prognosis /elsewhere)? 
6. Balance 
Emphasis on different dimensions /elements (e.g. more prognostic...) 
Frictions or contradictions within dimensions /elements. 
Based on Verloo (2005). 
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